POLITICAL SCIENCE/SOCIOLOGY

MODERNIZATION AND POSTA

Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies

RONALD INGLEHART

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"This latest book by Ronald Inglehart represents another path-breaking advance in his three-decade-long exploration of cultural change in contemporary societies. Few scholars are as adept as Inglehart in weaving together a broad vision of historical change and a fine-grained analysis of survey results into a coherent account of how the world is changing around us."

—Robert D. Putnam, author of *Making Democracy Work*

Ronald Inglehart argues that economic development, cultural change, and political change go together in coherent and even, to some extent, predictable patterns. This is a controversial claim. It implies that some trajectories of socioeconomic change are more likely than others—and consequently that certain changes are foreseeable. Once a society has embarked on industrialization, for example, a whole syndrome of related changes—from mass mobilization to diminishing differences in gender roles—is likely to appear.

But industrialization is not the end of history. Advanced industrial society embraces yet another set of values, de-emphasizing the instrumental rationality that characterized industrial society. Postmodern values then bring new societal changes, including democratic political institutions and the decline of state socialist regimes. To demonstrate the powerful links between belief systems and political and socioeconomic variables, this book draws on the World Values Surveys, a unique database that looks at the impact of mass publics on political and social life. It provides information from societies representing 70 percent of the world's population—from societies with per capita incomes as low as $300 per year to those with per capita incomes one hundred times greater and from long-established democracies with market economies to authoritarian states.

Ronald Inglehart is Professor of Political Science and Program Director at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. Among his books are *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* and *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, both published by Princeton University Press.

"Inglehart's new book analyzes the most encompassing dataset on political values and orientations ever collected, in order to assess cultural theories of political and economic change. His well-understood (and subtly reinterpreted) version of modernization theory will draw throngs of critics, as did Inglehart's previous works. But he provides clinchin[illegible] development that even his toughest critics cann[illegible]

— *Science, Duke University*

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CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES

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Culture is resistant to change, partly because people tend to believe whatever their society's institutions teach them. But one's worldview is also influenced by one's firsthand experience—and if the two are in conflict, one's firsthand experience may have even greater credibility than what one is told. This is one reason why political systems, even totalitarian ones, have limited ability to reshape their culture. People are sensitive to those aspects of reality that directly affect them. This was crucial in the shift toward Postmodern values. The younger birth cohorts in advanced industrial societies perceived, during their formative years, that survival was *not* precarious and that they could take it more or less for granted. This experience was profoundly different from the conditions that have shaped most people's lives throughout most of history. It led to pervasive changes in worldviews. For these birth cohorts, maximizing their economic gains no longer maximized their subjective well-being as it had for earlier generations.

People did not consciously set out to change their worldviews. New outlooks and new modes of behavior, like random mutations, arose for a variety of reasons—and some of them spread. Even within a given birth cohort, many continued to accept the established norms of industrial society; but others took on new orientations and transmitted them to some of their peers through social learning processes. Change has been uneven. But the new lifestyles have spread gradually—and in the last analysis, they have done so because they represent more effective ways to maximize survival and subjective well-being under new conditions. At a much earlier stage of history, new norms linked with the rise of modern society (such as the Protestant Ethic) gradually spread in somewhat similar fashion. We lack detailed information on how this took place, but it seems to have occurred more slowly than the rise of Postmodern values, which in some ways represents its reversal. In both cases, culture was gradually reshaped by changes in the socioeconomic environment; and these cultural changes eventually produced feedback that helped reshape political and economic life.

Postmodernization is a shift in survival strategies. It moves from maximizing economic growth to maximizing survival and well-being through lifestyle changes. Once industrialization had become possible, Modernization focused on rapid economic growth as the best way of maximizing survival and well-being. But no strategy is optimal for all times. Modernization was dramatically successful in raising life expectancies, but it has begun to produce diminishing returns in advanced industrial societies. Emphasizing competition, it reduces the risk of starvation, but increases psychological stress. With the transition from Modernization to Postmodernization, the trajectory of change has shifted from maximizing economic growth to maximizing the quality of life.

CHAPTER 3

Modernization and Postmodernization in 43 Societies

Introduction

As we have seen, Modernization theory falls into two main schools: (1) a Marxist version, which claims that economics, politics, and culture are closely linked because economic development determines the political and cultural characteristics of a society, and (2) a Weberian version, which claims that culture shapes economic and political life. Despite an enduring debate between the two schools, they agree on one crucial point: that socioeconomic change follows coherent and relatively predictable patterns. This means that key social, political, and economic characteristics are not randomly related; they tend to be closely linked so that by knowing one such trait, one can predict the presence of other key traits with much better than random success.

Cultural relativists, on the other hand, claimed that it would be ethnocentric not to believe that all cultures are equally conducive to economic development and democracy. And dependency theorists viewed a given society's culture as irrelevant to economic development and democracy, which were determined by the forces of global capitalism. Both of these views imply that the relationships between culture and economics and politics are more or less random.

This chapter presents a broad overview of a huge body of data from more than 40 societies. It demonstrates that, far from being randomly related, specific cultural, economic, and political variables are closely correlated. Although this chapter does not attempt to demonstrate whether causality flows in the Marxist or the Weberian direction, the linkages we find indicate that at least one version of Modernization theory was right. Subsequent chapters will probe more deeply into the causal linkages.

Although we find strong support for the central claim of Modernization theory, we disagree with it on several narrower points—above all, the notion that socioeconomic change is linear. Instead, we find evidence that a major change of direction occurs when societies reach an advanced level of industrial development. The Modernization phase involves the familiar syndrome of industrialization, occupational specialization, bureaucratization, centralization, rising educational levels, and beliefs and values that support high rates of economic growth; but among advanced industrial societies, a second syndrome of cultural and institutional changes emerges in which economic growth becomes less central, and there is rising emphasis on the quality of life and democratic political institutions.

Cross-sectional Evidence of Change over Time

This chapter will undertake something that verges on heresy: we will examine hypotheses about changes over time in the light of cross-sectional evidence. This procedure has been criticized (quite appropriately) in the past: taken by itself, cross-sectional evidence is an uncertain indicator of change. There is no substitute for time series data if one hopes to draw firm conclusions about social change. In keeping with this idea, much of this book is devoted to analyzing time series data concerning sociocultural change.

Nevertheless, we are convinced that the World Values surveys can usefully supplement the available time series evidence, providing additional insight on patterns of cultural change. Global cross-national data are needed because the available survey data on this topic are largely drawn from advanced industrial societies and limited to the past few decades. The World Values survey provides a much broader range of variation than has ever before been available, bringing together data from 43 nations throughout the world, covering the full range of economic and political variation.

If we had survey data covering the entire period from the early nineteenth century to the present we could analyze the interplay between changing cultural values and economic and political Modernization over many decades. We could then determine which came first, cultural change or economic or political change. But such data are not available. The analysis of cross-sectional data offers the nearest substitute. Examining the orientations of people in poor societies gives some sense of what prevailing mass orientations in today's rich democracies may have been like when these countries were poor and predemocratic.

Conversely, comparing the worldviews of rich and poor countries provides some idea of how the outlook of the publics of poorer countries may change if their societies become industrialized and economically secure. We do not view these changes as deterministic: economic and technological changes interact with political, cultural, and other variables. The cultural heritage of a given society may facilitate or retard Modernization; and determined leaders can repress or accelerate social change. Nevertheless, as we will demonstrate, it is possible to identify a specific syndrome of cultural values and beliefs that is likely to be present, if urbanization, industrialization, higher education, and other components of Modernization become widespread.

Inkeles and Smith (1974) suggested that this should be true, but their conclusion was based on a comparison of the belief systems of those working within the "modern" and premodern sectors of six developing societies, and it did not compare societies at various levels of development. This analysis, for the first time, demonstrates the existence of fundamentally different worldviews between the publics of preindustrial and industrial societies, confirming Inkeles and Smith's insight. But our analysis goes a step farther: it also analyzes the cultural differences between societies of scarcity (both preindustrial and early industrial) and economically affluent "Postmodern" societies.

Modernization and Postmodernization in Cross-sectional Perspective

The concepts of both Modernization and Postmodernization are based on two key assumptions:

1. Various cultural elements tend to go together in coherent patterns. For example, do societies that place relatively strong emphasis on religion also tend to favor large families (or respect for authority or other distinctive attitudes)? If each culture goes its own way, elements such as these would be uncorrelated, and one would find no consistent patterns of constraint.

2. Coherent cultural patterns exist, *and* they are linked with economic and technological development. For example, industrialization was accompanied by secularization in Western history. But some observers argue that, since some Islamic countries such as Iran and Libya have grown rich without secularization, there is no linkage between economic development and secularization. This argument ignores the fact that Modernization is not just the possession of large oil deposits: it is a syndrome of cultural, economic, and technological changes closely linked with industrialization—a syndrome that Iran and Libya have not experienced, and which *does* tend to be linked with secularization.

Together, these two postulates imply that some patterns are more probable than others—and hence, that development is to some extent predictable. *Is* economic development linked with coherent cultural patterns, distinct from those found in less developed societies? If so, then cross-national surveys should reveal clear patterns, with one syndrome of orientations being found in economically developed societies, and another syndrome being found in less developed societies. If such patterns are found, the evidence would support Modernization theory. Furthermore, it would imply that sociopolitical change has an element of predictability.

Do coherent cultural patterns exist, and are they linked with levels of economic development? To answer this question, we will analyze the World Values survey data on key values and beliefs among representative national samples of publics around the world. This survey was designed to test the hypothesis that economic development leads to specific changes in mass values and belief systems—which in turn produce feedback, leading to changes in the economic and political systems of these societies. We do not assume that *all* elements of culture will change, leading to a uniform global culture: we see no reason to expect that the Chinese will stop using chopsticks in the foreseeable future, or that Brazilians will learn to polka. But certain cultural and political changes *do* seem to be logically linked with the dynamics of a core syndrome of Modernization, involving urbanization, industrialization, economic development, occupational specialization, and the spread of mass literacy.

Change is not linear in any system subject to feedback. This complicates our analysis. If the process of economic-cultural-political change moved smoothly in one continuous direction, a cross section of the world's societies would

show a simple developmental progression of cultural changes as one moved from the least developed to the economically most developed societies. Analogously, a cross section of the earth's surface sometimes reveals neatly ordered geological layers, with the oldest stratum of rock lowest and the newer strata located above the older ones. But reality is not this simple: social change produces feedback, which eventually changes the direction of change. Thus, we are likely to find patterns similar to those produced by tectonic upheavals, in which identifiable geological layers are shifted and juxtaposed with other strata. The result is not chaos, but neither is it a simple layering from oldest to newest strata.

We suggest that we will find the residue of two major waves of change (along with many lesser ones) mirrored in the World Values survey's cross section of the world's cultures: the distribution of these cultural traits reflects the processes of Modernization and Postmodernization, respectively.

The literature on Modernization focuses on the first of these two processes. It argues (correctly, we believe) that a broad syndrome of changes has been linked with modern economic development. These changes include urbanization, industrialization, occupational specialization, mass formal education, development of mass media, secularization, individuation, the rise of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial motivations, bureaucratization, the mass production assembly line, and the emergence of the modern state. The material core of this process is industrialization; and though the industrial revolution originated in the West, this process is not inherently Western and should not be confused with Westernization. Although there are arguments about what the "real" driving force is behind this syndrome, there is widespread agreement that these changes include technological, economic, cultural, and political components.

Religion and Economic Growth

We propose a modified interpretation of Weber's thesis concerning the role of the Protestant Ethic in economic development. Weber was correct in arguing that the rise of Protestantism was a crucial event in modernizing Europe. But this was not due to factors unique to Protestantism—it has been argued that everything Weber ascribed to Puritanism might equally well be ascribed to Judaism (Sombart, 1913). European Judaism had an outlook that was in some ways modern, but it could not transform Europe because it held a marginal position there. The crucial impact of Protestantism was due to the fact that it supplanted a set of religious norms that are common to most preindustrial societies, and which inhibit economic achievement; and it replaced them with norms favorable to economic achievement.

Because they experience little or no economic growth, preindustrial economies are zero-sum systems: upward social mobility can only come at someone else's expense. In any preindustrial society that has endured for some time, the cultural system is likely to have adapted accordingly: social status is hereditary rather than achieved, and the culture encourages [illegible] their social position in this life, emphasizing that meek acceptance and denial of worldly aspirations will be rewarded in the next life. Aspirations toward social mobility are sternly repressed. Such value systems help to maintain social solidarity and discourage economic accumulation in a variety of ways, ranging from norms of sharing and charity, to the norms of noblesse oblige, to the potlatch and similar institutions in which one attains prestige by recklessly giving away one's worldly goods.

For Weber, the central element in the rise of modernity was the movement away from traditional religious authority to secular rational-legal authority: a shift from ascriptive status to impersonal, achievement-based roles, and a shift of power from society to state. Traditional value systems must be shattered in order for modern economic development to take place. In a society undergoing rapid economic expansion, social mobility is acceptable, even a virtue. But in hunting and gathering or agrarian societies, the main basis of production—land—is a fixed quantity, and social mobility can only occur if an individual or group seizes the lands of another. To preserve social peace, virtually all traditional cultures discourage upward social mobility and the accumulation of wealth. They help to integrate society by providing a rationale that legitimates the established social order, in which social status is hereditary; but these cultures also inculcate norms of sharing, charity, and other obligations that help mitigate the harshness of a subsistence economy.

The Confucian system was an exception in one important respect. Although (like virtually all traditional cultures) it inculcated the duty to be satisfied with one's station in life and to respect authority, it did permit social mobility based on individual achievement, through the Confucian examination system. Moreover, it did not justify meek acceptance of one's lot in this world, by stressing the infinitely greater rewards that this would bring in the next world. It was based on a secular worldview: if one were to rise, one would do so in this world or not at all.

On the whole, however, the traditional value systems of agrarian society (China included) are adapted to maintaining a stable balance in unchanging societies. Accordingly, they tend to discourage social change in general and accumulative entrepreneurial motivation in particular, which is stigmatized and relegated to pariah groups if tolerated at all. Economic accumulation is characterized as ignoble greed. To facilitate the economic accumulation needed to launch industrialization, these cultural inhibitions must be relaxed.

In Western society, the Protestant Reformation helped break the grip of the medieval Christian worldview on a significant part of Europe. It did not do this by itself. The emergence of scientific inquiry had already begun to undermine this worldview. But Weber's emphasis on the role of Protestantism captures an important part of reality. Prior to the Reformation, Southern Europe was economically more advanced than Northern Europe. During the three centuries after the Reformation, capitalism emerged—mainly in Protestant countries, and among the Protestant minorities in Catholic countries. Within this cultural

context, economic accumulation was no longer despised. Quite the contrary, it was highly respected because it was taken as evidence of divine favor: those whom God had chosen, he made rich.

Protestant Europe manifested a subsequent economic dynamism that was extraordinary, moving it far ahead of Catholic Europe. Shifting trade patterns, declining food production in Southern Europe, and other factors also contributed to this shift, but the evidence suggests that cultural factors played a major role. Throughout the first 150 years of the Industrial Revolution, industrial development took place almost entirely within the Protestant regions of Europe, and the Protestant portions of the New World. This began to change only during the second half of the twentieth century, when those regions that had been most strongly influenced by the Protestant Ethic—and had become economically secure—began to deemphasize economic growth. As we will argue, they did so precisely *because* they had become economically secure. At the same time, an entrepreneurial outlook had emerged in Catholic Europe and (even more strikingly) in East Asia, both of which are now showing higher rates of economic growth than Protestant Europe. The concept of the Protestant Ethic is outdated if we take it to mean something that can only exist in Protestant countries. But Weber's more general concept that culture influences economic growth is a crucial insight.

Modernization: The Shift from Religious Authority to State Authority

Secularization is inherently linked with Modernization. This holds true despite frequent assertions that a rapid growth of fundamentalist religion is taking place throughout the world. This interpretation reflects a misconception of what is happening, generalizing from two very different phenomena. The apparent rise of religious fundamentalism reflects two disparate elements:

1. Advanced industrial societies in North America, Western Europe, and East Asia, traditional forms of religion have been, *and still are*, declining, as we will demonstrate. During the past 40 years, church attendance rates have been falling and adherence to traditional norms concerning divorce, abortion, suicide, single parenthood, and homosexuality have been eroding—and continue to erode. Resurgent fundamentalist activism has indeed been dramatic: gay bashing and the bombing of abortion centers have received widespread coverage in the mass media, encouraging the perception that these actions have a rapidly growing constituency. They do not. Instead, precisely because fundamentalists correctly perceive that many of their central norms are rapidly eroding, they have been galvanized into unprecedented activism. But this reflects the rearguard action of a dwindling segment of the population, not the wave of the future.

2. Islamic fundamentalism, on the other hand, does have a growing mass constituency. But it is growing in societies that have *not* modernized: though some of these societies are rich, they have not become rich by moving along the Modernization trajectory of industrialization, occupational specialization, rising educational levels, and so on, but simply by virtue of the fact that they have large oil revenues. Even without modernizing, it is possible to become rich if one possesses large petroleum reserves that can be sold to industrialized countries, enabling traditional elites to buy the external trappings of Modernization.

The possession of this wealth is important: it has enabled oil-rich fundamentalist regimes to obtain such things as automobiles, air conditioning, modern medical treatment for elites, and, above all, modern weapons: without them, the fundamentalist regimes would be perceived as militarily weak and technologically backward—and their mass appeal and prospects for survival would be far weaker.

Modernization involves more than the shift away from cultural traditions (usually based on religious norms) that emphasize ascribed status and sharing, toward placing a positive value on achievement and accumulation. For Weber, the key to Modernization was the shift from a religion-oriented worldview to a rational-legal worldview. There were two key components of Modernization.

1. *Secularization.* Weber emphasized the *cognitive* roots of secularization. For him, the rise of the scientific worldview was the crucial factor that led to the decline of the sacred/prerational elements of religious faith. We suggest that, more recently, the rise of a sense of *security* among mass publics of advanced welfare states has been an equally important factor in the decline of traditional religious orientations. This difference in emphasis has important implications. The cognitive interpretation implies that secularization is inevitable: scientific knowledge can diffuse across national boundaries rapidly, and its spread is more or less irreversible. By contrast, the rise of a sense of security among mass publics takes place only after a society has successfully industrialized; and it can be reversed to some extent by rapid change or economic decline. Thus although scientific knowledge has been permeating throughout the world for many decades, religious fanaticism continues to flourish in societies that are still in the early stages of industrialization; and fundamentalist movements continue to emerge among the less secure strata of even the most advanced industrial societies, especially during times of stress.

2. *Bureaucratization.* The process of secularization paved the way for another key component of Modernization, Bureaucratization, the rise of "rational" organizations, based on rules designed to move efficiently toward explicit goals, and with recruitment based on impersonal goal-oriented achievement standards. A prerequisiite for bureaucratization was the erosion of the belief systems supporting ascriptive traditional authority and zero-sum economies; and their replacement by achievement-oriented, rational, and scientifically oriented belief systems that supported the authority of large, centralized bureaucratic states geared to facilitating economic growth. The core of cultural Modernization was the shift from traditional (usually religious) authority to rational-legal authority.

Along with this went a shift of prestige and socioeconomic functions away from the key institutions of traditional society—the family and the church—to the state, and a shift in economic activity from the small family enterprise to mass production that was state-regulated or even state-owned. Globally, it was a shift of prestige and power from society to state.

During the modernizing phase of history, it seemed (to Marxists and non-Marxists alike) that the direction of social evolution was toward the increasing subordination of the individual to a Leviathan state having superhuman powers. The state would become an omnipotent and benevolent entity, replacing God in a secular world. And for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the dominant trend (the wave of the future, as it was sometimes called) was a shift from societal authority toward state authority, manifested in the apparently inexorable growth of the economic, political, and social role of government. Even non-Marxist thinkers such as Schumpeter (1947) reluctantly considered the triumph of socialism to be inevitable. And until recently, even such mainstream figures as Lindblom (1977) thought that the only question was whether socialism would triumph over capitalism, or whether capitalism and socialism would continue to coexist. The possibility that socialism might give way to capitalism was not even entertained.

The Postmodern Shift

The socialist leviathan-state *was* the logical culmination of the Modernization process, but it did not turn out to be the wave of the future. Instead, the expansion of the bureaucratic state eventually approached a set of natural limits, and change began to move in a new direction. Figure 3.1 illustrates what happened. From the Industrial Revolution until well into the second half of the twentieth century, industrial society underwent Modernization. This process transformed political and cultural systems from traditional regimes legitimated by religious belief systems to rational-legal states legitimated by their claim to maximize the welfare of their people through scientific expertise. It was a transfer of authority from family and religious institutions to political institutions.

Within the last 25 years, a major change in the direction of change has occurred that might be called the Postmodern shift. Its origins are rooted in the economic miracles that occurred first in Western Europe and North America, and later in East Asia and now in Southeast Asia. Coupled with the safety net of the modern welfare state, this has produced unprecedentedly high levels of economic security, giving rise to a cultural feedback that is having a major impact on both the economic and political systems of advanced industrial societies. This new trajectory shifts authority away from *both* religion and the state to the individual, with an increasing focus on individual concerns such as friends and leisure. Postmodernization deemphasizes all kinds of authority,



Figure 3.1. The shift from Modernization to Postmodernization: changing emphasis on key aspects of life.

whether religious or secular, allowing much wider range for individual autonomy in the pursuit of individual subjective well-being.

The core function of culture in traditional society was to maintain social cohesion and stability in a steady-state economy. Norms of sharing were crucial to survival in an environment where there was no social security bureau and no unemployment benefits: in bad times, one's survival depended on how strongly the norms of sharing were inculcated.

The importance of these norms is almost certain to be underestimated by anyone brought up in an individualistic society. In relatively traditional societies such as Nigeria, even today people feel a strong obligation to help take care of not only their immediate family, but their brothers, sisters, cousins, nieces, nephews, and old friends and neighbors. These norms are highly functional in traditional societies: they enable people to survive who would otherwise starve. In industrial societies, this sense of obligation has eroded almost to the point of extinction.

The core project of Modernization is economic growth, and the means to attain it is through industrialization—the systematic application of technology

TABLE 3.1
Traditional, Modern, and Postmodern Society: Societal Goals and Individual Values

	Traditional	*Modern*	*Postmodern*
Core Societal Project	Survival in a steady-state economy	Maximize economic growth	Maximize subjective well-being
Individual Value	Traditional religious and communal norms	Achievement motivation	Postmaterialist and Postmodern values
Authority System	Traditional authority	Rational-legal authority	De-emphasis of *both* legal and religious authority

to maximize the output of tangible things, such as wheat, textiles, coal, steel, and tractors.

In Postmodernization, the core project is to maximize individual well-being, which is increasingly dependent on subjective factors. Human behavior shifts from being dominated by the economic imperatives of providing food, clothing, and shelter toward the pursuit of quality of life concerns.

Even economic behavior becomes less a matter of meeting the survival needs and becomes increasingly oriented toward attaining subjective well-being. Economic growth continues, but output consists less and less of tangible things that contribute directly to survival, and more and more of intangibles whose value is subjective. The Postmodernization writers are on target in emphasizing the increasingly subjective nature of life experience in advanced industrial society.

For example, government has become an enormous sector, now employing a larger proportion of the U.S. workforce than does industrial manufacturing. Government services are intangible, and their value is highly subjective—people even disagree about whether their value is positive or negative. Computer software, education, research, entertainment, and tourism have all become major industries. Unlike food, clothing, and shelter, their products are intangible and their value is largely subjective. Computer software, microchips, and entertainment have become three of the United States' largest exports, but the value of the film or silicon or disk on which they are stored is negligible. A successful motion picture or computer program may be worth hundreds of millions of dollars; another film or program that costs just as much to produce may be virtually valueless. Ideas and innovation are the crucial component—and their value is whatever people feel it is worth. With psychotherapy and tourism, this is equally true: they have become major economic activities, and their value lies almost entirely in their contribution to subjective well-being.

Table 3.1 compares the societal goals and individual value systems underlying traditional, modern, and postmodern society. As it indicates, the core societal goal of traditional society is survival under the conditions of a steady-state economy, in which social mobility is a zero-sum game. During the

Modernization phase, by contrast, the core societal project is maximizing economic growth—and, in both capitalist and socialist societies, it tends to be carried out by ruthlessly extracting the necessary capital from an impoverished populace, regardless of the costs to the environment and quality of life. In Postmodern society, by contrast, the top priority shifts from maximizing economic growth to maximizing subjective well-being.

From Survival Values to Well-being Values

Individual-level value systems reflect the core societal project of the three respective types of societies. Traditional societies vary enormously, but virtually all of them emphasize individual conformity to societal norms limiting violence, sexual behavior, and economic accumulation; and encouraging acceptance of the existing economic and social order. These norms are usually codified and legitimated within a religious framework. Perhaps the most central individual-level change linked with Modernization is the rise of achievement motivation; but the broad shift toward instrumental rationality weakens all traditional norms.

During the Modernization era, there was a consensus throughout industrial society that economic growth was not only a good thing, but virtually the ultimate good: though Marxists and capitalists disagreed sharply about how the fruits of production should be distributed, both sides shared an implicit consensus that economic growth was desirable. This consensus was unquestioned because it seemed self-evident. Economic growth and scientific discoveries constituted Progress: they were good almost by definition.

During the Cold War there was a similar shared sentiment that the question of whether East or West was the better society would be decided by which one achieved the most economic growth. And during the first half of the Cold War, the Eastern bloc seemed to be winning by the test that really counted: high growth rates. In 1972 Meadows et al.'s *The Limits to Growth* called this consensus into question, arguing that economic growth was *not* desirable and should be brought to a stop before it was too late. Shortly afterward, Schumacher's (1973) *Small Is Beautiful* questioned another key principle of the Modernization era: the tendency to equate Biggest with Best—a tendency that was widespread, but especially strong in the socialist bloc, where bigness and centralization were elevated almost to the rank of moral virtues. Both of these critiques reflected the emergence of well-being values, a core element of Postmodernism.

From Achievement Motivation to Postmaterialist Motivation

In the Postmodern shift, values that played a key role in the emergence of industrial society—economic achievement motivation, economic growth, economic rationality—have faded in salience. At the societal level, there is a radical shift from the priorities of early industrialization, and a growing tendency

for emphasis on economic growth to become subordinate to concern for its impact on the environment. At the individual level, maximizing economic gains is gradually fading from top priority: self-expression and the desire for meaningful work are becoming even more crucial for a growing segment of the population. And the motivations for work are changing, from an emphasis on maximizing income as the top priority, toward increasing emphasis on the quality of the work experience. There is even some willingness to accept ascriptive criteria rather than achievement criteria for recruitment, if it is justified by social goals.

Scarcity has prevailed throughout most of history: it follows from the ecological principle that population normally rises to meet the available food supply and is then held in check by starvation, disease, and war. The result has been chronic scarcity, with the possibility of starvation shaping the daily awareness and life strategies of most people. Both traditional and modern societies were shaped by scarcity, but industrial society developed the belief that scarcity could be alleviated by individual achievement and economic growth, a radical change in outlook.

The root *cause* of the Postmodern value shift has been the gradual withering away of value systems that emerged under conditions of scarcity, and the spread of security values among a growing segment of the publics of these societies. This, in turn, grows out of the unprecedentedly high levels of subjective well-being that characterize the publics of advanced industrial society, as compared with those of earlier societies. In advanced industrial societies, most people take survival for granted. Precisely *because* they take it for granted, they are not aware of how profoundly this supposition shapes their worldviews.

Starvation is no longer a real concern for most of the people in high-technology societies, where production has been increasing much faster than the rate of population growth. These societies have attained unprecedentedly high life expectancies and unprecedentedly high levels of subjective well-being. One consequence of this fact is the rise of Postmaterialist values, but this is only one component of a broader cultural shift. The emergence and spread of Postmaterialist values is only the tip of the iceberg—one component of a much broader syndrome of cultural changes that we term Postmodernization. There are several additional important components.

Growing Emphasis on Individual Freedom and Rejection of Bureaucratic Authority

The shift from traditional society to industrial society brought a shift from traditional authority to rational bureaucratic authority. In most societies, this simply substituted political authority for religious authority. But in Postmodern society, authority, centralization, and bigness are all under growing suspicion. They have reached a point of diminishing effectiveness; and they have reached a point of diminishing acceptability.

Every stable culture is linked with a congruent authority system. But the Postmodern shift is a move away from *both* traditional authority and state authority. It reflects a declining emphasis on authority in general—regardless of whether it is legitimated by societal or state formulae. This leads to declining confidence in hierarchical institutions. Today, political leaders throughout the industrialized world are experiencing some of the lowest levels of support ever recorded. This is not simply because they are less competent than previous leaders. It reflects a systematic decline in mass support for established political institutions, and a shift of focus toward individual concerns.

Because Postmaterialists view self-expression and political participation as things that are valuable in themselves, the Postmodern phase of development is inherently conducive to democratization. There is nothing easy or automatic about this tendency. Determined authoritarian elites can repress it almost indefinitely, though at growing cost to the morale and cooperativeness of their subjects. Similarly, the institutional structure and cultural heritage of a given society can facilitate or retard this tendency, as can external pressures and other macropolitical factors. But as economic development takes place, mass input to the political process becomes increasingly widespread and effective. Economic development leads mass publics to place growing emphasis on participatory values.

In addition to the changes in core societal goals, individual values, and authority systems outlined in table 3.1, the Postmodern shift has two other aspects.

First, as Postmodern philosophers argue, an essential attribute of postmodernity is a diminishing faith in science, technology, and rationality. One of the core components of Modernization was a growing faith in the power of science and rational analysis to solve virtually all problems. At the elite level (especially among Postmodern writers) Postmodernization is linked with a diminishing faith in rationality and a diminishing confidence that science and technology will help solve humanity's problems. This change in worldview has advanced farthest in the economically and technologically most advanced societies. And insofar as industrial society's culture of instrumental rationality is identified with the West, Postmodernity is linked with a rejection of the West. But for mass publics, Postmodernity has *also* brought a rejection of the Soviet model, which was even more hierarchical and instrumentally oriented than the Western version of industrial society.

Initially, Postmodernism focused on discontent with the dehumanizing aspects of modernity as manifested in the *West*. Many of the most prominent Postmodernist thinkers even considered themselves Marxists (and some still do). But it was inevitable that Postmodernization would eventually lead to the rejection of hierarchical, bureaucratic, centralized big government in the socialist world as well, where it was most extreme. This contributed to an unexpected development: the collapse of socialism. State socialism failed because (1) it no longer functioned well, in advanced industrial society—though it *had* functioned relatively well during the Modernization era, and (2) be-

cause it was no longer acceptable. The declining effectiveness and acceptability of massive, centralized bureaucratic authority contributed to the collapse of state socialism, as did the fact that Postmodernization brings an inherent tendency toward democratization, linked with its growing emphasis on individual autonomy.

Elements of Continuity between Modernization and Postmodernization

Postmodernization continues some of the trends that were launched by Modernization, particularly the processes of specialization, secularization, and individuation. The growing complexity of advanced industrial society results in increasing specialization in all areas of life. But the processes of secularization and individuation have taken on a new character.

Secularization

Weber attributed the decline of religious belief largely to the rise of the scientific worldview, which gradually replaced the sacred/mystical prerational elements of religious faith. Although the scientific worldview has lost its glamor, secularization continues—but for a new reason: the emergence of a sense of security among the economically more advanced societies diminishes the need for the reassurance that has traditionally been provided by absolute belief systems, which purport to provide certainty and the assurance of salvation, if not in this world at least in the next.

It would be a major mistake to equate either Modernization or Postmodernization with the decline of religion. Modernization does require the dismantling of some core aspects of traditional religion—in particular, it abolishes traditional tendencies to equate the old with the good, and the rigid rejection of social mobility and individual economic achievement. But—significantly—in the Protestant Ethic thesis, Weber argued that this was accomplished by having one type of religion replace another. The Marxist route to modernity achieved this by replacing traditional religion with a secular ideology that initially inspired widespread Utopian hopes and expectations of a new sort of Judgment Day that would come with the revolution. As it lost its ability to inspire such hopes, Marxism began to crumble.

In some form or other, spiritual concerns will always be a part of the human condition. This remains true after the shift from Modernization to Postmodernization. A core element in Postmodernization is the decline of instrumental rationality (equating economic growth with the good) to value rationality, seeking human happiness itself, rather than the economic means to that end. Although Postmodernism goes with a continuing decline in traditional religious beliefs, it is linked with a *growing* concern for the meaning and purpose of life.

Individuation

With industrialization, the erosion of religious social controls opened up a broader space for individual autonomy, but this space was largely taken up by growing obligations to the state. The Postmodern shift away from *both* religious and state authority continues this long-standing shift toward individuation, but in a much stronger form. Increasingly, individual rights and entitlements take priority over any other obligation.

Globally, there is a great deal of cross-national variation in degrees of Modernization: even today, only a minority of the world's population live in industrialized societies. An even smaller proportion of humanity live in the rich and secure advanced industrial societies in which Postmodern value systems have taken root.

Consequently, we would expect to find two main dimensions of cross-cultural variation across the 43 societies we are about to analyze. During the past two centuries, the two most pervasive and important processes that have shaped them have been (1) Modernization and (2) Postmodernization. Accordingly, we would expect the world's societies to vary according to the degree to which they have been transformed by these two processes. Furthermore, a given society's position on these two dimensions should be closely linked with its level of economic and technological development: societies that are only beginning to industrialize should manifest relatively traditional belief systems; those that are now in the stage of rapid industrialization should manifest value systems keyed to maximizing economic growth; and societies that had already attained high levels of existential security some time ago should have undergone an intergenerational value shift toward Postmodern values that give priority to subjective well-being over economic growth.

Modernization and Postmodernization Dimensions: Empirical Findings

We have outlined the patterns of cross-cultural variation we expect to find, and why. Now let us examine cross-cultural variation empirically, as reflected in survey data from 43 societies. Our first question is whether the various religious, social, economic, and political components of given cultures are randomly related, or whether they go together, with certain coherent combinations being more probable than others. Figure 3.2 shows the results of a principal components factor analysis of the data from representative national surveys in the 43 societies included in the 1990–91 World Values Survey. The responses to each of the variables used here are boiled down to a mean score for each country; using the society as the unit of analysis, we can examine cross-cultural variation in a wide range of norms and values.

Figure 3.2 sums up an immense amount of information. It presents an overview of findings from the World Values surveys, showing the relationships



Figure 3.2. Variation in the values emphasized by different societies: traditional authority vs. rational-legal authority and scarcity values vs. Postmodern values. *Source*: 1990–93 World Values Survey. This figure shows the first and second principal components emerging from a factor analysis of data from representative national surveys of 43 societies, aggregated to the national level. The scales on the margins show each item's loadings on the two respective dimensions. The items in italics (e.g., "reject outgroups") are multi-item indicators.

between scores of items. Subsequent chapters will probe more deeply into the causal relationships between key variables and examine changes over time. This figure is based on the responses given by nearly 60,000 respondents in 43 societies. We do not provide the full text of each question used here. A short phrase (such as "Abortion OK") is used to convey the gist of each item on figure 3.2; for the full text, see Appendix 2. The 43 variables used here reflect a much larger number of questions: some of them are based on responses to whole batteries of questions. "Affect balance," for example, sums up each respondent's answers to the 10 questions in the Bradburn Affect Balance Scale; "Postmaterialist Values" sums up the responses to a series of questions through which each respondent ranks a set of 12 basic goals; and "Achievement Motivation" sums up responses to four items concerning important values for a child to learn; "Reject outgroups" also sums up the responses to several questions.

Furthermore, these variables were chosen to reflect a considerably larger number of related items that show similar patterns. "God is important," for example, taps a cluster of more than 30 items that measure the extent to which religion is, or is not, an important part of the respondent's life. Similarly, "Life satisfaction," "Affect balance," and "Not happy" reflect a larger cluster of items that tap subjective well-being. To avoid redundancy, and to limit figure 3.2 to a readable size, we have only included the most sensitive indicators of each cluster. Figure 3.2 depicts the structure underlying responses to more than 100 questions dealing with many aspects of life in 43 societies, providing a global overview of basic cultural patterns.

Figure 3.2 shows the relationships between scores of variables covering a wide variety of topics ranging from religion to politics to sexual norms to attitudes toward science. These diverse orientations tend to go together in coherent patterns. For example, certain societies place relatively heavy emphasis on religion: the people of these societies also show high levels of national pride, prefer to have relatively large families, would like to see more respect for authority, tend to rank relatively low on achievement motivation and political interest, oppose divorce, and have a number of other distinctive cultural orientations. The people of other societies consistently fall toward the opposite end of the spectrum on all of these orientations, giving rise to a vertical dimension that reflects Traditional versus Secular-Rational orientations.

Figure 3.2 greatly simplifies a complex reality—in a sense, it is a one-page summary of the entire 1990 World Values Survey. It is, of course, an oversimplification. The present author has written two books on Postmaterialist values alone, and in this analysis, these values serve as only one indicator of a much broader Survival–well-being dimension. Nevertheless—to a surprising degree—reality fits this simplified model: over half of the cross-national variance among these variables can be explained by two dimensions that reflect the Modernization and Postmodernization processes, respectively.

Our first major finding is that there is a great deal of constraint among cultural systems. The pattern found here is anything but random. The first two dimensions that emerge from the principal components factor analysis depicted in figure 3.2 account for fully 51 percent of the cross-national variation among these variables. Additional dimensions explain relatively small amounts of variance. Moreover, these two main dimensions are robust, showing little change when we drop given items, even high-loading ones. The vertical axis reflects the polarization between Traditional authority and Secular-Rational authority; the horizontal axis depicts the polarization between a cluster of items labeled Survival Values and another cluster labeled Well-being Values.

The scales on the borders of figure 3.2 indicate each item's loadings on these two dimensions.

Just two dimensions account for over half of the cross-national variance among these items: this also means that about half of the variance in these values and orientations is *not* explained by the Modernization and Postmodernization dimensions. It is important to keep this in mind. Historical change cannot be entirely reduced to universal processes: to a great extent, each society works out its history in its own unique fashion, influenced by the culture, leaders, institutions, climate, geography, situation-specific events, and other unique elements that make up its own distinctive heritage. General explanatory factors can never account for everything in cross-cultural research. Just as each individual is unique, each society is unique (and each historical moment is unique). Thus, while we find the metaphor of evolution useful in describing how social change works, we do not equate evolution with determinism. Certain strategies for coping with a given environment are far more probable than others: such a strategy represents a mutually supportive combination of economic, technological, political, and cultural factors, and one that is likely to survive—while other, almost limitless, dysfunctional combinations prove abortive. But social change also involves less systematic factors that make each society unique.

Brilliant and instructive books have been written about the ways in which given societies differ from others. This book focuses on the general themes underlying the cross-national pattern, not because we are uninterested in the unique aspects of given societies—few things are more fascinating—but because the common themes are *also* interesting, and because any book that undertakes to deal with more than 40 societies almost inevitably *must* focus on what is common, rather than on what is unique. The evidence examined here indicates that common underlying themes *do* exist: it suggests that roughly half of the cross-national variance in these values and attitudes can be accounted for by the processes of Modernization and Postmodernization, while the remaining half of the variation reflects factors that are more or less nation-specific.

Religion plays a much more important role in some societies than in others. In Nigeria, fully 85 percent of the population said that religion is "very important" in their lives; in South Africa, the figure was 66 percent; in Turkey, 61 percent; in both Poland and the United States, 53 percent; in Italy, the figure was only 34 percent; in Great Britain, France, and Germany, the figures were 16, 14, and 13 percent, respectively; in Russia, it was 12 percent; in Denmark, 9 percent; in Japan, it was 6 percent; and in China, 1 percent.

"Do societies that place relatively strong emphasis on religion also tend to favor large families?" The answer is an unequivocal "Yes," as the proximity of "Religion important" and "Want many children" near the bottom of figure 3.2 suggests: the correlation between these two items is $r = .51$ (significant at the .001 level). Moreover, societies characterized by an emphasis on religion also tend to place relatively strong emphasis on work, as the proximity between "Work important" and "Religion important" suggests ($r = .62$, significant at the .0000 level). The emphasis here is on *having* work, for the sake of survival; in economically more developed societies, people place much greater emphasis on work as a source of personal *satisfaction.* Relatively traditional societies also tend to stress "Obedience" as an important quality to teach a child ($r = .58$), and to view the family as relatively important ("Family important," $r = .56$). And, as one would expect, those societies in which the public considers "Religion important" also tend to be those in which the public believe that "God is important," and to say that religious faith is an important quality to teach a child ("Religious faith"): these are almost 1:1 relationships ($r = .95$ and .87, respectively). These last two linkages are obvious; the others, though intuitively plausible, are not. All of these items have high loadings on the vertical dimension, labeled "Traditional Authority" vs. "Secular-Rational Authority."

Societies that place relatively strong emphasis on religion are characterized by very distinctive norms concerning sexual behavior, childrearing, the role of women, and fertility rates; they have distinctive attitudes toward divorce, abortion, and homosexuality; they also place relatively strong emphasis on deference to authority; and they have distinctive norms concerning economic achievement and distinctive motivations for work.

It is not particularly surprising that societies in which religion is relatively important have distinctive norms concerning abortion, childbearing, and the role of women. But these differences also extend to areas in which the connection is far from obvious. For example, societies in which religion is important are characterized by much higher levels of national pride than those in which it is not, as figure 3.3 demonstrates. Here, the horizontal axis shows the percentage in each society who say that God plays an important role in their lives. The people of societies that rank high on this variable show much higher levels of national pride than do those that rank low. China is a deviant case, with a high level of national pride despite being overwhelmingly secular, and West Germany deviates in the opposite direction, showing a lower level of national pride than its level of religiosity would predict. But the overall linkage is remarkably strong and significant at the .0000 level (see figure 3.3).

As these findings suggest, high levels of constraint exist between various cultural attributes. For example, if we know that a society ranks high on national pride, we can pretty accurately predict its position on childrearing practices, religiosity, and a number of other important attributes. But the pattern extends even farther. Societies that emphasize the importance of religion tend to attach low importance to politics, as the locations of "Religion important" and "Politics important" (far apart from each other on the vertical dimension) suggests: the correlation between the two is -0.39. And these same societies tend to place *low* emphasis on "Thrift" and "Determination" as important qualities to teach a child ($r = -.57$ and $-.59$, respectively). As we will see in a more detailed analysis in chapter 5, emphasis on these values is part of an Achievement Motivation syndrome that is strongly linked with the economic growth rates of given societies.



Figure 3.3. Coherent values patterns on the traditional vs. secular-rational authority dimension: the linkage between religiosity and national pride.
Horizontal dimension shows percentage ranking importance of God in their lives as relatively high (i.e., scores of 7–10 on a 10-point scale ranging from "not at all important" [1] to "very important" [10]). r = .71, significant at .0000 level.

Coherent Value Patterns: The Postmodernization Dimension

In the Postmodernization phase of development, emphasis shifts from maximizing economic gains to maximizing subjective well-being. This gives rise to another major dimension of cross-cultural variation, on which a wide range of orientations are structured. So far, we have been discussing items with high loadings on the second principal component, labeled "Traditional Authority" vs. "Rational-Legal Authority." This dimension reflects the Modernization process, in which authority moves away from a traditional (usually religious) basis, toward increasing emphasis on impersonal bureaucratic authority. This is an important dimension, accounting for 21 percent of the variance among these 47 variables. But it is overshadowed by the first principal component, which accounts for 30 percent of the total variance. This dimension taps "Survival Values" versus "Well-being Values." A very sensitive indicator of this dimension is "Postmaterialist Values" (located near the right-hand pole of the horizontal axis on figure 3.2). This is a central element in a much broader cultural configuration.

Societies with large numbers of Postmaterialists tend to be characterized by a relatively strong sense of subjective well-being. Their publics tend to express high levels of satisfaction with their lives as a whole ("Postmaterialist Values" has a .68 correlation with "Life satisfaction"). Moreover, they report relatively high levels of positive affect (saying that within the past few days they felt interested in something, or proud, or pleased about having accomplished something) rather than negative affect (reporting that they were restless, or felt lonely, or upset because someone criticized them), which produces high scores on the Bradburn "Affect balance" scale. Furthermore, the publics of societies with high levels of Postmaterialism are likely to rate themselves as "In good health," (r = .58) and are *not* likely to describe themselves as "Not happy" (the correlation with "Postmaterialist Values" is −.71).

Subjective well-being is a condition, not a value, and is not correlated with Postmaterialism at the individual level. But high levels of subjective well-being are a key element in the cultural syndrome called Postmodernism. When a society attains high levels of economic security and subjective well-being, it is conducive to Postmaterialist values; but further economic development does not necessarily bring increased subjective well-being.

The linkage between Postmaterialism and subjective well-being is a cultural syndrome, not an individual-level ideology. It reflects the fact that societies with high levels of economic development not only have relatively high levels of *objective* need satisfaction (being relatively well-nourished, in good health, and having relatively high life expectancies); but their publics also experience relatively high levels of *subjective* security and well-being, which leads to an intergenerational shift toward Postmaterialist values. This cultural syndrome has gone largely unnoticed in previous Modernization literature, but manifests itself clearly when one has survey data covering a sufficiently broad range of countries.

At the individual level, however, Postmaterialists do *not* report relatively high levels of subjective well-being. Far from being a paradox, this is central to their nature: Postmaterialists have experienced relatively high levels of economic security throughout their formative years. They develop Postmaterialist priorities precisely because further economic gains do *not* produce additional subjective well-being: they take economic security for granted and go on to emphasize other (nonmaterial) goals. Moreover, they have relatively demanding standards for these other aspects of life—to such an extent that they often manifest *lower* levels of overall life satisfaction than do Materialists in the same society.

This leads to another finding that at first seems paradoxical. Generally, within any given society, the rich show higher levels of subjective well-being than the poor, as common sense might suggest. But Postmaterialists are an exception: they are richer (and have better education, more prestigious occupations, etc.) than most people—but they do *not* rank higher on subjective well-being than other people. This is significant. It reflects the fact that, as given nations become advanced industrial societies, they reach a point of diminishing marginal utility at which maximizing economic gains (for the individual) or economic growth (for the society) no longer results in higher levels of subjective well-being (we noted this phenomenon in chapter 2). From this perspective, it is perfectly rational to cease making economic efficiency and economic growth top priorities, and give increasing emphasis to quality of life concerns.

This cultural syndrome is pervasive and lies at the heart of Postmoderniza-

tion. The publics of societies with high proportions of Postmaterialists do *not* emphasize "Hard work" as one of the most important qualities to teach a child (reflected in a loading of −0.67 on the Scarcity-Security dimension); instead, they emphasize "Tolerance" and "Imagination." Similarly, their publics do not view more emphasis on "Money" as a desirable change.

The polarization between survival values and well-being values extends to family values as well. The publics of societies with high proportions of Postmaterialists tend to reject the proposition that "A woman needs children" to be fulfilled, and disagree that "A child needs both parents," in a home with both a father and a mother, to grow up happily. There is a growing emphasis on self-realization for women, linked with a shift of emphasis from the role of mother to emphasis on careers.

"Respect parents" and "Respect authority" show strong loadings on both dimensions in figure 3.2. Their loadings indicate that *both* the Modernization process and the Postmodernization process are linked with declining respect for authority. And "Good and Evil are clear" has a negative relationship with both the shift from traditional authority to rational-legal authority and the shift from survival values to well-being values. A growing moral relativism is linked with both Modernization and Postmodernization. In traditional societies, moral rules are absolute truths, revealed by God. At the opposite extreme, in Postmodern society, absolute standards dissolve, giving way to an increasing sense of ambiguity.

We have argued that these two dimensions reflect the Modernization process and the Postmodernization process, respectively. And the fit is generally good. For example, the rise of Achievement Motivation is strongly linked with the vertical (Modernization) dimension. Moreover, the rankings of the global domains of life fit the expected configuration: as we move up the vertical dimension we see a shift in emphasis from family and religion (as indicated by "Family important" and "Religion important") toward increasing emphasis on the state ("Politics important"). Then, as we move from left to right on the horizontal dimension, we move away from emphasis on *both* traditional authority and state authority, toward increasing emphasis on individual concerns: "Leisure important" and "Friends important" show loadings of .66 and .72, respectively, on the Postmodernization dimension.

An emphasis on science and technology was a core element of modernity. But the publics of societies with high proportions of Postmaterialists (at the Postmodern end of the continuum) tend to have little confidence that scientific advances will help, rather than harm, humanity ("Trust science" has a negative correlation with "Postmaterialist values" that is significant at the .001 level); similarly, they tend to doubt that more emphasis on "Technology" would be a good thing. Conversely, these same societies have relatively high levels of support for the "Ecology" movement. The fact that societies shaped by security tend to reject science and technology is a major departure from the basic thrust of Modernization—another reason why this dimension reflects change in a *Post*-modern direction.



Figure 3.4. Coherent values patterns on the survival vs. well-being dimension: the linkage between life satisfaction and rejection of homosexuals as neighbors (part of the "Reject outgroups" cluster).
r = −.75, significant at .0000 level.

Societies influenced by Postmodern or well-being values tend to be markedly more tolerant than are those characterized by survival values. These societies emphasize "Tolerance" as an important quality to teach a child. Similarly, their publics are less likely to "Reject outgroups," saying that they would not like to have foreigners, people with AIDS, or homosexuals as neighbors; and they are relatively likely to feel that homosexuality is acceptable ("Homosexual OK"). Both of these correlations with "Postmaterialist values" are significant at the .001 level. Moreover, societies with relatively high levels of subjective well-being rank relatively low on intolerance of outgroups, as figure 3.4 illustrates.

The outgroup dealt with here is homosexuals, but the same pattern applies to rejection of other outgroups. In Russia and Belarus, where subjective well-being was extremely low in 1990, fully 80 percent of the public said they would not like to have homosexuals as neighbors. In such societies as Denmark or the Netherlands, where overall life satisfaction was much higher, only about 10 percent of the public were unwilling to have homosexuals as neighbors. Numerous other orientations are closely related to whether a society has high or low levels of subjective well-being.

Security is conducive to tolerance and conversely, insecurity is conducive to xenophobia. The narrower one's margin for survival is, the more likely one is to fear that strangers are threatening. This is especially true if the strangers

speak a foreign language or hold different values and therefore seem incomprehensible and unpredictable.

In an agrarian or hunting and gathering society in which the land supply is just sufficient to feed the existing population, the arrival of a foreign group poses a direct threat to survival: in such a situation, xenophobia is realistic and almost certain to arise. In a technologically advanced society with a growing economy, foreigners may be tolerated or even welcomed. They do not pose a threat to survival and may even enhance the standard of living. But in times of economic or political crisis, even advanced industrial societies are prone to xenophobia, as the rise of fascism during the Great Depression demonstrated, and as recent events in Western Europe and the United States continue to demonstrate. But the severity of xenophobia tends to be proportionate to the degree of insecurity; hence, ethnic conflict is far more severe in Eastern Europe, where the economic systems and political systems have collapsed, than in Western Europe: far more people have been killed in ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe, by several orders of magnitude.

No culture is immune to xenophobia, but it tends to be most intense where insecurity is most severe. Conversely, at the individual level, Postmaterialists—those who have grown up under conditions of relative economic and physical security—tend to be relatively tolerant of people with different ethnicity or sexual orientations. Similarly, they are relatively supportive of the "Women's movement." The rise of security values seems conducive to increasing tolerance of diversity, an essential component of democracy.

An environment of security and subjective well-being seems to foster not only tolerance, but a whole cluster of traits that are conducive to democracy. For example, well-being values are linked with high levels of interpersonal trust (as reflected in the .66 loading of "Trust people" on this dimension). Moreover, a participant public is an essential component of democracy—and one of the defining characteristics of Postmaterialist values is the fact that they give a high priority to self-expression and participation in decision making at all levels, including the political. Postmaterialism constitutes a central component of Postmodern values. Are these values linked with stable democracy? As we will see shortly, the answer is Yes.

In addition to its emphasis on science and technology, another key characteristic of Modernization was its tendency to bureaucratize all aspects of life, with the biggest bureaucracy of all resulting from the seemingly inexorable growth of government. But Postmodern values are linked with *declining* support for big government: believing that the state (rather than the individual) should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for ("State responsible") is linked with survival values, and not with well-being values; the same is true of support for "State/employee management" rather than owner management. Support for big government was a central component of Modernization. It does *not* go with Postmodern values, which is another indication that Postmodernization reflects a fundamental change of direction.

The analysis presented here is not the only possible way to slice the data. If one applies varimax rotation to the factors, one gets a somewhat different solution. Similarly, one can generate a three-dimensional or six-dimensional or even a 30-dimensional solution. Doing so produces a far more complicated result that might superficially seem more scholarly. But if one is looking for the *simplest* possible configuration, a reasonable approach is to use principal components analysis and focus on the first dimensions. Figure 3.2 is what emerges then—a structure that sums up a surprisingly wide range of phenomena in just two dimensions that capture over half of the total cross-national variance in this array of orientations. Additional dimensions exist, but they explain relatively small amounts of additional variance. The reality is that cross-cultural variation is surprisingly orderly and can be interpreted with a relatively parsimonious model.

Another critique of this approach would be to point that it is based on the assumption that our questions have comparable meaning to people from 43 widely varying societies, who were interviewed in 31 different languages. Our questionnaire was, of course, designed with this in mind: building on extensive previous cross-national survey research and extensive pilot testing, with input from social scientists on five continents, it was designed to ask questions that *do* have a shared meaning across many cultures. If we had asked questions about nation-specific issues, the cross-cultural comparability would have broken down. In France, for example, a recent hot political issue (linked with Islamic immigration) was the question whether or not girls should be allowed to wear scarves over their heads in school. This question would have had totally different meanings (or would have seemed meaningless) in other societies. On the other hand, a question about whether religion is important in one's life *is* meaningful in virtually every society on earth, including those in which most people say it is not. The same is true of questions about respect for authority, or about how many children one would like to have, or whether or not one is satisfied with one's life as a whole.

Moreover, the cross-national placement of societies underlying this configuration of worldviews is astonishingly coherent. As we will see below, societies that show similar cultural orientations in our surveys fall into compact and theoretically meaningful clusters. Working independently and without knowledge of each other's findings, the World Values survey investigators in the five Nordic countries came up with relatively similar results. So did our colleagues in Nigeria and South Africa, and so did those in the four Latin American countries and in Eastern Europe. The evidence suggests that the World Values survey group was generally successful in framing cross-nationally meaningful questions. If these items had idiosyncratic meanings in each society, we would not have attained such a parsimonious and coherent structure. Instead, the orientations that went together in one society would be unrelated in other societies, and it would take 15 or 20 dimensions to explain half of the variance.

Where Are Given Societies Located on These Dimensions? A Cultural Geography of the World

In most respects, the two dimensions in figure 3.2 show a good fit with the attributes we would expect to find if they reflected the shift from Traditional to Modern values, and from Modern to Postmodern values, respectively. But in one important way the pattern seems wrong: the growth of big government was a central aspect of Modernization. For many decades, the all-encompassing socialist state was thought to be the wave of the future: it was the logical culmination of the trend toward bureaucratization and state authority. If so, we would expect to find emphasis on "State/employee management" and "State responsibility" located near the top of the vertical dimension. Instead, we find them occupying roughly neutral positions on this dimension. Why? In order to understand the answer, let us examine the specific national cultures underlying this pattern.

Figure 3.5 shows the location of each society on the two dimensions we have been examining. To locate them in this space, dummy variables were created for each of our 43 societies; these variables were mapped onto the two dimensions shaped by the worldviews of the respective publics. Because these dummy variables are extremely skewed (each having one country coded "1" and 42 countries coded "0"), the correlations with the cultural dimensions are modest; but if we combine countries into larger groups (such as the Nordic group or the Latin American group) the correlations with the ideological space become quite strong. The societies that show similar cultural orientations in our surveys (and therefore are near each other on this figure) fall into intuitively plausible clusters.

Our broadest generalization is that the value systems of richer countries differ systematically from those of poorer countries. The poorer countries tend to be located toward the lower left on figure 3.5, with the richer ones falling into the upper right-hand quadrant. Although there are some deviant cases (the United States having much more traditional values than its GNP per capita would predict), the overall correlation between values and economic development is very strong.

But the pattern is coherent in many additional respects. For example, all four of the Latin American societies included in the 1990 World Values Survey fall into one cluster, reflecting the fact that, in global perspective they have relatively similar value systems. The two African societies fall into another cluster; and the three Confucian-influenced societies of East Asia fall into another cluster—which partly overlaps with another cluster containing the former communist societies. The historically Catholic societies of Western Europe fall into another compact cluster. Although church attendance in Western Europe has collapsed, the historically Protestant societies of Northern Europe fall into another cluster (with Eastern Germany located at the intersection of the Northern European cluster and the ex-communist cluster, as its historical experience might suggest). The United States and Canada constitute a North American



Figure 3.5. Where given societies fall on two key cultural dimensions. *Source*: 1990–93 World Values Survey. Positions are based on the mean scores of the publics of the given nation on each of the two dimensions.

cluster—that could be expanded to include the other English-speaking societies. Poland is an outlier, having more traditional values than the other ex-communist societies of Eastern Europe: it does not fit into any coherent cluster. But on the whole, the value systems of a majority of the world's people are anything but random: though shaped by a variety of factors, they manifest a remarkably coherent pattern that can be interpreted parsimoniously.

Societies that are close to each other on figure 3.5 show relatively similar responses to most of the questions that were asked in the World Values survey. For example, though the peoples of the United States and Canada differ in many ways, they have relatively similar basic values in comparison with most other societies: accordingly, they are located close to each other on figure 3.5.

Just how close are they? To answer this question, let us examine the responses to the first six questions asked in the survey. The publics of each society were asked "Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life." They rated the relative importance of "Work," "Family," "Friends," "Leisure," "Politics," and "Religion." This list covers a broad range of human concerns, and the various publics differed a great deal in how much importance they attached to the respective aspects of life. The cross-national rankings for nearly 350 variables are shown in Basanez, Inglehart, and Moreno (1997), and they support the claim that societies that are close to each other on figure 3.5 tend to show similar values and beliefs in many other ways; here, we will limit ourselves to these six variables.

Since 43 societies are ranked here, the greatest possible distance between any two societies would occur if one of them were ranked first and the other were ranked forty-third: all 41 of the other societies would fall between them. Conversely, the smallest possible distance would occur if the two societies had consecutive ranks, with *none* of the other societies falling between them. Finally, if the two societies were randomly distributed, about 20 societies would fall between them.

The publics of the United States and Canada give relatively similar ratings to these six aspects of life: on the average, only 3.3 other societies fall between them. The values of Canadians and Americans are much more similar to each other than they are to those of most other peoples. The British are also relatively close to the Americans, but by no means as close as the Canadians. On the other hand, the publics of the United States and China generally give these six domains quite different ratings: on the average, they are separated by nearly 24 societies, as the following ratings show:

CULTURAL DISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES
(mean number of societies between the United States and given society)

United States–Canada	3.3
United States–Britain	9.0
United States–France	16.7
United States–Japan	21.8
United States–Russia	22.2
United States–China	23.8

This principle applies generally. One finds a similar pattern if one views the world from a Swedish perspective, for example. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are located relatively near each other on figure 3.5, and they make rather similar ratings of the six aspects of life. On the average, only 3.8 societies fall between Sweden and Norway in these rankings, and only 5.8 societies fall between Sweden and Denmark. On the other hand, Sweden and France are separated by a mean of 13.6 societies, while Sweden and Russia are separated by an average of 17.8 societies, Sweden and Japan by 18.2 societies, and Sweden and China are separated by an average of more than 19 societies.

Given groups of nations take coherent positions on the two dimensions. For example, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden—the five Nordic countries—form a compact cluster located in the upper right-hand quadrant of figure 3.5: all five have related histories and similar cultures, ranking fairly high on the cultural outlook associated with rational-legal authority, and ranking very high on Postmodern values. To some extent, these countries are geographically proximate, but the fact that they are prosperous and traditionally Protestant welfare states seems more important than their geographic proximity. Thus the Netherlands, which is not a Nordic country but was historically Protestant and is today a prosperous welfare state, falls squarely into the middle of the Nordic group. Although geographically located next door to Belgium and sharing a common language with half of Belgium, the Netherlands is culturally much closer to the Nordic countries than to Belgium. Historically, the Netherlands has been shaped by Protestantism; even the Dutch Catholics today are remarkably Calvinist. And although the churches themselves are now a fading influence in Western European society, religious traditions helped shape enduring *national* cultures that persist today. Thus, culturally, the Netherlands is located somewhere between Norway and Sweden.

Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Austria constitute another cluster in the cultural space of figure 3.5. Although church attendance has declined drastically, all of these countries were historically Roman Catholic. Furthermore, this cluster is adjacent to a Latin American (and overwhelmingly Catholic) cluster containing Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. These predominantly Catholic countries form a fairly coherent group. One could even expand it to include the four other historically Roman Catholic countries, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and Lithuania. The last four countries are outliers, probably because of their divergent histories since 1945: the rising prosperity experienced by Western European Catholic countries in recent decades had much less impact on them, and they are more permeated by survival values than are the rest of the Catholic group. On the Modernization dimension, however, their values are almost as traditional as those of other Catholic countries (and they have more traditional values than the other exsocialist countries). As Basanez (1993) demonstrates, the Protestant-Catholic differences do not simply reflect the fact that the historically Protestant countries tend to be richer than the Catholic ones: controlling for GDP/capita, the value differences between them remain significant at the .001 level.

Nevertheless, there is no question that traditional orientations *are* closely related to a society's level of economic development. Almost all of the economically less-developed countries fall into the lower left-hand quadrant of figure

3.5, with cultures that emphasize traditional authority and survival values. But interestingly enough, all five of the English-speaking societies (Britain, Canada, the United States, Ireland, and Northern Ireland) fall into a cluster located in the lower right-hand quadrant: these countries have relatively strong security values, but much more religious-traditional values than most other countries at their economic level. This is particularly true of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which have a traditional/religious outlook that is fully as strong as that found in India, South Africa, or Brazil—with only Nigeria being markedly more traditional.

The former West German and East German regions of Germany were still independent states when these surveys were carried out and were sampled separately. Although West Germany falls into the upper right-hand quadrant with the other Western European societies, and East Germany into the upper left-hand quadrant containing most of the historically communist societies, the two societies are relatively close to each other on the two main cultural dimensions. This is significant. From 1945 to 1990, the communist regime made a massive effort to reshape East German culture to support a Marxist and atheistic authoritarian regime. Simultaneously, the Western powers launched massive efforts in West Germany to remake political culture to support a market-oriented Western liberal democracy. The evidence indicates that 45 years under radically different regimes did have an impact: by 1990 the two societies were some distance apart, especially along the Postmodernization dimension. But even more impressive is the fact that, in global perspective, the basic cultural values of the two societies were still relatively similar. This natural experiment indicates that, even when it makes a conscious and concerted effort to do so, the ability of a regime to reshape its underlying culture is limited. After 45 years under diametrically opposed political and economic institutions, in their basic values East Germany and West Germany remained as similar to each other as are the United States and Canada.

Almost all of the socialist or ex-socialist societies fall into the upper left-hand quadrant: these societies are characterized by survival values and a strong emphasis on state authority, rather than traditional authority. Poland is a striking exception, distinguished from the other socialist societies by its strong traditional-religious values. China is an outlier in the opposite direction—the least religious and most state-oriented society for which we have data. These societies' positions reflect their distinctive cultural heritages. On one hand, adherence to the Catholic church has been a mainstay of the Polish struggle for independence since 1792. The church continued to play a vital role in this struggle throughout the 1980s, revitalizing the role of religion in the national culture.

China, on the other hand, has had a relatively secular cultural system for 2,000 years; and bureaucratic authority developed within the Confucian system long before it reached the West. Thus China and the other Confucian-influenced societies of East Asia have had one major component of modern culture for a very long time. Until recently, they lacked the emphasis on science and technology and the esteem for economic achievement that are its other main components; but their secular, bureaucratic heritage probably helped to facilitate their rapid economic development once these were attained. China's traditional emphasis on the state may have been reinforced by four decades of socialism. Japan, another Confucian-influenced society, and both Eastern and Western Germany are also characterized by relatively strong emphasis on rational-legal authority.

Most of the socialist and ex-socialist societies are oriented toward rational-legal, rather than traditional-religious, authority. Their people have experienced four to eight decades of socialist regimes in which religion has been systematically repressed and in which it is perfectly realistic to consider politics important because economic life, cultural life, and even one's chances of survival depend on the state. The socialist states were probably the most heavily bureaucratized, centralized, and secularized societies in history, and they held science and technology in such esteem that their elites legitimated their power by the claim that they ruled, not through the unscientific and fallible process of majority rule, but according to the principles of scientific socialism. By these standards, the socialist states represented the culmination of Modernization—and the fact that, on figure 3.5, they are located near the Modernization pole of the Traditional Authority–Rational-Legal Authority dimension seems appropriate. But figure 3.2 revealed one surprising anomaly: one would expect that such key ideological components of the socialist state as its tendency to hold the "State responsible" for providing for everyone's needs should *also* cluster near the Modernization pole and gain maximum support in the socialist societies. It does not. Why?

We suspect that if these surveys had been carried out a decade or two earlier, support for state management and state responsibility *would* have been relatively strong in the ex-socialist societies. Most of them had experienced relatively high economic growth rates from 1945 to 1975 or 1980. Up to this point, they seemed to be functioning well: they had done a good job of providing the basic necessities for nearly everyone and were able to conceal or repress criticism of their shortcomings in other aspects of life. Support for a state-run economy and society was probably a good deal higher then, in socialist countries, than it was in 1990. In this simpler, more orderly world, we would have found "State responsible" located near the Modernization pole. And the empirical picture may now again be closer to this model than it was in 1990: as the transition to market economies proved unexpectedly traumatic, reform communist elites returned to power in a number of ex-communist societies during the early 1990s.

But reality is complex. In 1990–91, when these surveys were carried out, the socialist economic and political systems were collapsing; and mass support for state-run economies had withered away in these societies. The classic model of state socialism was surviving only in North Korea and Cuba, and paradoxically mass support for socialism was no longer the wave of the future for industrial society, but had become a Third World phenomenon.



Figure 3.6. Where given societies fall on two key cultural dimensions: religious influences. *Source*: 1990–93 World Values Survey. Positions are based on the mean scores of the publics of the given nation on each of the two dimensions.

Institutional Determinism of Culture?

As we have seen, the historically Protestant countries of both Northern Europe and North America tend to cluster together to form one large group; similarly, the historically Roman Catholic countries of Western Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe tend to cluster together, forming another broad but reasonably cohesive cluster. Despite the enormous recent changes linked with economic and social Modernization, and despite the tremendous sociopolitical changes linked with communist domination of four traditionally Catholic societies throughout the Cold War, in global perspective the historically Catholic societies still have relatively similar cultural values—as do the historically Protestant societies. As figure 3.6 illustrates, the Catholic societies form a group characterized by more traditional values, and by greater emphasis on survival values, than holds true of most Protestant societies. At first glance, this might seem to constitute strong evidence for an institutional determinist interpretation: the religious institutions of these societies led them to develop different cultures.

If institutional determinism is simply taken to mean that a society's institutions are among the factors that help shape its culture, it is undoubtedly correct. But institutional determinism is often pushed to a much more extreme claim than this. It is taken to mean that institutions alone determine a society's cultural values, so one need not really take cultural factors into account: if one changes the institutions, the culture automatically changes to fit it. If one examines the evidence more closely, it is clear that this position is untenable.

There are tremendous cultural differences between Protestant and Catholic societies, but for the most part they do not reflect the direct influence of the Catholic and Protestant churches today. For the direct influence of the church today is very slight in many of these countries. Although church attendance remains relatively high in Poland and Ireland (and the United States), it has fallen drastically in most of the historically Catholic countries of both Western and Eastern Europe; and it has fallen even more drastically in most historically Protestant European societies, to the point where some observers now speak of the Nordic countries as post-Christian societies: church attendance has plummeted toward zero. The societies that were traditionally Catholic still show very distinct values from those that were traditionally Protestant—even among segments of the population who have no contact with the church. But these values persist as part of the cultural heritage of given nations, and not through the direct influence of the religious institutions. This cultural heritage has been shaped by the economic, political, and social experience of the people, including the fact that the Protestant societies industrialized earlier than most of the Catholic societies—which at an even earlier stage of history may, in turn, have been linked with religious differences (as Weber suggests), but is certainly not a case of mere institutional determinism.

There is a remarkable degree of coherence to this pattern. Forty of the 43 societies fall into compact and historically meaningful clusters, such as Latin America or Eastern Europe or East Asia. There are only three outliers from this perspective: Poland plus Ireland and Northern Ireland (with the two parts of Ireland being closely linked). Both Poland and Ireland might be described as hyper-Catholic societies: they are Roman Catholic societies that for centuries were occupied and dominated by more powerful non-Catholic neighbors and that responded to pressures toward cultural assimilation by an intense reemphasis on their Roman Catholic heritage as a means of preserving their national identity. Ironically, this may have led to a similar reaction on the part of the Irish Protestants, who constitute a small minority within Ireland as a whole and might be described as hyper-Protestants. Poland and both parts of Ireland strongly emphasize traditional cultural values concerning not only religion, but also politics, gender roles, sexual norms, and family values. They illustrate the fundamentalist reaction to threat.

In most countries, these cultural differences reflect the entire historical experience of given societies, and *not* the influence of the respective churches

today. This point becomes vividly evident when we examine the value systems of such societies as the Netherlands and Germany—both of which were historically predominantly Protestant societies, but (as a consequence of different birth rates and different rates of religious attrition) have about as many practicing Catholics as Protestants today. Despite these changes in their religious makeup today, both the Netherlands and Germany manifest typically Protestant values. Moreover, the Catholics and Protestants *within* these societies do not show markedly different value systems: the Dutch Catholics today are as Calvinist as the members of the Dutch Reformed Church.

The historically Protestant and Catholic societies are not randomly distributed on our cultural map—far from it, they constitute coherent clusters. The communist ideology has been described as a secular religion, and the historically communist societies also make up a coherent cluster, which partly overlaps with the Catholic cluster: 13 of the 14 formerly communist societies fall into a compact cluster in the upper left-hand quadrant, and this Eastern European cluster could easily be expanded to include China and Eastern Germany. And as we have noted, though they are located on two different continents and span the Catholic-Protestant divide, the five English-speaking societies are also relatively near to each other on this cultural map: a common language is the unifying factor in this case. But the most pervasive influence of all seems to be economic development. If one draws a diagonal from the lower-left corner to the upper-right corner of figures 3.5 or 3.6, it traces the transition from poorer to richer societies. Both the Modernization dimension and the Postmodernization dimension are strongly correlated with a society's level of economic development: the values of richer societies differ systematically from those of poorer societies on both dimensions. Clearly, institutional determinism would be a far too simple interpretation of the evidence. Although the impact of religious institutions is evident, economic, political, geographic, linguistic, and other factors also play important roles. The worldview of a given people reflects its entire historical heritage.

To What Extent Was Modernization Theory Correct?

Coherent Cultural Patterns Exist

We have found that constraint *does* exist among cultural patterns. To get a sense of just how true this is, let us imagine two extreme models, ranging from a world wholly without cultural constraint, to one with total constraint. In the former model, each society goes its own way: the fact that it possesses one specific cultural attribute has no influence on whether other attributes are present. Cultural components are randomly related. The other extreme model is one of total determinism: only a few cultural patterns are possible, and if one major component of a pattern is present, all the other elements are also present in every case.

As one would expect, the empirical findings do not fit either extreme model, but they come much closer to the constrained model than to the random one. Fully half of the cross-cultural variation among this broad array of variables can be captured in just two dimensions. This picture is certainly not one of complete determinism: these two dimensions do not explain *all* of the variation among these 43 cultural indicators. But they do account for 51 percent of the variance—vastly more than the less than 5 percent that they would explain in a random model.

These Coherent Cultural Patterns Are Linked with a Society's Level of Economic Development

The fact that constrained cultural patterns exist does not, by itself, demonstrate that Modernization theory is correct: coherent cultural patterns might be found exclusively in given regions (such as Western Europe) as a result of given historical or religious traditions (such as Protestantism or Buddhism) without having any relationship to economic and technological change. Modernization theory, by contrast, implies that economic development *is* strongly linked with given cultural patterns—either because economic development produces specific types of culture, or because certain cultural patterns produce economic development. In short, Modernization theory implies that coherent cultural patterns exist, *and* that these patterns are linked with a given society's level of economic development. As figure 3.7 demonstrates, this clearly *is* the case.

We argued that the vertical dimension on figures 3.2 and 3.3 reflects the Modernization process, while the horizontal dimension reflects Postmodernization. The evidence presented in figure 3.7 indicates that economic development is conducive to *both* Modernization and Postmodernization, which are two successive stages of development: a society's per capita GNP is correlated with Modernization values at the .60 level, and at the .78 level with Postmodernization values. But other economic indicators show quite different relationships to these two respective dimensions. For example, the percentage of the labor force in the manufacturing sector is strongly correlated with the vertical (Modernization) dimension ($r = .63$) but much less strongly linked with the horizontal (Postmodernization) dimension ($r = .22$); but Postmodern values are strongly linked with the percentage of the labor force in the *service* sector ($r = .79$).

Bell argues that Postindustrial society has arrived when a majority of a society's workforce is employed in the service sector. There is a good deal of overlap between Postmodern society and Postindustrial society. But Bell's concept of Postindustrial society emphasizes changes in the structure of the workforce, while the term "Postmodern society" emphasizes cultural changes linked with economic security; we have argued that existential security is a key factor underlying Postmodernization. In keeping with this contention, we find that prosperity has as strong a relationship with Postmodern culture as does the composition of the workforce.

Similarly, the percentage of a given society's population having a secondary



Figure 3.7. Economic and social correlates of two key dimensions of cross-cultural variation. *Source*: 1990–93 World Values Survey.

or higher education shows a .71 correlation with the Rational-Legal pole of the Modernization dimension—and a .63 correlation with the Well-being pole of the Postmodernization dimension. These findings support the claim by Lerner (1958), Inkeles and Smith (1974), and others that rising educational levels have contributed to major cultural changes.

The consequences of growing up in a setting in which one can take satisfaction of one's survival needs for granted, rather than in a society of scarcity, seems to have been underestimated by Bell, Inkeles and Smith, and others. The strong linkage between Postmodern values and a society's GDP/capita supports the interpretation that these are, indeed, *security* values: they have an extremely strong tendency to be found in relatively prosperous societies.

An even more striking contrast between the economic correlates of Modernization and Postmodernization is the fact that Modernization values have a substantial positive linkage with economic growth rates, while Postmodern values have a *negative* linkage with economic growth: Postmodern societies are even richer than modernizing societies, but they show lower economic growth rates.

Overall, the evidence in figure 3.7 suggests that if educational levels continue to rise and the workforce continues to move out of farming and manufacturing into the service and knowledge sectors, and if per capita income continues to rise, then we can expect to see a gradual modernization of preindustrial societies and a shift toward Postmodern values, in advanced industrial societies.

Is Cultural Change Taking Place?

The fact that Postmodern values are strongly linked with economic development does not necessarily prove that as economic development takes place, these values will become more widespread. The linkage might be spurious. Long-term time series data are needed to demonstrate whether or not the predicted changes are taking place and help sort out the causal relationships. We don't have extensive time series data for most of the variables examined here, but we do have some—and virtually all of the available evidence points to the conclusion that a shift toward Postmodern culture *is* taking place in advanced industrial societies.

The most abundant time series data (by far) relate to Materialist/Postmaterialist values. Though this is only one component of the much larger syndrome of Postmodern values, it is a key indicator of this broader syndrome. Evidence of a shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values will be presented in chapter 4; it shows that Postmaterialist values have increased in the past quarter century, and that they have increased at almost exactly the rate predicted by the intergenerational population replacement model (about one point on the values percentage difference index per year).

If Postmaterialist values are moving in the predicted direction, this suggests that the entire set of closely correlated Postmodern values may be moving in the same direction, since theoretically they share a common set of causes: the transition from conditions of scarcity to the relative security of Postmodern society.

This broader shift toward Postmodern values in general *does* seem to be taking place. In chapters 7 and 8 we test the hypothesis that all values having reasonably strong correlations with Postmaterialism are part of an intergenerational shift linked with population replacement. To do so, we first identified 40 variables that were strongly correlated with Postmaterialist values and were included in both the 1981 and 1990 World Values surveys. Our expectation was that whatever values were positively correlated with Postmaterialism would become more widespread over time, other things being equal. When we compare the 1981 responses, with responses to the same questions in the same countries in 1990, we find that in the great majority of cases these values shifted in the predicted direction. The available evidence suggests that cultural change is taking place in the predicted direction.

As hypothesized, the apparent decline of traditional values is strongly linked with economic growth: as figure 3.7 indicates, a country's growth rate from

1965 to 1990 shows a .44 correlation with emphasis on Rational-Legal Authority (and a corresponding negative correlation with Traditional Authority). In chapter 6 we probe into the relevant causal linkages: the findings suggest that culture shapes economic life, as well as being shaped by it. In the early stages of industrialization, achievement motivation seems to contribute to economic growth. But insofar as this growth produces prosperity, in the long run it leads to cultural changes that tend to de-emphasize achievement motivation, leading to *lower* rates of economic growth. This points to still another contrast between Modernization and Postmodernization: while the Modernization process is linked with high *rates* of economic growth, Postmodernization is not. Quite the contrary, relatively high growth rates show a *negative* linkage ($r = -.47$) with well-being values. In part, this reflects the fact that Postmaterialists do not emphasize economic growth, and they tend to give priority to protecting the environment, if forced to choose.

Traditional values are negatively linked with economic growth, but positively linked with high fertility rates, as figure 3.7 demonstrates ($r = .48$). As we saw earlier, societies with Traditional values tend to emphasize the family and have relatively large numbers of children. It seems that this is not just a matter of lip service. A society's values and its actual fertility rate are closely linked, probably in a causal relationship. This tends to set up a self-reinforcing process: traditional values not only seem to inhibit a set of norms that are conducive to economic growth, they also encourage population growth rates that tend to offset the effects of whatever economic growth *does* occur, making it still more difficult to raise per capita income. Conversely, both Modernization and Postmodernization are linked with declining birth rates, so the pie gets divided up among fewer people—another example of how cultural and economic factors constitute mutually reinforcing syndromes.

Modernization, Postmodernization, and Democratization

Finally, the Postmodernization process has important political implications. Inkeles and Diamond (1980), Inglehart (1990), and others have argued that economic development is linked with cultural changes that are conducive to democracy, an argument that has been disputed by dependency theorists, neo-Marxists, and some rational choice theorists. As figure 3.7 indicates, there is no correlation whatever between the Modernization axis and the number of years for which a given society has been democratic. As Moore (1966) pointed out, modernization can give rise to either democratic or authoritarian regimes.

But there is an amazingly strong correlation between the Postmodernization dimension and democracy: $r = .88$. We suggested earlier that high levels of subjective well-being, coupled with Postmodern values, including interpersonal trust, tolerance, and Postmaterialist values, should be conducive to democracy. The empirical evidence is remarkably strong: this cluster of cultural traits clearly *is* linked with stable democracy. One could argue that this cultural syndrome is conducive to democracy, or that democracy somehow gives rise to a culture of trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, and Postmaterialist values, or that the cultural syndrome and the political institutions are mutually supportive. We will analyze the causal linkages more closely in chapter 5; for the moment, we will simply observe that Postmodern values and stable democracy go together very closely.

It has been known for some time that democracy is more likely to be found among relatively prosperous countries than among poorer ones (Lipset, 1960). The present body of evidence supports that conclusion. But the linkage between culture and democracy found here is even stronger than the linkage between economic development and democracy. This finding suggests that economic development by itself does not automatically produce democracy; it does so only insofar as it gives rise to a specific syndrome of cultural changes.

Putnam (1993) supports this interpretation, using aggregate time series data from 20 regions of Italy, extending from 1860 to the mid-1980s. He finds that given regions have varying degrees of a cultural syndrome termed "Civic Community" (characterized by trust, tolerance, solidarity, civic engagement, political equality, and civic associations), which is strongly correlated with the effectiveness of democratic institutions in the given regions. Economic development is also related to democratic effectiveness; but controlling for civic traditions, economic development has no impact whatever. On the other hand, a region's level of civic involvement in 1900 not only predicts subsequent civic involvement and institutional performance, but also helps explain subsequent economic development.

Why Does Change Follow Predictable Patterns?

Coherent trajectories of cultural change exist, with some cultural patterns being far more probable than others. Why?

The evidence suggests that in the long run, cultural change behaves as if it were a process of rational choice—subject to substantial cultural lags, and subject to the fact that the goals being maximized vary from one culture to another and can only be understood through empirical knowledge of the specific culture. In this loosely rational process, peoples are maximizing a variety of goods, the most basic of which is survival—and their cultures are survival strategies for a given people. Cultural variation tends to follow predictable patterns because some ways of running a society work better than others. If one is willing to concede that most people prefer survival to nonsurvival, then both Modernization and Postmodernization are linked with outcomes that almost anyone would consider "better." As figure 3.7 indicates, there is a .59 correlation between a society's female life expectancy and its level of Modernization, and a .65 correlation between life expectancy and Postmodernization. Neither process bestows moral superiority, but both Modernization and Postmodernization are linked with a markedly lower likelihood of dying prematurely from

disease or malnutrition. Life expectancy today ranges from as low as 39 years in the poorest countries to almost 80 years in developed ones. This is a difference that few people would fail to appreciate, regardless of cultural orientation. It is one reason why the modernization syndrome had such pervasive appeal. Successful industrialization requires a relatively competitive, impersonal, bureaucratic, achievement-oriented form of social relations that tends to be dehumanizing and stressful; but in societies of scarcity around the globe, it came to be viewed as a worthwhile trade-off. Islamic fundamentalism remains an alternative model insofar as oil revenues make it possible to obtain many of the advantages of modernization *without* industrializing; but we would not expect this model's credibility and mass appeal to outlast the oil reserves.

The Modernization process brought substantial gains in life expectancy by maximizing economic growth, making it possible to sharply reduce the two leading causes of death in preindustrial societies—malnutrition and disease. But the linkage between economic development and rising life expectancy eventually reached a point of diminishing returns.

Postmodernization represents a shift in survival strategies, from maximizing economic growth to maximizing survival and well-being. Modernization focused on rapid economic growth, which provided a means to maximize survival and well-being under the conditions that emerged when rationalization and industrialization first became possible. But no strategy is optimal for all time. Modernization was dramatically successful in raising life expectancies, but it has begun to produce diminishing returns in advanced industrial societies. By emphasizing competition it reduced the risk of starvation—but it probably also increased psychological stress. As we have seen, subjective well-being levels are lower in the communist and ex-communist societies—which are, by some criteria, the most "modern" of all societies—than in the most traditional societies. These low levels of subjective well-being in the ex-socialist world are almost certainly linked with the current crisis in the former communist societies, but the 1981 World Values Survey found low levels there even before the collapse of communism. During the decade before 1990, symptoms of severe demoralization and psychological stress were evident in the former Soviet Union and were manifest in high rates of alcoholism and declining life expectancies.

Postmodernization, on the other hand, has a mildly negative linkage with economic growth, but a strong positive linkage with subjective well-being. With the transition from Modernization to Postmodernization, the trajectory of change seems to have shifted from maximizing economic growth to maximizing the quality of life.

Cross-sectional Evidence of Social Change

Cross-sectional data can be a useful supplement to time series data in understanding processes of socioeconomic change. Although time series data provide the only reliable measurements of changes over time, appropriate cross-sectional data can extend the scope of one's perspective in time and space: its configuration may reflect processes that occurred over many decades or even centuries.

Interpreted in connection with the available time series data, the cultural configurations found in the 43-nation World Values survey suggest that coherent, and even to some extent predictable, trajectories of political and cultural change are linked with given socioeconomic developments. These trajectories are not deterministic: the leaders and institutions, and the cultural and geographic heritage, of a given society also help shape its course. And development does not move in a simple, linear fashion: all trends eventually change direction.

But neither is socioeconomic change random and unpredictable, with each society following its own idiosyncratic course. On the contrary, change tends to follow clear configurations, in which specific clusters of cultural characteristics go together with specific types of political and economic change. The familiar Modernization syndrome of urbanization, industrialization, and mass literacy tends to have foreseeable consequences such as increasing mass mobilization. Modernization is linked with given cultural changes, such as a growing emphasis on Achievement Motivation, and a shift from Traditional to Rational-Legal Authority, which encompasses dozens of more specific changes.

Similarly, the emergence of advanced industrial society, with an increasing share of the public having higher education, being employed in the service sector, and feeling assured that their survival needs will be met, gives rise to a process in which high levels of subjective well-being and Postmodern values emerge—and in which a variety of attributes, from equal rights for women to democratic political institutions, become increasingly likely.