Opinionated Family Migration Policies?

Public opinion and resistance to EU harmonization of family reunification policies in Europe

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Abbreviations

CIDOB: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs
ESS: European Social Survey
EU: European Union
EVS: European Values Study
ISSP: International Social Survey Programme
MIPEX: Migrant Integration Policy Index database
MIPex: Migrant Integration Policy Index
MIPi: Migrant Integration Policy implicative scale
MPG: Migration Policy Group
SEM: Structural / Simultaneous equation modeling
WVS: World Values Study

Overview

Overview, conclusions and discussion
Opinionated family migration policies?

'To be sure, public opinion is not the decisive factor in carrying the European project on immigration forward…'

(Lahav, 2004: 1156)

Summary

Despite the harmonizing efforts of the European Union [EU], family reunification policies remain diverse across its member states in terms of, among many other aspects, income requirements for sponsors and the requirements for the reuniting family member obtaining an autonomous residence permit. This thesis examines whether member states' resistance to the harmonization of family migration policies can be partly explained by divergent public opinion about gender roles and/or about immigration/immigrants across the EU. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002-2012), the European Value Study (1990-2008) and the Migrant Integration Policy Index database (2007 and 2010), this thesis examines whether changes in policies in 27 European countries are influenced by these two types of public opinion, as suggested by previous authors.

The thesis first finds circumstantial evidence for the relationship between family migration policies and public opinion. Specifically, it finds that family migration policies diverged in the EU between 2007 and 2010 and at the same time support for both immigration and sharing the childcare role in the family also diverged across EU member states. When directly testing the relationship, however, the results do not show any influence of public opinion about immigration on changes to these family migration policies. In contrast, the thesis does find a direct negative effect of public opinion about gender roles in the family: European countries with more conservative views on sharing care in the home have more open family migration policies. This latter finding supports the hypothesis of previous studies suggesting that as gender egalitarianism in a country increases, traditional gender role norms of dependency are projected on the migrant 'other', manifesting in restrictive family migration policies, for example, in the form of strict income requirements for sponsors. The finding of an overall negative direct effect of public support for shared-caring on family migration policies across countries suggests that divergent public opinion across European countries on gender norms could be one reason for the lack of strict EU harmonization of family migration polices.

Introduction

In recent years, family migration has become one of the main modes of entry for migrants to the European Union [EU], and for some countries, almost the only legal means of entry (Kraler, 2010). Family migration is defined here as the movement of non-EU citizens (third-country nationals) into EU member states to join a family member for more than three months.[1] The 'family' is usually the 'nuclear family', however this is defined by the state (Kofman, 2004). In 2012, the average percentage of first permits being issued to third-country nationals (i.e. non-EU citizens) for family reasons across

1 This thesis does not deal with the free movement of EU citizens and their family members.

the EU (and Norway) was 34.9%, ranging from 2% in Poland to 72.8% in Luxembourg (Eurostat, 2013b). On average, these proportions increased in EU countries from 2008-2012 (Eurostat, 2013b).

Despite similar experiences, many member states have resisted the harmonization of policies regulating the entry of third-country family migrants. This resistance was already obvious in the negotiations of the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC (Council of the European Union, 2003), where some states pushed for the inclusion of derogation clauses in the Directive to allow for the possibility of including stricter conditions, for example on integration requirements. This means that currently, the Directive does not in fact direct countries toward having identical policies, but is rather an 'instrument of minimum harmonization' (Boeles, Den Heijer, Lodder, & Wouters, 2009: 182). Thus member states have wide discretion about the rights granted to third-country nationals to family reunification, e.g. setting age requirements and income requirements of the sponsoring family member (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Boeles et al., 2009).

The reasons given why countries have only agreed to 'minimal harmonization' often rest in traditional explanations of migration policymaking. Traditionally, migration policymaking is explained 'in terms of a rational balancing of economic interests, electoral pushes, and judicial constraints' (Bonjour & De Hart, 2013: 61). But many researchers have begun to point to alternative explanations of migration policymaking, as traditional theories often cannot explain final policymaking decisions. One of the alternative explanations is the influence of public opinion. For family migration policies, authors have recently highlighted a specific type of public opinion that may influence family migration policies. Notably, Van Walsum (2008) analyzed the history of nationality and immigration law in the Netherlands during the second half of the twentieth century, in the context of changes that took place in family norms during the same period, and highlighted the importance of gender norms in explaining changes to family migration policies. Similarly, Bonjour and De Hart (2013: 62) point out that '[d]ebates about family migration policies are shaped in fundamental ways by conceptions of what the roles of men and women ought to be, what marriage ought to be, what parenting ought to be, and what family ought to be… Such gender and family norms play a crucial role in the production of collective identities, i.e. in defining who "we" are and what distinguishes "us" from "the others."' Such an argument would suggest that diverging ideas about gender roles in the family across EU countries would be a barrier to the harmonization of family migration policies. Other authors suggest that a lack of harmonization of EU policies on immigration may be rooted in divergent public opinion about immigration (Luedtke, 2005). These divergent immigration attitudes can be seen, for example, by the increase in support for populist political parties using anti-immigration rhetoric in some countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, but not being a consistent and persistent phenomenon in other countries.

Research problem

This study looks at how public opinion may influence the changes in family migration policies. It asks: ***can divergent public opinion about gender roles and/or immigration/ immigrants explain the lack of harmonization of family migration policies in the European Union?***

This research question originates from the ideas of Van Walsum (2008), namely that family migration policies embody certain gender norms; and member states cannot agree to having strict EU harmonization in the form of a Directive requiring identical family migration policies because gender norms still remain very different across countries. Van Walsum (2008) clarifies this relationship between differences in norms and policies further by suggesting that *egalitarian* gender norms are related to more *restrictive* family migration policies. This idea seems to be confirmed by anecdotal evidence. For example, Denmark, a country with very egalitarian gender norms, has very restrictive family migration policies, while Italy, a country with less egalitarian gender norms, has very permissive family migration policies. The hypothesis that the lack of harmonization is related to divergent gender norms *across* the EU would imply that there is a link between gender norms and family migration policies across all countries. Testing this hypothesis requires a large cross-country comparative approach. It requires, for instance, looking at whether Denmark, with its very restrictive family migration polices, also has comparatively egalitarian gender norms, and whether Sweden, with its very permissive family migration policies, has traditional gender norms. To allow for the influence of other types of public opinion on the harmonization of family migration policies, such cross-country comparisons should also include an examination of the differences in opinions about immigration and immigrants. It may be that Denmark has restrictive family migration policies because of the anti-immigration/immigrant sentiments in this country. The first step in answering the research question, however, is detailing the recent changes in family migration policies in the EU.

Trends in family migration policies across the EU

In most EU countries, there are different policies regulating family reunification for nationals and immigrants, often with a distinction made between immigrants who are EU nationals versus those who are third-country nationals (i.e. non-EU citizens) (Strik, De Hart, & Nissen, 2013). The changes in family migration policies for this group have been influenced by recent attempts at harmonization at EU level. When family migration was discussed at the European Council in Tampere in 1999, family reunification was seen as a way to *facilitate* the integration of migrants. The idea was to model the family reunification rights for third-country nationals after the liberal rights granted to mobile EU citizens as consolidated in the Free Movement Directive 2004/38/EC (Kraler, 2010).

But by the time the negotiations of this first EU Directive on family reunification for third-country nationals had reached their final stage in 2003, the perspective on family reunification had changed dramatically; the wide-spread perception in governments appeared now to be that family reunification for migrants *hindered* migrants' integration (Kraler, 2010; Strik et al., 2013). In the negotiations of the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC (Council of the European Union, 2003), some member states argued for the inclusion of clauses that allowed some states to apply stricter entry conditions for third-country nationals than for mobile EU citizens. When the Directive came into effect in 2005, its stated objective remained to facilitate family reunification, but the Directive has left member states much discretion about the rights granted to third-country nationals to family reunification in the form of numerous derogation clauses (i.e. 'may' or optional clauses) (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Boeles et al., 2009; Niessen, 2009).

The many 'may' clauses in the Directive illustrate the wide discretion given to member states. For example, Article 4 of Directive 2003/86/EC states that a sponsor's spouse and minor children are eligible for family reunification, but that member states are free to set conditions for other family members, such as parents, children above the age of majority (i.e. no longer a minor) and unmarried partners. Additionally, Article 4(5) of the Directive states that member states may set an age limit of sponsors and migrant spouses up to the age of 21, and in Article 7(1)(c) that member states may require a stable income. Also, Article 7(2) permits member states to require third-country nationals to comply with integration measures.

The 'minimal harmonization' of family reunification policies has meant that some EU countries seeking to restrict their policies, are able to embark on, what previous authors have called, a 'race to the bottom' (Block & Bonjour, 2013:215). Countries on a **'race to the bottom'** seek to implement increasingly restrictive family migration policies (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Strik et al., 2013). These restrictions in family migration include raising the age requirement for family reunification, raising the income requirement, instituting pre-departure integration measures, and limiting family reunification to the nuclear family (Strik et al., 2013). This race to the bottom, as at 2010, was suggested by previous studies to be led by Denmark and the Netherlands, with Austria and/or Germany sometimes added to the list. Joppke (2008:23) called Denmark, the Netherlands, and Austria the **'European hardliners'**, as these are the countries where anti-immigrant parties have been part of shaping legislation. But there are also suggestions that not all countries are on a similar path of family migration policy development, rather that family migration policies are becoming increasingly different or **diverging** (Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2012).

Europeanization is supposed to better align EU member states' policies through the top-down influence of the European institutions (Joppke, 2007), in particular through the

introduction of strict Directives. There are several reasons to suggest that family migration policies are unlikely to converge in the EU, however, and may even be expected to diverge. Firstly, some Directives, such as the Family Reunification Directive, contain a number of derogation clauses and this lack of comprehensive rules for identical policies means that policies across the EU can remain highly varied. Secondly, some countries have opted out of the immigration cooperation (the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland). Although these countries are not completely outside the decision-making process (Kaeding & Selck, 2005; Naurin & Lindahl, 2010; Selck & Kuipers, 2005) and their policies may therefore be broadly in line with harmonization standards (Strik et al., 2013), policies are unlikely to be the same across all EU countries. Thirdly, previous authors have suggested that Europeanization can also happen through the horizontal transfer of information between national policymakers observing each other's policies (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Strik et al., 2013). The idea that national policymakers may find inspiration in each other's policies suggests that different policies can disperse to different countries. This is in line with Radaelli's (2005) 'diffusion without convergence' argument, suggesting that although policies may spread, identical policies will not emerge in all countries.



Figure 0.1. Conceptual model

The weak harmonization of family migration policies means that member states have much discretion in the family migration policies that they can implement, while still complying with the Directive. This thesis examines this lack of harmonization of family migration policies by asking whether divergent public opinion about gender roles and/or immigration/immigrants can explain this lack of harmonization of family migration policies in the EU. Figure 0.1 conceptualizes the research question about the influence of these two different types of public opinion on family migration policies, while allowing for the possibility that family migration policymaking may also influence public opinion. Answering the research question illustrated in the conceptual model above is approached in three steps, addressing the three aims of the thesis. First, the measurement of the changes in family migration policies across countries is addressed. Second, the measurement of changes in public opinion. Third, these public opinion and family migration policy measurements are combined in a panel design to consider the possible causal relationships between opinions and policies.

Theoretical framework - public opinion and policies

Public opinion can be defined as an aggregate form of attitudes. Attitudes are individuals' preferences in specific situations, e.g. whether an individual thinks that women should work (Lück, 2005). As attitudes are analyzed here at the aggregate country-level, they are referred to as social attitudes or public opinion. Policies are defined in two ways, in line with the seminal work by Hammar (1985) on the difference between immigration and immigrant polices. *Immigration* policies are defined as 'the rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign citizens' (Hammar, 1985: 52), while an *immigrant* policy 'refers to the conditions provided to resident immigrants…' (Hammar, 1985: 53). Simply stated, immigration policies are directed at people who are not yet 'here', while immigrant policies are directed at people who are already 'here'. Family migration policies include both of these policy areas, as they refer to the rights of the already present *immigrant* (sponsors) by regulating the entry (*immigration*) of their family members (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014).

A convergence of attitudes can be expected to be related to the harmonization of policies for several reasons. Firstly, this could be so because harmonization is only possible where attitudes have converged. As expressed by Ceobanu and Escandell (2010: 323-324) about EU harmonization, 'these proposed policies are feasible only as long as the national publics agree with what is being offered to them.' Secondly, it may (also) be that social attitudes converge *as a result* of harmonization. A lack of, or partial, harmonization could even lead to a divergence of attitudes, as public opinion follows countries' separate policy strategies employed to deal with the different immigration challenges they face. The causal direction between harmonization of policies and convergence is scarcely theorized and

there is even less empirical evidence. This thesis takes tentative steps toward examining both. It looks at the opinion-policy nexus as well as the policy-opinion nexus across countries, but focuses on the opinion-policy nexus and therefore develops this theoretical direction in more detail.

Opinion-policy nexus

In a bottom-up perspective on policy-making, social attitudes inform voting, with a majority opinion being reflected in majority voting. This majority voting in turn indirectly influences policies (Raven, Achterberg, van der Veen, & Yerkes, 2011; Risse-Kappen, 1991). This process is referred to by Raven et al. (2011) as the *opinion-policy nexus*. As expressed by Jacobs and Herman (2009: 114), '[o]bviously, there is by definition some link between public opinion and policy making in democracies. Politicians and political parties cannot systematically act against public opinion and hope to get re-elected.' Indeed, classical studies such as the work by Page and Shapiro (1983) describe how public opinion is a major influence on the policy changes in the US. When opinions change, so too do policies after a 1-4 year time lag (Page & Shapiro, 1983).

Some authors have previously made the case that immigration policies are a unique type of policy not influenced by public opinion because decision-making remains within the elite-domain (Freeman, 1995). This has since been disputed, with authors pointing out that immigration has become such a highly salient issue in public and political debates, that decision-making is no longer taking place behind closed doors (Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006). It is in line with this latter view, that it is examined here how two different types of public opinion can influence family migration policies: immigration/immigrant attitudes versus gender role attitudes.

Gender role attitudes – family migration policy nexus

Gender role attitudes are defined here as the attitudes about what roles men and women should adopt within the family. These roles refer to how the earning of the family income should be arranged (single, shared-earning or 1.5 model) and how 'care' should be arranged, mainly referring to childcare (one parent or shared with between partners, other family members, and/or with state/market institutions). These views have changed greatly over the last few decades, especially since the 1970s when women entered the workforce *en masse*, creating a vacuum of childcare in European homes (Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011).

Van Walsum (2008) traced how these types of family norms have been used to distinguish the 'national' from the 'foreign' in Dutch family migration policies from 1945 to 2000. Interestingly, she observed that as family norms became more egalitarian, these egalitarian family norms were *not* transferred to family migration policies. In fact, an increasingly traditional view of the family was projected on migrants. She discussed, for example, the

appearance of the gendered notion of 'dependency' in family migration policies, referring to the income and housing requirements for sponsoring family members. These requirements necessitate the sponsor to provide for the incoming family member, which is very much in line with the single-earner view of the dependency of one (female) spouse on the other (male). Van Walsum (2008:239) points out that the aim of these policies was to prevent the welfare state supporting entire immigrant families, but that another way to prevent migrants relying on welfare would be to allow for the earnings of the incoming family member to count towards the income requirement. This would mean that neither partner would be expected to provide for the other, but that both can contribute to the family earnings. Such an alternative policy approach would embody very different family norms, namely shared-earning (shared between partners) rather than the breadwinner norm implied by a single income requirement. Such an alternative policy approach can be observed in Sweden, where the required income represents a single-earner salary rather than a breadwinner salary (Borevi, 2014).

The reasoning that authors such as Van Walsum (2008), Bonjour and De Hart (2013) and Block (2014) give for the influence of family norms on family migration law is that the 'family' is an important way for the native population to distinguish themselves from the migrant 'other'. Family migration especially is construed as 'a problem of culture, identity, and belonging' (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014: 4), with the national identity being 'construed in opposition to the perceived culture and identity of migrants, epitomized by the "migrant"—especially "Muslim"—family. Whereas the "Western" family is imagined as modern, emancipated, and egalitarian, the "migrant" family is associated with tradition, patriarchy, oppression, and even violence' (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014: 4). According to these authors, egalitarian gender norms are used as a marker between insiders and outsiders. Gender norms are used specifically as a marker because culture is arguably fundamentally about gender roles (Bonjour & De Hart, 2013), with women at the center of ethnic and national reproduction (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992). Gender role norms are therefore a fundamental way of creating social boundaries. As more egalitarian norms develop, they are used to distinguish between 'us' and 'them' with one manifestation being in family migration policies. Family migration thus becomes a vital part of defining belongingness to a polity (Block, 2014).

The empirical works of Van Walsum (2008), Bonjour (2011) and Bonjour and De Hart (2013) all look at changes in family norms within one country over time. Another way to look at the influence of gender norms on family migration policies would be to see whether changes in prevalent norms in different countries are reflected in countries' family migration policies over time. Such an analysis would see whether countries with more egalitarian gender norms (e.g. Denmark) have more restrictive/closed family migration policies (e.g. high income requirement), and whether those with less egalitarian gender

norms such as Italy have less restrictive/more open family migration policies (e.g. low income requirement). It could also look at whether as norms become more egalitarian over time, policies become more restrictive. This thesis attempts such a country comparison, looking at norms and policy trends using large cross-national surveys and quantitative policy measures.

Immigration/immigrant opinion – immigration/immigrant policy nexus

Apart from the proposed link between gender norms and family migration policies, other authors have explored the more intuitive relationship between public opinion and migration policies, namely that it is public opinion about immigration/immigrants which influences immigration/immigrant policies. Beutin et al. (2007: 390) provide the following example: 'suppose that the public perceives migration predominately as a phenomenon associated with dead bodies in the Mediterranean, human trafficking, and unemployment. Calls for tighter border controls are often the consequence.' In her review of eighteen studies looking at the relationship between integration policies and attitudes, Callens (2015: 16) states that a 'consistent and positive relationship emerged in several studies between countries with more inclusive integration policies and lower levels of perceived threat and, to some extent, lower levels of negative attitudes towards immigrants'. But authors such as Simon and Lynch (1999) do not find a direct relationship between the attitudes toward immigration and immigrants and countries' immigration policies. Similar to others, they claim that general public opinion has no influence, but rather suggest that lobbying or pressure groups can have an effect on immigration policies (Facchini & Mayda, 2008; Freeman, 1995). Several measurements of immigration/immigrant attitudes are included in this thesis to further explore the disputed link between these social attitudes and policies.

Policy-opinion nexus

The opinion-policy nexus discussed above, where opinions influence policies, has been previously suggested only to exist for *newer* social policies (Raven et al., 2011). Only for policies not yet institutionally well-established would politicians be open to public opinion. Well-established social policies are not suggested to be open to change by public opinion because policies are locked in 'path-dependency' (Pierson, 2001). For well-established welfare policies, previous studies rather have found a policy-opinion nexus, in other words that policies *influence* opinions (Raven et al., 2011). Unfortunately, it is not clear from these authors, whether family migration policy is an example of a new or an established policy.

The policy-influencing-opinion perspective is supported by normative theories of law. As expressed by Schlueter et al. (2013: 672), 'majority group members adapt their pre-

existing attitudes in response to legislative measures, presumably because they recognize that deviations from a social norm produce negative sanctions'. According to normative theories of law, laws can influence conduct and beliefs not just through sanctions, but also through conveying a consensus about a topic (Albiston, Correll, Stevens, & Tucker, 2011). If the legal system is legitimate, then a law will be perceived as expressing a consensus. This consensus may be an actual consensus of public opinion or it may be driven by a small elite. In line with social psychological hypotheses, a majority opinion conveyed by laws will influence individual beliefs because people's attitudes change toward the perceived consensus to avoid cognitive dissonance (Albiston et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2008).

Previous authors have discussed that the policy-opinion nexus and the opinion-policy nexus could work together, reinforcing each other (Callens, 2015; Jacobs & Herman, 2009; Meuleman & Reeskens, 2008; Schlueter et al., 2013). Because the aim of the thesis is not specifically this potential reciprocal relationship, but rather to examine the influence of public opinion on policy, the policy-opinion nexus is not theorized in as much detail. But shortly, for example, positive attitudes toward immigrants may influence inclusive immigrant policies, which then positively influence further attitudes toward immigrants. For gender role attitudes it may be that if there is a negative relationship between public opinion about gender roles and family migration policies, these restrictive family migration policies are then used to further distinguish the native population from the migrant 'other'. Including both public opinion and two measurements of integration policies in a cross-lagged model, Schlueter et al. (2013), do not find this reciprocal relationship. This thesis builds on such previous studies, but focuses on one type of immigration/integration policy, namely family migration policies, and begins by developing a measurement index that is more sensitive to actual policy changes. It also includes different and additional measurements of public opinion, specifically on gender norms.

Overview of studies included in this thesis

This thesis consists of four studies (see Table 0.1 for summaries) that all attempt to disentangle the connection between the lack of harmonization of policies and divergence/convergence of attitudes.[2] Study I starts by looking at the lack of harmonization of family migration policies. The study firstly develops a new index for studying trends over time. It then examines the extent to which family migration policies are diverging/converging over time, looking at countries that take part in the EU's cooperation on immigration

2 All four studies are written as stand-alone pieces intended for publication in academic journals. This approach means that there is some level of repetition throughout the thesis.

and those that do not. Studies II and III look at both the divergence/convergence of public opinion. Specifically, these studies compare the developments in public opinion related to various policy areas–female employment and immigrant policies versus childcare and immigration policies. While these studies assume that more similar policies are related to more similar attitudes, they do not directly *test* how and whether public opinion has influenced policymaking. In study IV, the bidirectional influence of public opinion on policy is tested directly in a causal model, similar to that shown in Figure 0.1. While studies II and III can only provide circumstantial evidence of the relationship between divergent public opinion on divergent policies, study IV combines these findings to draw conclusions about the causal relationships between changes in public opinion and in policies. These four studies together allow for drawing conclusions on the relationship between the divergence of public opinion and harmonization of family migration policies.

Study I. MIPi: A new index developed with implicative scaling for comparing family reunification policies in 27 European countries

Study I looks at whether and how family reunification policies have changed in 27 European countries between 2007 and 2010. It critically examines the most widely-used existing quantitative measurement of family migration policies and proposes a new instrument to measure whether and how far policies have diverged/converged. The study answers the question:

Research Question 1. What is the best way to quantitatively measure differences in family migration policies across EU and non-EU countries over time?

The study finds that the index calculated by the creators of the Migrant Integration Policy Index database [MIPex] does not reflect the developments described by previous studies, namely: a 'race to the bottom' (Block & Bonjour, 2013:215), the race being led by 'European hardliners' Denmark and the Netherlands (Groenendijk, 2011; Joppke, 2008; Reeskens, 2010), and a divergence of policies (Koopmans et al., 2012). Constructing a new scale [MIPi] using the same data but with more rigorous methods, yields results more in line with expected trends: family migration policies are indeed becoming more restrictive and this trend is led by the Netherlands and Denmark. Importantly, this study shows that policies diverged from 2007 to 2010, with little harmonizing influence of the Family Reunification Directive.

Study II. Growing Apart or Growing Together? Public support for shared-earning and shared-caring in 33 EU and non-EU countries between 1990 and 2008

Study II looks at attitudes toward gender roles in EU and non-EU countries. Ideally, it would be interesting to look at attitudes specifically toward gender roles in family reunification policies, but these are not available. There are, however, thorough

comparative data available for general attitudes about gender roles. Importantly, these measurements contain the different ideals suggested by previous studies to be the core of gender norms, namely female employment and sharing of childcare (Sjöberg, 2010), here referred to as 'shared-earning' and 'shared-caring'. Because many of these attitudes are expected to have changed alongside changes in relevant policies, this study looks much further back than other studies in the thesis–to 1990. Going further back in time allows for examining attitudes alongside relevant policy developments outlined by previous authors, namely the harmonization of female employment policies and the start of the informal EU harmonization of childcare policies (O'Connor, 2005). The study answers the question:

Research Question 2. What has been the influence of EU membership on divergence/convergence of gender role attitudes between 1990 and 2008?

The results of this study show that attitudes toward female employment (here: shared-earning) have converged, while attitudes toward childcare not being the sole responsibly of the mother (here: shared-childcare) are diverging. These results suggest that where policies have been harmonized, so too have attitudes. Additionally, they suggest that no or only weak harmonization can be related to a divergence of attitudes. This divergence in shared-caring attitudes lends support to a lack of harmonization of family migration policies being possibly related to a divergence of public opinion about sharing care roles in the family home.

Study III. Moving Apart? The influence of the EU on public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes in Europe between 2002 and 2012

The starting point for Study III is the previous finding of divergence in family migration policies. The study looks at whether attitudes toward immigration are also diverging. It answers the question:

Research Question 3. What has been the influence of EU membership on divergence/convergence of public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes between 2002 and 2012?

The results show that public support for immigration is diverging slightly less in EU countries than in non-EU countries. The study also shows that while pro-immigrant attitudes are diverging in non-EU countries, they are not diverging in EU countries. Importantly, however, the results do not reveal any evidence of convergence of public opinion toward immigration nor toward immigrants across the EU. These results could suggest that the lack of harmonization of immigration policies may be related to divergent immigration attitudes and also imply that as attitudes continue to diverge, further harmonization will be increasingly difficult.

Study IV. Opinionated Family Migration Policies? Examining the influence of pro-immigrant/immigration attitudes and egalitarian gender role attitudes on family migration policies in European countries

The final study combines the data and findings of the previous studies in answering the question:

Research Question 4. Can divergent public opinion about gender roles and/or immigration/ immigrants explain changes in family migration policies across European countries?

This paper is the only study in the thesis that includes a direct measurement of policies *alongside* the attitudinal measurements. The two previous studies only include general overviews of the policy developments and speculate about their relationship without measuring them directly. The results of this final study show that policies do not affect public opinion (the policy-opinion nexus), but instead show some support for the opinion-policy nexus. The study finds that opinions about immigration and immigrants do not influence family migration policies, but opinions about shared-caring do. They have a negative effect on family migration policies.This supports the theory of the opinion-policy nexus and previous research (Van Walsum, 2008) suggesting that as gender role attitudes become more egalitarian, family migration policies become increasingly restrictive.

Data and methodology

The general approach in this thesis is a country-level analysis of *trends* in public opinion and family migration policies over time in EU and non-EU European countries, thus combining dynamic and cross-sectional information in one study of trends. This country-level approach means that the thesis draws conclusions about the possible influence of EU harmonization of policies on the divergence/convergence of public opinion and vice versa. As the thesis is focused solely on country-level effects, all analyses are conducted at the level of aggregated data. The meta-analyses of these data follow the recent caution against using multilevel modeling with small sample sizes and the suggestion rather to return to meta-analyses to obtain more unbiased estimates and reliable standard errors (Bryan & Jenkins, 2015; Hox & Maas, 2005).

For comparing family migration policies over time, this thesis uses the **M**igrant **I**ntegration **P**olicy Ind**ex** [MIPEX] database. This database is created by the Migration Policy Group [MPG], a non-profit Brussels-based European organization, initially with the British Council and now with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB). The project is a collaboration between the two organizations, being advised by 27 national-level organizations (e.g. think-tanks and NGOs). The resulting database continues to be the database with the most extensive number of migration policy indicators. The MIPEX[3]

3 Data accessed 20 February 2013 via http://www.MIPEX.eu/.

Table 0.1. Overview of studies included in the thesis

Study	Title	Research question	Data	Results
I	MIPi: A new index developed with implicative scaling for comparing family reunification policies in 27 European countries	What is the best way to quantitatively measure differences in family migration policies across EU and non-EU countries over time?	Migrant Integration Policy Index data 2007-2010	Results indicate that an implicative scale best show the expected trends. Family migration policies are becoming more negative, led by the European hardliners, and are diverging.
II	Growing Apart or Growing Together? Public support for shared-earning and shared-caring in 33 EU and non-EU countries between 1990 and 2008	What has been the influence of EU membership on divergence/ convergence of gender role attitudes between 1990 and 2008?	European Values Study 1990-2008	Results show that for EU countries, shared-earning attitudes have converged, but shared-caring attitudes are diverging. Such patterns are not found in non-EU countries, indicating that where policies have been largely harmonized across the EU, so too have attitudes.
III	Moving Apart? The influence of the EU on public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes in Europe between 2002 and 2012	What has been the influence of EU membership on divergence/ convergence of immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes between 2002 and 2012?	European Social Survey 2002-2012	The EU generally has a positive effect on public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes. There is no indication of convergence of attitudes in EU countries, however, and divergence is found in public support for immigration.
IV	Opinionated Family Migration Policies? Examining the influence of pro-immigrant/ immigration attitudes and egalitarian gender role attitudes on family migration policies in European countries	Can divergent public opinion about gender roles and/or immigration/ immigrants explain changes in family migration policies across European countries?	Migrant Integration Policy Index data 2007-2010 European Social Survey 2002-2012 European Values Study 1990-2008	Public opinion about immigration and immigrants does not influence family migration polices, but support for shared-caring is found to negatively affect open family migration policies. No effect is found of family migration policies on opinions.

database contains 148 indicators measuring national policies on integration for migrants, including 37 family reunification policy indicators. Data for each indicator are collected in every country by informants, who are researchers or practitioners in migration law, education and anti-discrimination. These informants score policies based on publicly available data, which are then anonymously peer-reviewed by a second informant or national expert. The first complete MIPEX dataset was collected for policies in 2007 in EU-25, Canada, Norway and Switzerland. For the 2010 data, the database was expanded to include Australia, Bulgaria, Japan, Romania and the USA, bringing the total number of countries to 33. For this thesis, only the 27 European countries that are repeated between the two time points are included, as the focus is on the *changes* in policies in Europe across time.[4]

For the public opinion data, this thesis uses cross-national survey data. It uses the best available survey data, namely data from the European Values Study [EVS] and the European Social Survey [ESS]. The EVS is a Europe-wide survey fielded every nine years (EVS, 2008). It is the only Europe-wide survey that includes a range of repeated items on attitudes toward childcare and female employment over an extended time period. The ESS is fielded every two years and includes six items on attitudes toward immigration and immigrants (ESS, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). The ESS organizers go to great lengths to design questions that are comparable across countries, a feat that is particularly difficult with topics related to immigration (Card, Dustmann, & Preston, 2005). Using survey data is the only way to study trends in divergence/convergence of attitudes over time across a large number of countries. It is especially important for the research question in this thesis that the included countries comprise EU as well as non-EU European countries, to enable the study of the influence of EU harmonization. According to Statham and Geddes (2006: 252), '[m]any immigration studies draw anecdotally or from assumed knowledge on public anti-immigration and xenophobic sentiments … without explicitly conceptualizing or analysing "the public." Against this, survey research contributes important explanatory gains...' The survey data used in this thesis respond to this call.

The survey data and the policy data are analyzed using several different methods. In study I, a new scale is developed using the implicative scaling method. In studies II and III, a new method of testing the divergence/convergence of attitudes is developed. In study IV the data are all combined and random-effects panel regression applied, as well as structural equation modeling. These methods allow for controlling between-country and within-country effects, other than public opinion and policies in focus such as an increase in

4 Unfortunately, these data were released too late to be included in this thesis, but will be useful for future studies. Data release date: 30 June 2015. See press release: http://www.mipex.eu/changes-government-and-far-right-emergence-hard-times-integration-policies, accessed 15 July 2015.

migrant population or economic factors, enabling the isolation of the effect of the changes in public opinion on changes in family migration policies.

Conclusions

This thesis looks at how public opinion can influence the changes in family migration policies. It asks: *can divergent public opinion about gender roles and/or immigration/ immigrants explain the lack of harmonization of family migration policies in the EU?* The results of the thesis indicate several findings about the possible influence of public opinion on the harmonization of family migration policies:

- The thesis shows that there has been very weak harmonization of EU family migration policies and that these policies remain very different, with very little harmonizing influence of the Family Reunification Directive.
- The thesis provides evidence that where there is stricter harmonization of policies, there is also a greater convergence of public opinion. This is best exemplified by the finding that for the strongly harmonized policies on female employment, there is greater convergence of public opinion than for weakly harmonized policies such as childcare policies.
- The thesis finds no evidence for family migration policies influencing public opinion. This finding contests the normative theories of law that suggest the existence of a policy-opinion nexus.
- The thesis shows that public opinion about immigration/immigrants does not influence family migration policies, but public opinion about family norms does influence family migration policies. Denmark illustrates this finding: a country with very egalitarian gender norms and very restrictive family migration policies. There are some country exceptions to this finding, however. For example, Sweden has very egalitarian gender norms, but very open family migration policies. Despite such exceptions, on average, public opinion about sharing care in the family is found to have a direct negative effect on the openness of family migration policies.

The above findings lead to the overall conclusion of the thesis, namely that the divergence of public opinion could partly explain the lack of harmonization of family migration policies. The fact that the opinion-policy relationship exists across a number of countries, exceptions notwithstanding, confirms the benefit of large cross-national studies for examining these relationships instead of a case-study approach. The findings of this thesis also confirm the usefulness of including different types of public opinion when studying its impact on policies. The opening quote of the thesis states that 'public opinion is not the decisive factor in carrying the European project on immigration forward' (Lahav, 2004: 1156, 1158), but this thesis concludes that public opinion about *gender norms* may indeed be a part of the European project on immigration.

Discussion

This thesis is a first attempt at a cross-national study across time of the hypothesis put forward by Van Walsum (2008) on the relationship between family norms and family migration policies. The thesis uses the best survey data available for measuring changes in public opinion over time. Additionally, it uses the most extensive policy data available and makes important improvements to the use of the database by developing a new family migration policy index. The thesis also makes strides in studying the divergence/convergence of public opinion by developing a new method for directly testing these trends over time.

Despite these improvements, as with any study, there are also several limitations. Firstly, it would improve the thesis if the policy measurement could be included at three time points instead of two. Unfortunately, the third wave of the MIPEX database became available too late to be included in the thesis. Secondly, the measurement of public opinion should ideally be supplemented with a measurement of people's opinions about the gender norms of migrants with their ideas about family migration policies specifically. None of these measurements is yet available, however, in cross-national surveys across time. Thirdly, it should also be noted that working with country-level mean attitudes assumes that there is such a thing as the attitude of the 'majority' and that this is what influences policies. It may be of course, that only certain elements of a society influence policies, e.g. the elite, or that politicians only appeal to one section of the population. This could be the subject of further study. Lastly, although it can be seen as an improvement on studies looking only at single case studies, this thesis still only has a limited sample, which affects the reliability of the estimates of structural equation models. All these limitations could be effectively improved in further studies

As well as addressing the above limitations, there are also additional possibilities for extending this study. One extension would be to look not just at the official policies in the countries; but also the application of these policies. Rules may stay the same, while the application of the policies changes (Hammar, 1985) or there may be differences in how these policies are applied by street-level bureaucrats (Ellermann, 2006; Van der Leun, 2003). None of these possibilities has been measured here and it would be interesting to see whether the application of these policies is affected differently by public opinion than the policies themselves. Another extension would be to look not just at the *total* influence of public opinion on policies, but also at the mechanisms underpinning this relationship. Some authors argue that public opinion influences immigration policies indirectly through lobbying or pressure groups (Facchini & Mayda, 2008; Freeman, 1995). This potential mediating role of pressure groups and the media would be an interesting addition to the study, but difficult to research the number of countries in the thesis. Similarly, the mechanisms for *how* public opinion about gender is used in *othering*

migrants could also be examined. In addition, by looking at the total relationship of opinion-policy, there could be greater recognition of that fact that even if policymakers aimed to make policies completely in line with public opinion, they would still have to abide by several legal obligations, both European and International Law. Also, further studies could include possible differences across different political systems (i.e. does public opinion affect policies in some political systems, but not in others). A final extension could be conducting a similar analysis using other policies and opinions.

Study I

MIPi: A new index developed with implicative scaling for comparing family reunification policies in 27 European countries[1]

'Since 2007, little changed for non-EU families reuniting in Europe…'
(Huddleston, Niessen, Chaoimh, & White, 2011: 14)

'Thus, the [Family Reunification] Directive contributed to building legitimacy for a restrictive turn that resembled a "race to the bottom."
(Block & Bonjour, 2013: 215)

1 With thanks to the comments from the research group *Interuniversitaire Werkgroep Sociale Ongelijkheid en Levensloop* for their comments on an earlier draft on 5 February 2014 in Utrecht, NL. A previous version of this paper was also presented on 14 August 2014 at the 17th Nordic Migration Research Conference 'Flows, Places and Boundaries, migratory challenges and new agendas' held 13-15 August 2014 in Copenhagen, DK. A version of this paper written with Harry Ganzeboom was submitted to *Comparative European Politics* on 22 April 2015 and is currently under review.

Summary

This study develops a new index for measuring family reunification policies across 27 European countries. Using an implicative scaling model, policy indicators are selected from the Migrant Integration Policy Index database [MIPEX] to create a measurement instrument that is truly unidimensional and sensitive to actual policy changes. The study shows that the new MIPi index is more consistent with expectations about family migration policy developments in European Union [EU] countries from 2007 to 2010 than the existing MIPex policy index. In particular, the new MIPi index shows that there has been a general trend toward more restrictiveness, singling out Denmark and the Netherlands as leaders in this 'race to the bottom'. The results also indicate that the variation in policies between countries has actually increased, despite the efforts to harmonize at the EU level.

Introduction

Recently, there have been numerous changes in family migration policies for third-country nationals across the European Union [EU]. To track these policy changes, quantitative indices have been developed for policymakers and researchers alike to compare policies across countries. The Migrant Integration Policy Index [MIPex] is calculated based on the most comprehensive existing database of these measurements [MIPEX] and is the index most widely used (Huddleston et al., 2011). A simple search using Google Scholar,[1] shows that references to 'MIPEX' increase from 12 in 2007 to 281 references in 2012. Between 2007 and 2013 it yields a total of 994 references to MIPEX. Comparing this to two of the indices discussed by Helbling (2013) in his study of the existing integration and citizenship policy indices, in this same time period, only 52 references are found to the Index of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) created originally in 2005 (Koopmans et al., 2012) and 19 references to the civic integration index (CIVIX) (Goodman, 2010).

The debates about the validity of different indices (Helbling, 2013; Koopmans et al., 2012) culminated in a special issue on the topic in 2013 in *Comparative European Politics* (Helbling & Vink, 2013). These debates mostly rely on correlations between indices to show that they measure the same phenomenon (Helbling, 2013; Koopmans et al., 2012), but such a method cannot show the superiority of one index over another, merely the similarity of these indices. This study argues instead to first identify the trends that the index is supposed to measure and compare the indices alongside the insights that an overview of trends provides.

This study asks: what is the best way to quantitatively measure differences in family

1 http://scholar.google.nl, accessed 20 October 2014 and 22 April 2015.

migration policies for non-EU citizens across EU countries over time? It argues for a new use of the Migrant Integration Policy Index database [MIPEX] on family reunification, and specifically for the use of implicative scaling, as a technique to select and combine policy indicators in a valid unidimensional scale. To evaluate the quality of the old and new measurements of family migration policy indices, the study compares the existing index, MIPex, and the newly constructed implicative scale, the MIPi, with the general trends in family reunification policies identified by other scholars. These overall trends are: a 'race to the bottom' (Block & Bonjour, 2013:215), the race being led by 'European hardliners' Denmark and the Netherlands (Groenendijk, 2011; Joppke, 2008; Reeskens, 2010) and a general divergence of family migration policies (Koopmans et al., 2012).

Trends in family migration policies in Europe

In most countries, there are different policies regulating family reunifications for nationals and immigrants, often with a distinction between immigrants who are EU nationals versus those who are third-country nationals (i.e. non-EU citizens) (Strik et al., 2013). This paper deals only with the variety of policies regulating family reunification for non-EU citizens/third-country nationals. The changes in family migration policies for this group have been influenced by recent attempts at harmonization at EU level. The harmonization of European migration policies was initiated by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The harmonization of family reunification for third-country nationals policies began soon after, being based on the Conclusions of the European Council in Tampere in 1999 (Kraler, 2010). At the time of the European Council in Tampere, family reunification was seen as a way to facilitate the integration of migrants. The idea was therefore to model the family reunification rights for third-country nationals after the liberal rights granted to mobile EU citizens as consolidated in the Free Movement Directive 2004/38/EC (Kraler, 2010). But by the time the negotiations of the first EU Directive on family reunification for third-country nationals had reached their final stage, the perspective on family reunification had changed dramatically; the wide-spread perception of governments now appeared to be that family reunification for migrants *hindered* migrants' integration (Kraler, 2010; Strik et al., 2013). In the negotiations of the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC, some member states therefore argued for stricter entry conditions for third-country nationals than for mobile EU citizens. When the Directive came into effect in 2005, it was a merely an 'instrument of minimum harmonization' (Boeles et al., 2009: 182). Its stated objective remained to facilitate family reunification, but the Directive has left member states much discretion about the rights granted to third-country nationals to family reunification in the form of numerous derogation clauses (i.e. 'may' clauses) (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Boeles et al., 2009; Niessen, 2009).

There are many examples of this 'minimum harmonization' in the final Directive. Article 4 of Directive 2003/86 states that a sponsor's spouse and minor children are eligible for family reunification, but that member states are free to set conditions for all other family members such as parents, children above the age of majority, and unmarried partners. Additionally, Article 4(5) of the Directive states that member states may set an age limit of sponsors and migrant spouses up to the age of 21 and in Article 7(1)(c) that member states may require a stable income. The many 'may' clauses in the Directive indicate the ample discretion provided to member states. These include Article 7(2), whereby member states are permitted to require third-country nationals to comply with integration measures.
The basic trends in the harmonization of family reunification policies identified in the literature are threefold, namely a '**race to the bottom**', '**European hardliners**' Denmark and the Netherlands leading this race, and a general **divergence** of family migration policies.
Some European countries seem to have recently embarked on, what previous authors have called, a '**race to the bottom**' (Block & Bonjour, 2013:215) where countries seek to implement more and more restrictive family migration policies (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Strik et al., 2013). These restrictions in family migration include, but are not limited to, raising the age requirement for family reunification, raising the income requirement, instituting pre-departure integration measures and limiting family reunification to the nuclear family (Strik et al., 2013) (see further elaboration below for selected countries). Strik et al. (2013:59) point out that the shift towards more restrictiveness is not happening in every single country (notably it does not include Portugal), but on average, family migration policies have become more restrictive.
The race to the bottom, as at 2010, was suggested by previous studies to be led by Denmark and the Netherlands, and sometimes Austria and/or Germany are on this list. Joppke (2008:23) called Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria the "**European hardliners**", as these are the countries where anti-immigrant parties have taken part in shaping legislation. In conducting a cluster analysis of the first wave of the MIPEX data, Reeskens (2010) identified AT, CH, DK, NL, LV, CY, EL, UK, FR, NL, NO[2] as having restrictive family reunification regimes.
Among these, Denmark established itself as a hardliner early on, with restrictions on family reunification beginning already in the 1990s. In Denmark, the automatic right

2 All country codes used for European countries are in line with Eurostat guidelines on country abbreviations, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country_codes, accessed 22/04/1 July 2015. Countries included: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK).

to family reunification established in 1983 was abandoned in 1992, by making the family migrant dependent on a sponsor having a family income (Kraler, 2010). The age requirement in Denmark for family reunification was set at 24 years old from 1 July 2002 (Kofman, 2004) and at the time of this study, Denmark still had the highest age requirement for sponsors in any country in the EU (Huddleston et al., 2011). Additionally, Denmark's restrictiveness can also be seen in the form of the country's 'attachment requirement' (*tilknytningskravet*) which requires family migrants to prove that their 'attachment to Denmark' is greater than their 'attachment to other countries' (Schmidt, 2011). Further restrictions on family reunification were instituted in 2010 in the form of pre-departure measures (see below).

From 2005 onwards, EU countries began looking to another model of restrictiveness than Denmark, namely the Netherlands (more about the Netherlands in the next paragraph). This was because from 2005, most EU countries, including the Netherlands, were bound by the new Family Reunification Directive, whereas Denmark, along with the United Kingdom and Ireland, had opted out of Article IV of the Amsterdam Treaty and were therefore not bound by this Directive (Guiraudon, 2001; Kostakopoulou, 2000; Strik et al., 2013). This meant that most EU countries could no longer follow the Danish model and set harsher restrictions than those allowed by the Directive, including exceeding the maximum age limit of 21 set by the Directive, which Denmark has done.

The Netherlands acted as a hardliner already in the negotiations of the Family Reunification Directive, this country being instrumental in ensuring that the Directive left member states sufficient discretion to institute their own harsher criteria for family reunification (Block & Bonjour, 2013). During these negotiations, it was the Netherlands, with support from Austria and Germany, that ensured the insertion of the clause that countries *may* introduce integration measures (Bonjour & Vink, 2013; Groenendijk, 2011). The Netherlands was the first to institute pre-departure integration measures to restrict entry (*basisexamen inburgering in het buitenland*), thus paving the way across the EU for the implementation of restrictive pre-departure measures for family migrants, discussed further below. Some of the other restrictive measures in the Netherlands were recalled in 2010, when the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled against the Netherlands in the *Chakroun* case (Case C-578/08). The Court ruled that the Dutch income requirement of 120% of the minimum wage was not in line with the Family Reunification Directive, after which the Dutch government reluctantly lowered it to the previous requirement of 100% (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Kulu-Glasgow & Leerkes, 2013).

Finally, the lack of strict EU harmonization has also meant that family migration policies have **diverged**, becoming increasingly different from each other (Koopmans et al., 2012). There are several reasons for this divergence of family migration policies despite EU harmonization. Firstly, some countries have opted out of the immigration cooperation

(UK, DK and IE), meaning that although these countries are not completely outside the decision-making process (Kaeding & Selck, 2005; Naurin & Lindahl, 2010; Selck & Kuipers, 2005), and their policies may therefore be broadly in line with harmonization standards (Strik et al., 2013), policies are unlikely to be the same as in other EU countries. Secondly, while Europeanization is supposed to bring policies of the EU member states closer together through the top-down influence of the European institutions (Joppke, 2007), the Family Reunification Directive contains a number of derogation clauses and there are no comprehensive rules for identical policies. Thirdly, previous authors have suggested that Europeanization can also happen through the horizontal transfer of information between national policymakers observing each other's policies (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Strik et al., 2013). The idea that national policymakers may find inspiration in each other's policies suggests that different policies can be dispersed to different countries. This is in line with Radaelli's (2005) 'diffusion without convergence' argument, suggesting that although policies may spread, identical policies will not be implemented in all countries.

There *is* evidence to suggest that similar family migration policies have spread across the EU. An example is the pre-departure measures, allowed by the derogation clause in Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification Directive. Pre-departure measures refer to integration tests/courses that a family migrant has to take before being allowed to join a family member in the country of destination. These measures started in the Netherlands, as mentioned above, before spreading to Germany, France, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Austria (Bonjour, 2012; Groenendijk, 2011). In the Netherlands, such pre-departure integration measures were first imposed in 2006. To be granted entry and stay, spouses/partners and family migrants between 16 and 65 years old who come to join a parent or child in the Netherlands, were now required to take a computer-based A1 language test (before January 2011, A1-minus level) as well as a test of knowledge about Dutch society (Bonjour, 2012). In Germany, such pre-departure measures came into force in 2007. Spouses/partners must pass an A1 language test to gain entry and stay in Germany. Since January 2008, France has required spouses/partners as well as family migrants between 16 and 65 years old who come to join a parent or child to participate in an evaluation of language abilities at A1-minus level and a test on the knowledge of the values of the French Republic. In France, these tests are not a requirement for entry, instead each family migrant who does not pass the tests must sign a contract that s/he will attend the free language/civic values courses provided by the government. In Denmark, the pre-departure policy came into force in 2010. For partners/spouses to gain entry and stay, migrants are granted a temporary visa to Denmark to take an A1-minus language test and a test of knowledge about Danish society (Bonjour, 2012). Also in 2010, the British government instituted pre-departure measures for spouses and partners to be granted entry and stay

(Bonjour, 2012; Groenendijk, 2011). Most recently in 2011, Austria instituted a pre-departure language test 'at the lowest level' without further specification, for 'family members' more broadly (Bonjour, 2012:3).

Although these pre-departure measures appear very similar, they have only been instituted in the few countries mentioned above. Indeed, previous authors maintain that there remains a large difference in countries' immigration policies (Jacobs & Rea, 2007; Meuleman & Reeskens, 2008). In fact, previous authors suggest that policies may even be diverging. Hooghe and Reeskens (2009) show divergence of such policies, including family migration policies. These authors join Huddleston and Borang (2009) in suggesting that the lack of convergence in family migration policies may be related to the lack of *strict* EU harmonization of family migration policies. In one of the few quantitative studies of these policies over time, Koopmans et al. (2012) include developments in marriage migration policies between 1980 and 2008 in ten Western-European countries. This study shows that despite EU influences such as the Family Reunification Directive, marriage migration polices went from being very similar in 1980 to *diverging* more at every time point until 2008 (when the study ended). In other words, while a convergence of policies could be expected when an EU Directive comes into force, convergence cannot be expected when a Directive gives member states too much discretion. In this case, countries will selectively look to each other for inspiration about policies and some policies will diffuse across *some* countries, resulting in a divergence of policies. A way to establish whether there is a divergence/convergence of policies is through the use of a cross-country quantitative index.

Existing family migration policy database and index: MIPEX and MIPex

Quantitative indices are desirable for comparing migration policies across countries and over time because of the impossibility of comparing the wealth of qualitative information on policies across large numbers of countries. An index using a straightforward methodology is preferable, because it makes comparative data accessible for audiences, such as most policymakers and many researchers, who are unspecialized in quantitative methodology. There are lively debates about the appropriate methodologies to construct such indices, for example which policy outputs to include (immigration, integration, citizenship) and/or policy outcomes (naturalization rates, rejection rates) (Helbling, 2011, 2013; Helbling, Bjerre, Römer, & Zobel, 2013; Koopmans, 2013; Koopmans et al., 2012; Michalowski & van Oers, 2012; Reichel, 2011), but the **M**igrant **I**ntegration **P**olicy Ind**ex** [MIPex] appears to be most comprehensive and widely used index to date. The MIPex index is constructed from the MIPEX database created by the Migration Policy Group [MPG], a non-profit Brussels-based European organization, with the

Barcelona Centre for International Affairs [CIDOB][3] and contains 148 indicators measuring national policies on integration for migrants, including family reunification policies.[4] Note that we distinguish here between the MIPex policy index and the MIPEX database from which it was constructed.

The MIPex/MIPEX project is a collaboration between these two European organizations, being advised by 27 national-level organizations (e.g. think-tanks and NGOs). Data are collected in every country from informants who are researchers or practitioners in migration law, education, and anti-discrimination. These informants score policies based on publicly available data. Their judgments are then anonymously peer-reviewed by a second informant or national expert. The informants write comments on all of their evaluations and, unlike with other indices, these comments are freely available (Migration Policy Group, 2011), along with the raw data. While the use of experts has been criticized for being too subjective (Bjerre, Helbling, Römer, & Zobel, 2014), this multiple-staged peer review attempts to avoid that subjectivity. Unlike other expert surveys, all the data and notes are also made publicly available, meaning that the results can be further reviewed.

To complete the information for all policy indicators, the informants are given three response categories. The scores indicate the *level of permissiveness*. The three options are coded 0, 50 or 100 respectively. A score of 100 means that the policy in a country meets the highest level of permissiveness or openness of migration policies. These levels are benchmarked against the highest standards set by EU Directives or Council of Europe Conventions (Huddleston, 2011; Niessen, 2009). Where there are no standards set by a Directive, policies are measured against European-wide policy recommendations. A score of 50 means that a country is half-way to the highest standard of permissiveness and a score of 0 means that the policy is furthest from the highest standard *or* that there is no policy on that indicator in a country if the absence of that policy indicates restrictiveness.[5] As expressed by Niessen (2009: 10), 'the MIPEX assesses whether domestic and European policy changes have the outcome of leveling up or leveling down the rights and responsibilities of non-EU citizens in each Member State…'. An example of this scoring is given here regarding the policy on the right to an autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching the age of majority (policy 24a in Table 1.A1). For this policy, the most permissive category (100) gives this right automatically. The half-way category (50) grants this right only on limited grounds or under certain conditions (e.g. a fixed period of residence), while the most restrictive category (0) does not grant this right.

3 Previously with the British Council.

4 Data accessed 20 February 2013 via http://www.MIPEX.eu/.

5 Since the MIPEX is a normative index of "best" *integration* measurements, for family reunification, the indicators on this policy strand are created within the discourse of reunification being beneficial for integration, though this is debatable.

For most indicators, an absence of a policy would indicate a more restrictive policy approach, e.g. no policy on admitting dependent adult children would mean that no adult children are allowed as part of family reunification. But for some family reunification indicators, an absence of a policy can in fact mean a more inclusive policy approach, for example the absence of pre-departure requirements and upon-arrival requirements for family migrants in fact represents a more permissive policy approach (i.e. score 100).[6] The informants were instructed to leave some such policies 'blank', but to ensure that all policy indicators were included in the analyses, these policy indicators were here coded as '100' instead.[7] For the pre-departure policies (items 22a2-22a8), this meant coding 26 of the 27 countries as 100 in 2007–as only the Netherlands had pre-departure measures at this point. In 2010, it only involved recoding blanks for 20 countries. This practice means that policies can be looked at in more detail, but also avoids the 'hiding' of country differences, which is the outcome of the procedure used in the existing database.

After a pilot study of a smaller number of policies in 2004, the first complete MIPEX database was collected for policies in 2007 in EU-25, Canada, Norway and Switzerland. For the 2010 data, the database was expanded to include Australia, Bulgaria, Japan, Romania and the USA, bringing the total number of countries to 33. The 2007 data include data on six policy strands: labor market mobility, family reunification, political participation, long term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination. The 2010 data include an additional policy strand: integration in education. These six/seven policy strands are further refined by dimensions. In the family reunification policy strand, there are 37 indicators grouped in four dimensions: eligibility, conditions for acquisition of residence status, security of residence status, and rights associated with residence status. Summary reports for each data round are freely available (Geddes & Niessen, 2006; Huddleston et al., 2011; Niessen, Huddleston, Citron, Geddes, & Jacobs, 2007). The MIPEX indicators for family reunification policies are listed in Table 1.A1 in the Appendix.

6 This was the case for 22a2 Level of language requirement, 22a3 Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad, 22a4 Pre-departure requirement exemptions, 22a5 Conductor of pre-departure requirement, 22a6 Cost of pre-departure requirement, 22a7 Support to pass pre-departure requirement, 22a8 Cost of support, 22b3 Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory, 22b4 Language/integration requirement exemptions, 22b5 Conductor of language/integration requirement, 22b6 Cost of language/integration requirement, 22b7 Support to pass language/integration requirement, 22b8 Cost of support.

7 The replacement coding includes recoding all "blanks" to "100", to indicate more inclusive policies in this area. This is done for all of these indicators, including for example coding the indicator for "support for language courses abroad" as "100", although Sweden has no language courses abroad. Coding these policies as "100" is simply another way of showing these countries' permissiveness, while enabling a more complete country comparison. These policy indicators are named sub-questions under the policy dimensions of the first and second question of dimension 2.2 (i.e. 22a1, 22a2… and 22b1, 22b1…).

The MPG and partners have done an invaluable service of collecting detailed information on migration policies across time and countries and freely offering the use of these data. The collated MIPEX database is often not distinguished from the migration integration policy index, the MIPex that is computed from the data. Note again, that this thesis makes the explicit distinction between the database MIPEX, and the index MIPex, because the stepwise aggregation approach used for computing the index seems questionable and should be re-considered. The MIPex calculation uses the means of the 'composite policy dimensions'. For example, with family reunification policies in the Netherlands in 2007, the average scores for the four dimensions mentioned above are (with 100 being the most permissive): eligibility – 45; acquisition conditions – 42; security of status – 50; rights associated with status – 100. The average of these means is then calculated, representing the overall score for permissiveness of family reunification policies. In 2007 the Netherlands scores 59 on the family reunification policy strand [(45+42+50+100)/4], ranking it 14 out of the 28 countries, which is completely out of line with observed trends suggesting the Netherlands is a European hardliner. Canada had the highest, most permissive score (89) and Ireland the lowest (36), most restrictive score. See the MIPex country scores on the family reunification policy strand for the 27 European countries with repeated measurements in Table 1.1.

MIPex and recent trends in family migration policies

Ruedin (2011), examining the reliability of the various MIPEX policy strands, questions the unidimensionality and thereby validity of the family reunification items. The validity of the MIPex can be externally assessed by looking at the index in relation to expected trends as identified above. [8] In particular, does the index reveal the three trends found in previous studies: a race to the bottom; the European hardliners being Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and Germany; and a divergence of policies?

First, when looking at the change in means for the MIPex on family reunification policies, there is no evidence of the suggested 'race to the bottom' as Table 1.2 illustrates through the small (positive!) change in means from 2007 to 2010 (+0.045). This explains why the creators of the index conclude that little has changed for non-EU migrants regarding family reunification (see quote at the beginning of the paper). Secondly, if there is a race to the bottom, this does not appear to be led by the suspected European hardliners. As seen in Table 1.1, Denmark and Austria are ranked among the five most restrictive countries, but the Netherlands and Germany are in the middle of the table. Lastly, there is no conclusive evidence of divergence, with a +0.258 difference in standard deviations

8 Unless otherwise specified, the MIPex referred to here is the index for family reunification policies, rather than the overall MIPex.

Table 1.1. A comparison of MIPex versus MIPi country rankings on family migration policies. Countries are ranked from most to least restrictive. Countries found in previous studies to have the most restrictive family migration policies are highlighted in bold.

2007				2010			
MIPexfam		MIPifam		MIPexfam		MIPifam	
IE	35.833	**NL**	29.545	IE	33.750	**NL**	27.273
DK	36.845	**AT**	56.818	**DK**	36.994	**DK**	38.636
CY	39.167	CH	56.818	CY	39.167	**DE**	52.273
CH	39.792	**DK**	61.364	CH	39.792	FR	54.545
AT	43.333	FR	63.636	**AT**	40.833	**AT**	56.818
LV	46.250	**DE**	68.182	LV	46.250	CH	56.818
EL	47.083	CY	72.727	MT	48.125	NO	70.455
MT	50.208	NO	72.727	EL	49.167	CY	72.727
FR	52.798	EL	77.273	FR	51.607	EL	77.273
SK	52.917	IE	77.273	SK	52.917	IE	77.273
LU	53.333	UK	77.273	UK	53.750	UK	77.273
UK	56.250	LV	79.545	**NL**	57.649	LV	79.545
HU	56.458	MT	79.545	LT	58.958	MT	79.545
LT	58.958	SK	84.091	**DE**	60.179	LU	84.091
NL	59.315	FI	86.364	HU	60.625	SK	84.091
DE	62.113	HU	86.364	EE	64.792	FI	86.364
EE	64.792	EE	88.636	CZ	66.458	HU	86.364
CZ	66.458	LT	88.636	LU	66.667	EE	88.636
PO	67.083	LU	88.636	PO	67.083	LT	88.636
FI	69.792	BE	90.909	NO	67.500	BE	90.909
BE	70.417	CZ	90.909	BE	68.333	CZ	90.909
NO	72.083	SI	90.909	FI	69.792	SI	90.909
SI	74.792	ES	93.182	IT	73.542	ES	93.182
ES	76.250	IT	93.182	SI	74.792	IT	93.182
IT	77.708	PO	93.182	SE	84.375	PO	93.182
PT	88.542	PT	95.455	ES	84.583	SE	95.455
SE	88.542	SE	97.727	PT	90.625	PT	97.727

Note: All codes used for European countries are in line with Eurostat guidelines on country abbreviations, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country_codes, accessed 22 April 2015. Countries included: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE) , Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK)

of the MIPex. Similarly, for only EU countries, the difference is +0.405 and for countries bound by the Family Reunification Directive, the difference is only +0.203. In sum, the family reunification index calculated by the publishers of the MIPEX, referred to here as MIPex, does not support any of the expected trends.

This study proposes that this disconnect with trends discussed in previous studies may be due to the way the MIPEX indicators of family reunification policies have been amalgamated into the MIPex. This study proposes an alternative method, implicative scaling, to improve the use of the data and increase the likelihood that they will show the trends suggested by previous studies.

Implicative scaling

There are several reasons to suggest that the methodology used by the publishers of the MIPEX data in calculating their MIPex-index is the reason why the index does not show the expected trends. Firstly, it appears that *all* the indicators in the policy questionnaire were uncritically included in the index, without first assessing whether they could be combined in a single index without inconsistencies. Instead of indiscriminately including all policy indicators, a procedure should be used to assess the usefulness of including each item for distinguishing between countries. Second, it is unclear how the

Table 1.2. Comparing the means and standard deviations of the MIPex scale and MIPi scale. Only repeated countries are included. Means and standard deviations are also listed only for EU countries (i.e. not CH and NO) and only those bound by the Family Reunification Directive (i.e. not CH, DK, NO, IE and UK).

	All European countries included at both time points (N=28)		All EU countries included at both time points (N=25)		Only countries bound by the Family Reunification Directive (N= 22)	
	MIPex	MIPi	MIPex	MIPi	MIPex	MIPi
2007 Mean	59.523	79.293	59.810	80.455	62.105	81.612
2010 Mean	59.567	77.189	60.041	78.273	62.570	80.165
Difference (2010-2007)	0.045	-2.104	0.232	-2.182	0.465	-1.446
t-value	0.061	-2.004**	0.307	-1.927**	0.552	-1.722
2007 Standard Deviation	14.879	15.496	14.729	15.358	13.760	15.807
2010 Standard Deviation	15.136	18.220	15.134	18.418	13.963	17.579
Difference (2010-2007)	0.258	2.724	0.405	3.060	0.203	1.772

** $p<0.05$, one-tailed

policies were divided into dimensions within the policy strands and indeed whether these data were first examined for multidimensionality. It appears that policies were amalgamated into dimensions without paying attention to the logical and empirical relationships that exist among indicators.[9] This is problematic, also because these dimensions were used for the stepwise aggregation of the MIPex. This implies weighing of policies, which is influenced by the number of items in each sub-dimension, giving greater weight to items in sub-dimensions with a smaller number of items (Bjerre et al., 2014). Any such aggregation should be clearly discussed and justified (Bjerre et al., 2014; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002), but in the case of MIPex, it has not been justified anywhere.[10]
This paper proposes that analyses of family reunification policies need to use the MIPEX in a better way than has previously been done. Previously, Ruedin (2011) has questioned the use of the MIPEX family reunification measurements. He used factor analysis to question the unidimensionality of MIPex. Factor analysis is unfortunately not appropriate for these data, however, due to the discrete nature and often skewed distributions of MIPEX policy indicators. These two features of the data mean that modern item response models should be applied instead. This study thus proposes the use of implicative scaling to examine the dimensionality of the indicators and the usefulness of including *each* policy indicator in a unidimensional scale. Implicative scaling is mentioned by Munck and Verkuilen (2002: 23) as a method to test whether items are unidimensional, when developing democracy indices. At the end of his study, Ruedin (2011: 19) suggests this scaling approach specifically for family reunification policies. If items are tested for unidimensionality and only selected if they sufficiently represent the single underlying dimension, this also avoids the potential over/under emphasis of items in sub-dimensions of the MIPEX mentioned above.
Implicative relationships are fairly typical for phenomena that develop over time, such as immigration restrictions. Such data are interrelated by logical *implication* (or: necessary condition). In other words, imposing a policy of further restrictiveness would *imply* that more permissive policies become irrelevant, because a new policy incorporates the old restrictions. Models for these types of data are known as scalogram, cumulative scaling or guttman scales, after Guttman (1944). These scales have been used particularly in

9 Additionally, some policy indicators were also inexplicably aggregated by the MIPex creators. For the eligibility dimension within the family reunification policy strand, two indicators are grouped into "family reunion eligibility conditions" namely: "eligibility for ordinary legal residents" and "documents taken into account to be eligible for family reunion". Two other indicators are grouped under "eligibility conditions for partners other than spouses", namely: "eligibility for stable long term relationships or registered partnerships" and "age limits for sponsors and spouses". These four indicators are used separately here, namely 21a1 and 21a2 (i.e. sub-questions of the first question in dimension 2.1) and 21b1 and 21 b2 (i.e. sub-questions of the second question in dimension 2.1).

10 Correspondence with the Migrant Policy Group on 23 and 25 October 2013 also did not clarify the reasons behind these choices.

educational testing but also in attitudinal research. For example, Mokken (1971) applies this method in political attitude research. Munck and Verkuilen (2002: 23) mention it in relation to developing democracy indices. The technique is referred to here as 'implicative scaling' to emphasize the *implicational relationships* between policies discussed above which the scale implies. An accessible introduction is provided by Van Schuur (2011).

A formal procedure for implicative scaling concentrates on the degree to which logical inconsistencies arise in empirical data. Loevinger (1948) defined the statistic H (for homogeneity) that expresses the observed count of such inconsistencies in a normalized way. Loevinger H coefficient calculates the errors for each pair of items as follows: H_{ij} = 1- [Observed N_{ij} (1, 0)] / [Expected N_{ij} (1, 0)]. The expected value N_{ij} is calculated assuming that the items are independent, i.e. do not have an underlying dimension in common. Whether an item fits the scale is determined by testing whether the observed errors arise significantly less than expected under statistical independence, expressed in a z-statistic. A good scale should have high Loevinger H coefficients for all pairs of items, similar to factor loadings in a common factor analysis. When aggregated over items,

H is similar to estimating the reliability of a scale using internal consistency, e.g. Cronbach's α. The cut-off values used to judge the homogeneity of a scale are as follows: > 0.30 indicates a useful scale; > 0.40 indicates a medium-strong scale; and > 0.50 indicates a strong scale (Engelhard, 2008; Van Schuur, 2011).

Table 1.3 shows a simplified version of a calculation of the Loevinger H coefficient for data from 2007 and 2010 on policies 23b and 24a. Policy 24a (on the right to an autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching the age of majority) is the more permissive of the two, i.e. this policy is more widely implemented across countries. Policy 23b (on the grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status) is the less permissive of the two, i.e. countries are more widely *restrictive* on this policy. For the countries and the policies to fit a unidimensional scale, countries should *not* be restrictive on a widely permissive policy (i.e. 0 on policy 24a), while being permissive on a widely restrictive policy (i.e. 50 or 100 on policy 23b). This means that the logical inconsistency (or 'error cell') of those countries that do not follow the expected scale pattern is at the top right of Table 1.3. In this case, two countries in three instances (Ireland in 2007 and 2010 and Luxembourg in 2007) do not follow the implicative pattern: both countries have permissive policies on eligibility for dependent adults, while having restrictive grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status. If the two policies were independent, we would expect 7.24 countries in the error cell (N_{ij} = (23*17)/54). For three instances in the error cell, a Loevinger's H = 1 – (3/7.2) = 0.59 is well above the minimum criteria mentioned above.

The **loevh** routine in Stata calculates Loevinger H coefficients for all pairs of items,

Table 1.3. Cross-tabulation of frequencies of the more permissive policy 23b with the more restrictive policy 24a in 2007 and 2010 data. Highlighted cell is the 'error' cell

		Policy 23b – Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or renewing status		
		50 or 100	0	Total
Policy 24a – Rights to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	50 or 100	20 (AT07, AT10, CH10, CY07, CY10, CZ07, DK07, DK10, FI07, FI10, LT10, LT07, LU10, MT07, MT10, NL10, SK07, SK10, UK07, UK10)	3 (IE07, IE10, LU07)	23
	0	17 (CZ07, CZ10, DE07, DE10, EL07, EL10, FR07, FR10, HU07, HU10, LV07, LV10, NL07, NO07, NO10, SI07, SI10)	14 (BE07, BE10, EE07, EE10, ES07, ES10, IT07, IT10, PO07, PO10, PT07, PT10, SE07, SE10)	31
	Total	37	17	54

indicating how well each item fits the common scale.[11] This procedure was done here on all policies both for 2007 and 2010, including European countries with repeated measurements (N=27).[12] Backward elimination was used to remove policies that do not fit the common scale (i.e. those with low Loevinger H coefficients). This was repeated until all Loevinger H coefficients exceeded 0.30.[13] This process resulted in the exclusion of 15 of the 37 policies[14] that do not fit the common scale, according to the method,

11 The **msp.ado** routine also written for Stata, based on Mokken (1971), automatically divides indicators into scales, but the step-by-step approach used here allows for maintaining control over the procedure.

12 AT, BE, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, NO, PO, PT, SE, SI, SK, UK

13 Note that 24a has a borderline H coefficient of .263, but this item is left in to ensure that all subtopics are included in the scale and because the scale is strong with its inclusion.

14 List of policy indicators excluded, in order of removal:
22a2 Level of language requirement for family member abroad
24b Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional violence
23c Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law)
21b1 Eligibility for stable long term relationships or registered partnerships
24e Access to employment and self-employment
23d Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal
24f Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing
21a1 Eligibility for ordinary legal residents
24d Access to education and training for adult family members
22e Maximum length of application procedure
22c Accommodation requirement
21b2 Age limits for sponsors and spouses
22f Costs of application and/or issue of status
24c Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor
21a2 Documents taken into account to be eligible for family reunion

because: they do not measure the same phenomenon, are irrelevant for distinguishing between countries, or contain measurement error. Note that the final selection still includes items from all the original MIPEX subcategories: 2.1 eligibility, 2.2 conditions for acquisition of status, 2.3 security of status and 2.4 rights associated with status. The overall fit of the scale containing the remaining 22 policies is 0.528, which indicates a strong scale (Van Schuur, 2011). The items are shown in Table 1.4 ranked by H (homogeneity) coefficients–the z-statistic and the p-values indicate that all H coefficients are significantly different from 0, in other words, significantly correlated with the rest of the items (Van Schuur, 2011).

The policy indicators are also shown in Tables 1.A2 and 1.A3 in the Appendix, ordered by the 'popularity' of policy indicators. The term 'popularity' stems from attitudinal research, where attitudes are ranked by how 'popular' (or: widespread) they are. In this application, a 'popular' policy would be one where permissiveness is widespread.

The selected policy items are thus listed in Table 1.A3 for 2007 from the most 'popular' policy, '22a4 Pre-departure requirement exemptions' to the least 'popular' policy, '23b Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status'.

The un-weighted average of the 22 selected policies is taken as the **M**igrant **I**ntegration **P**olicy **i**mplicative scale on the permissiveness of family reunification policies or: MIPi. Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between scores in 2007 and 2010 to illustrate the country rankings and where countries have changed over this time period. Table 1.1 shows the rankings of the countries for this scale compared to the MIPex. Note, that some countries having the same overall MIPi score does not mean that they have identical scores on all polices. For example, Poland and Spain both score 93.182 in 2007, but in Spain this stems from scoring '50' on policy indicators 21c, 22d and 24a, while Poland scores '50' on 21d, 24a and 21e. The scaling procedure considers these combinations as equivalent in permissiveness.

Validation results

The quality of the MIPex versus the MIPi scales on the permissiveness of family reunification policies are compared to the three trends found in previous studies–the race to the bottom, the European hardliners, and divergence of policies.[15]

15 Another way of establishing construct validity is showing that the MIPi is closely related to criterion variables. This is done elsewhere (Søndergaard, 2015). An additional test of the measurement quality of the MIPi versus the MIPEX would be to compare the measurements over time in a simplex model similar to the procedure in other studies (Søndergaard, 2014b; Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013), but this can only be done with three data points.

Table 1.4. Family migration policies in the MIPi scale, ranked by H coefficient, N= 54. See details of coding of policies in Appendix Table 1.A1.

#	Policy indicator	Loevinger H	Z-statistic	H0: Hj<=0 p-value
22b1	Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	0.748	15.591	0.000
22b3	Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	0.721	15.931	0.000
22a4	Exemptions of pre-departure requirement	0.684	12.589	0.000
22a3	Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad	0.650	12.752	0.000
22a5	Conductor of pre-departure requirement	0.650	12.752	0.000
22a1	Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad	0.643	13.132	0.000
22a6	Cost of pre-departure requirement	0.638	12.489	0.000
23b	Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status	0.616	8.047	0.000
22a7	Support to pass pre-departure requirement	0.602	11.081	0.000
22a8	Cost of support for family member abroad	0.601	10.801	0.000
22b2	Level of language requirement after arrival on territory	0.567	12.234	0.000
22b7	Support to pass language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	0.538	10.751	0.000
22b8	Cost of support after arrival on territory	0.486	10.263	0.000
22b5	Conductor of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	0.463	9.642	0.000
21c	Eligibility of minor children	0.460	10.249	0.000
22b6	Cost of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	0.457	9.505	0.000
21e	Eligibility of dependent adult children	0.455	8.109	0.000
21d	Eligibility of dependent relatives in the ascending line	0.445	8.231	0.000
23a	Duration of validity of permit	0.434	9.151	0.000
22b4	Exemptions of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	0.368	6.773	0.000
22d	Economic resources requirement	0.304	6.158	0.000
24a	Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	0.263	4.655	0.000
Scale		0.528	32.511	0.000



Figure 1.1. Relationship between MIPi scores in 2007 and 2010, correlation 0.960

Race to the bottom

According to the overall expected trends outlined above, countries appear to be competing for the most restrictive family migration policies. As shown in Table 1.2, the MIPex shows a slightly more *permissive* trend for policies (+.045), while the MIPi scale shows the expected negative trend, with the means changing by -2.104 between the two time points. It should be noted that because the means for the two scales are slightly different, their absolute numbers cannot be compared, only the *differences* in the means between time points can be compared. Paired-samples t-tests showed that while the MIPex change is not significant (t= 0.061, p= 0.476, one-tailed), the MIPi change is significant (t= -2.004, p< 0.05, one-tailed).

The harmonization of family reunification policies may have resulted in a different 'race' for EU countries than for non-EU countries (i.e. not CH and NO). The MIPi results in Table 1.2 show that even though the EU countries have become significantly more restrictive between the two time periods (t=-1.927, p< 0.05, one-tailed), the means are slightly higher in EU countries than in non-EU countries (e.g. MIPifam 2007 for all countries: 79.293 versus 80.455 for just EU countries). This suggests a small liberalizing influence of the EU,

regardless of whether countries are bound by the Family Reunification Directive. Although the Directive only binds a group of countries to minimum standards, it may influence the permissiveness of policies; a better test of the possible influence is to look just at the countries bound by the Directive. The results in Table 1.2 of both the MIPex and the MIPi scales show slightly more permissive policies for the Directive-bound countries: e.g. for MIPi 2007: 79.293 in all countries versus 81.612 in countries bound by the Directive. The changes in these means for Directive-bound countries from 2007 to 2010 also show a more positive trend in these countries: MIPex: +.203 and MIPi: +1.772. These results support the idea that despite the Directive allowing much discretion for countries, there may be a difference between the countries bound by the Directive and those that are not. The countries bound by the Directive appear to be on a slower race to the bottom and a paired-sample t-test of the MIPi shows that there is no significant move toward the bottom for the countries bound by the Directive ($t = -1.722$, $p = 0.05$, one-tailed).

European hardliners

Where the MIPex did not clearly single out the European hardliners identified in the literature except for Denmark, Table 1.1 shows that using the MIPi scale, the suspected countries appear. The most restrictive countries listed here are NL, AT, CH, DK, FR, DE, CY, NO, EL, IE and UK, very similar to those identified by Reeskens (2010) as having restrictive family reunification regimes (AT, CH, DK, NL, LV, CY, EL, UK, FR, NL, NO). For the MIPi family reunification policy scale, Denmark is again shown as one of the hardliners, but additionally Germany and Austria are listed as being restrictive and the Netherlands turns out to be the most restrictive country for both time points, in line with expectations from outlined trends. These differences in the rankings of countries between the two scales can be seen in the correlations between the scales, shown in Table 1.5. For both scales, the correlations between time points is very high (MIPex: 0.969, MIPi: 0.960), indicating that the ranking of countries remains fairly stable between time points. But the correlations *between* the scales clearly show that there are differences in rankings. The MIPex rankings and the MIPi scale correlate by 0.569 in 2007 and 0.601 in 2010. Note that such correlations are used by previous studies to show that scales are measuring the same phenomenon, without examining where the differences in country rankings are and comparing them to expected trends in policy developments. The differences in rankings appear to be especially at the more restrictive end of policies, with the MIPi scale allotting a different ranking for the expected European hardliners. For both scales, the same countries are consistently permissive, namely Sweden and Portugal, countries which are also shown in other studies to have open family migration policies, e.g. Strik et al. (2013) for Portugal and Borevi (2014) for Sweden.

Table 1.5. Correlations between the MIPex scale on family reunification policies and the MIPi scale in 2007 and 2010.

	MIPexfam 2007	MIPexfam 2010	MIPifam2007	MIPifam 2010
MIPexfam 2007	1			
MIPexfam 2010	0.969	1		
MIPifam 2007	0.569	0.617	1	
MIPifam 2010	0.560	0.601	0.960	1

Divergence

Whereas the MIPex showed hardly any change from 2007 to 2010 in the restrictiveness of policies, the MIPi scale presents a very different picture. The MIPi scale shows divergence between countries over time, in line with the findings of expected trends discussed above. As seen in Table 1.2, for the MIPi scale, the standard deviation increases by +2.724 from 15.496 in 2007 to 18.220 in 2010. These results support previous studies that have shown divergence of policies using other data than the MIPEX.

Similar to the examination of the means, the standard deviations were also examined separately for EU countries and separately for those bound by the Family Reunification Directive. As indicated in Table 1.3, for the 25 EU countries, the MIPi shows a divergence of policies (+3.060) in fact greater than for all countries together. But it also shows substantially less divergence for the 22 countries bound by the Directive (+1.772). Unfortunately, for our case of the two dependent samples, we have not found a formal test of the significance of the change in variance. But we can conclude from the size of the standard deviations that while the MIPex scale does not provide overwhelming evidence for the divergence hypothesis, regardless of whether countries are in the EU or bound by the Directive, the MIPi shows a clearer indication of divergence. Both scales show slightly *less* divergence for the countries bound by the Directive, but there is no indication of convergence of policies, despite the seemingly overall (small) positive influence of the EU and the Directive.

Conclusions and discussion

This study explores improvements to quantitative cross-country comparisons of family migration policies. It suggests a range of improvements to the use of the extensive MIPEX data, particularly in the form of implicative scaling, resulting in a short and certified unidimensional index MIPi. The study tests two scales, MIPex and MIPi, against each other by comparing the index results to existing studies on family migration policies. The results show that the MIPi scale on the permissiveness of family reunification policies, yields results similar to the expected trends in policy developments from 2007 and 2010,

whereas the MIPex index calculated by the publishers of the MIPEX data does not. The results of the MIPi scale show firstly that there is indeed a race to the bottom on family migration policies from 2007 to 2010. Secondly, it shows that this race toward restrictiveness is led by the European hardliner countries, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Germany. These results are not found with the scale calculated by the publishers of MIPEX. Lastly, there is evidence to support a divergence of policies, despite most countries being bound by the Family Reunification Directive, which is in line with other cross-country quantitative studies on family migration and with the 'diffusion without convergence theory' by Radaelli (2005). This study therefore concludes that the MIPi scale is a more adequate instrument to represent changes in family reunification policies across EU and non-EU countries than the MIPex.

Overall, the results suggest the need for more thorough evaluation of the quality of the comparative family migration policy measurements currently available. The study explores another method for establishing the validity of a measurement than correlating it with other indices. This is done by comparing results to an overview of previous study findings, thereby integrating the insights from case studies into the study. It should be noted that this study does not look at the *outcome* of these family migration policies nor how these policies are applied in different countries. This could be a useful extension to this study. A second improvement to the study could be to examine further whether family migration policies follow just one line of policy development policies, as implied by the implicative scaling model, or whether there is a different implicative logic with different types of policies. A third improvement could be made with the latest MIPEX data.[16] This new data would enable us to see more clearly whether the trends described here are continuing and to examine the *recent* developments in the differences between countries bound by Directive 2003/83, and those not bound by the Directive, e.g. recent increased restrictiveness in the UK after 2010. Lastly, to further test the findings of this study, implicative scaling could be applied to the other policy strands in the MIPEX to see whether the implicative scaling approach also better represents changes in policy strands such as anti-discrimination or naturalization policies. This could all be usefully explored in future studies.

16 Unfortunately, these data were released too late to be included in the analysis of this study, but could be useful for future studies. Data release date: 30 June 2015. See press release: http://www.mipex.eu/changes-government-and-far-right-emergence-hard-times-integration-policies, accessed 15 July 2015.

Table 1.A1. Family reunification policies in the MIPEX policy evaluation table

Policy number**	*Policy*	*Option 3 - 100*	*Option 2 - 50*	*Option 1 - 0*
2.1 ELIGIBILITY				
21a1	Eligibility for ordinary legal residents	≤ 1 year of legal residence and/or holding a residence permit for ≤ 1 year (please specify)	> 1 year of legal residence and/or holding a permit for > 1 year (please specify)	≥ 2 years of legal residence and/or holding a permit for ≥ 2 years (please specify)
21a2	Documents taken into account to be eligible for family reunion	Any residence permit	Certain residence permits excluded	Permanent residence permit
21b1	Eligibility for partners other than spouses: a. Stable long-term relationship, b. Registered partnership	Both	Only one or only for some types of partners (ex. homosexuals) (please specify)	Neither. Only spouses.
21b2	Age limits for sponsors and spouses	≤ Age of majority in country (18 years)	> 18 ≤ 21 years with exemptions (please specify age)	> 21 years OR > 18 years without exemptions (please specify age)
21c	Eligibility for minor children (<18 years), a. Minor children, b. Adopted children, c. Children for whom custody is shared	All three	Only a and b	a and b but with limitations (please specify)
21d	Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line	Allowed	Certain conditions (other than dependency) apply	Not allowed
21e	Eligibility for dependent adult children	Allowed	Certain conditions (other than dependency) apply	Not allowed

2.2 CONDITIONS FOR ACQUISITION OF STATUS				
22a1	Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad (if no measure, leave blank)	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/ information (please specify which)	Requirement to take a language course	Requirement includes language test/ assessment
22a2	Level of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted). 1. These levels come from the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). If national data is not directly translated into CEFR levels, an approximation can be made from the CEFR's global scales: http://www.coe.int/T/DG4/ Portfolio/?L=E&M=/main_pages/levels.html	A1 or less set as standard	A2 set as standard	B1 or higher set as standard OR no standards, based on administrative discretion. (please specify which)
22a3	Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad, ex. not language, but social/cultural (if no measure, leave blank)	None OR voluntary information/ course (please specify)	Requirement to take an integration course	Requirement to pass an integration test/ assessment
22a4	Pre-departure requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank), a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications, b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability	Both of these (please specify)	One of these please specify	Neither of these
22a5	Conductor of pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank), a. Language or education specialists, b. Independent of government (ex. not directly subcontracted by or part of a government department)	a and b, ex. language or education institutes (please name)	a but not b, ex. citizenship/ integration unit in government (please name)	Neither a nor b, ex. police, foreign service, general consultant (please name)
22a6	Cost of pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank)	No or nominal costs (please specify amount)	Normal costs (please specify amount) ex. If provided by state, same as regular administrative fees. If provided by private sector, same as market price in countries	Higher costs (please specify amount)

22a7	Support to pass pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank), a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide, b. Assessment based on publicly available course	a and b	a or b	Neither a nor b
22a8	Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank)	No or nominal costs (please specify amount)	Normal costs (please specify amount) ex. If provided by state, same as regular administrative fees. If provided by private sector, same as market price in countries	Higher costs (please specify amount)
22b1	Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory (if no measure, leave blank), Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments.	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/ information (please specify which)	Requirement to take a language course	Requirement includes language test/ assessment
22b2	Level of language requirement, (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted), Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments. 1. These levels come from the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). If national data is not directly translated into CEFR levels, an approximation can be made from the CEFR's global scales: http://www.coe.int/T/DG4/Portfolio/?L=E&M=/main_pages/levels.html	A1 or less set as standard	A2 set as standard	B1 or higher set as standard OR no standards, based on administrative discretion. (please specify)
22b3	Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory ex. not language, but social/cultural	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/ information (please specify which)	Requirement to take an integration course	Requirement includes integration test/ assessment
22b4	Language/integration requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank), a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications, b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability	Both of these (please specify)	One of these (please specify)	Neither of these

22b5	Conductor of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank), a. Language or education specialists, b. Independent of government (ex. not directly subcontracted by or part of a government department)	a and b, ex. language or education institutes (please name)	a but not b, ex. integration unit in government (please name)	Neither a nor b, ex. police, foreign service, general consultant (please name)
22b6	Cost of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)	No or nominal costs (please specify amount)	Normal costs (please specify amount) ex. If provided by state, same as regular administrative fees. If provided by private sector, same as market price in countries	Higher costs (please specify amount)
22b7	Support to language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank), a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide, b. Assessment based on publicly available course	a and b	a or b	Neither a nor b
22b8	Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank)	No or nominal costs (please specify amount)	Normal costs (please specify amount) ex. If provided by state, same as regular administrative fees. If provided by private sector, same as market price in countries	Higher costs (please specify amount)
22c	Accommodation requirement	None	Appropriate accommodation meeting the general health and safety standards	Further requirements (please specify)

22d	Economic resources requirement	None or at/below level of social assistance and no income is excluded (please specify)	Higher than social assistance but source is not linked with employment (please specify)	Linked to employment/ no social assistance
22e	Maximum length of application procedure	≤ 6 months defined by law (please specify)	> 6 months but the maximum is defined by law (please specify)	No regulation on maximum length
22f	Costs of application and/or issue of status	None	Same as regular administrative fees and duties in the country (please specify amounts for each)	Higher costs (please specify amounts for each)
2.3 SECURITY OF STATUS				
23a	Duration of validity of permit	Equal to sponsor's residence permit and renewable	Not equal to sponsor's residence permit but ≥ 1 year renewable permit	< 1 year renewable permit or new application necessary
23b	Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status: a. Actual and serious threat to public policy or national security, b. Proven fraud in the acquisition of permit (inexistent relationship or misleading information). c. Break-up of family relationship (before three years) d. Original conditions are no longer satisfied (ex. unemployment or economic resources)	No other than a-b	Grounds include c	All grounds and others than those included on the list, such as d and others
23c	Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law) : a. Solidity of sponsor's family relationship b. Duration of sponsor's residence in MS c. Existing links with country of origin d. Physical or emotional violence	All elements	Elements include any of these (or other) but not all	No elements
23d	Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal, a. reasoned decision b. right to appeal c. representation before an independent administrative authority and/or a court	All rights	At least a and b	One or both of a and b are not guaranteed

2.4 RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH STATUS				
24a	Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	After ≤ 3 years	After > 3 ≤ 5 years	After > 5 years or upon certain conditions (e.g. normal procedure for permanent residence)
24b	Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional violence	Yes automatically	Yes but only on limited grounds or under certain conditions (ex. fixed period of prior residence or marriage)	None
24c	Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor	After ≤ 3 years	After > 3 years or upon certain conditions (e.g. normal procedure for permanent residence)	None
24d	Access to education and training for adult family members	In the same way as the sponsor	Other conditions apply	None
24e	Access to employment and self-employment	In the same way as the sponsor	Other conditions apply	None
24f	Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing	In the same way as the sponsor	Other conditions apply	None

***Note** This table is a reproduction of the information on policies and dimensions on the MIPEX data spreadsheet found on their website, except for the policy numbering. The numbering of the MIPEX policies in this study follows that of the four dimensions mentioned by the publishers of the MIPEX data, but does not follow the policy numbering in the data. For example, eligibility of minor children is grouped by the MIPEX publishers under category 2.1 "eligibility". This policy is numbered here as 21c, representing the third question in category 2.1. This makes it easier to interpret than the MIPEX numbering in the raw data (19).

Table 1.A2. Family migration policy indicators included in the 2007 MIPi scale. ranked by country and policy indicator means

COU	22a4	22a7	22b4	22a1	22a3	22a5	22a6	22a8	22b7	22b5	22b6	22b8	22b2	22b3	22b1	21c	23a	22d	21d	24a	21e	23b	
Item	Pre-departure requirement exemptions	Support to pass pre-departure requirement	Language/integration requirement exemptions after arrival on territory	Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad	Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad	Conductor of pre-departure requirement	Cost of pre-departure requirement	Cost of support for family member abroad	Support to pass language/ integration requirement after arrival on territory	Conductor of language/ integration requirement after arrival on territory	Cost of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	Cost of support after arrival on territory	Level of language requirement after arrival on territory	Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	Eligibility for minor children	Duration of validity of permit	Economic resources requirement	Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line	Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	Eligibility for dependent adult children	Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status	
NL	50	50	100	0	0	0	0	0	50	50	0	0	50	0	0	0	50	50	50	100	50	0	29.545
AT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	50	50	0	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	56.818
CH	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	0	0	50	0	0	0	0	0	56.818
DK	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	50	0	50	0	50	0	0	0	0	61.364
FR	100	100	50	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100	100	100	50	50	50	50	0	0	50	0	0	63.636
DE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	0	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0	68.182
CY	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	72.727
NO	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	100	50	50	100	50	100	50	100	50	0	72.727
EL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	0	0	50	0	0	77.273
IE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	0	0	50	77.273
UK	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	0	0	0	0	77.273
LV	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	50	50	50	0	0	79.545
MT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	0	0	79.545
SK	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	0	50	0	84.091
HU	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100	50	50	0	86.364
FI	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	50	0	86.364
LU	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	0	0	100	88.636
EE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	50	50	50	88.636
LT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	100	0	100	0	88.636
CZ	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	100	0	90.909
BE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	50	50	90.909
SI	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100	100	100	100	0	90.909
IT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	100	100	50	100	93.182
PO	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	50	100	93.182
ES	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	100	50	100	100	93.182
PT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	100	50	95.455
SE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	97.727
	98.148	98.148	98.148	96.296	96.296	96.296	96.296	96.296	96.296	94.444	87.037	87.037	85.185	83.333	79.630	74.074	72.222	53.704	48.148	42.593	40.741	24.074	

Table 1.A3. Family migration policy indicators included in the 2010 MIPi scale, ranked by country and policy indicator means

COU	22a4	22a7	22b4	22b7	22b5	22a8	22a3	22a5	22a6	22b6	22a1	22b8	22b2	22b3	22b1	21c	23a	22d	21d	21e	24a	23b	
Item	Pre-departure requirement exemptions	Support to pass pre-departure requirement	Language/integration requirement exemptions after arrival on territory	Support to pass language/ integration requirement after arrival on territory	Conductor of language/ integration requirement after arrival on territory	Cost of support for family member abroad	Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad	Conductor of pre-departure requirement	Cost of pre-departure requirement	Cost of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad	Cost of support after arrival on territory	Level of language requirement after arrival on territory	Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	Eligibility for minor children	Duration of validity of permit	Economic resources requirement	Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line	Eligibility for dependent adult children	Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status	
NL	50	50	100	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	0	0	0	50	100	50	50	0	0	27.273
DK	50	100	50	100	100	100	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	50	50	50	0	0	0	0	38.636
DE	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	100	0	100	0	50	0	0	0	50	50	50	50	50	50	0	52.273
FR	100	50	50	50	50	100	50	50	100	100	50	100	100	50	50	50	50	0	0	0	50	0	54.545
AT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	50	50	0	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	56.818
CH	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	0	0	50	0	0	0	0	0	56.818
NO	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	100	50	50	100	50	50	50	50	100	0	70.455
CY	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	72.727
EL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	0	0	0	50	0	77.273
UK	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	0	0	0	0	77.273
IE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	0	0	50	77.273
LV	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	50	50	0	50	0	79.545
MT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	0	0	79.545
SK	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	50	0	0	84.091
LU	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	0	0	0	84.091
HU	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100	50	50	0	86.364
FI	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	0	0	86.364
LT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	100	100	0	0	88.636
EE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	50	50	50	88.636
CZ	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	50	0	90.909
SI	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100	100	100	100	0	90.909
BE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	50	100	50	90.909
IT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	50	100	100	93.182
PO	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	50	100	93.182
ES	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	50	100	100	100	93.182
SE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	100	50	95.455
PT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	97.727
	96.296	96.296	96.296	96.296	94.444	92.593	90.741	90.741	88.889	88.889	87.037	87.037	85.185	79.630	77.778	75.926	74.074	53.704	44.444	40.741	40.741	20.370	

Study II

Growing Apart or Growing Together? Public support for shared-earning and shared-caring in 33 EU and non-EU countries between 1990 and 2008[1]

'Fathers, meanwhile, could take on some of the logistical brain-mulch of childcare, so that neither sex need be incapacitated by it.'
Jemima Lewis, The Telegraph (UK), 12 May 2012[2]

'Because this mentality is ingrained in the psyche of society, even policymakers think in a traditional manner and, consequently, everything is being shouldered by the mother.'
Kristina Chetcuti, Times of Malta (MT), 31 December 2011[3]

1 With thanks to the research seminar on *Interuniversitaire Werkgroep Sociale Ongelijkheid en Levensloop* for comments on an earlier draft on 24 April 2013 in Utrecht. A previous version of this paper was presented on 24 April 2012 at The Normative Anatomy of Society Conference in Lund and on 21 March 2013 at the European Conference on Politics and Gender (ECPG) held at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.

2 'Paternity leave: We all benefit if new dads stay at home'. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/family/9261014/Paternity-leave-We-all-benefit-if-new-dads-stay-at-home.html, accessed 30 May 2012.

3 'Work and having children are both a part of daily life', http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/-view/20111231/local/Work-¬and-having-children-are-both-a-part-of-daily-life.400415, accessed 11 July 2013.

Summary
Attitudes toward female employment (shared-earning) and especially toward gendered child-care roles (shared-caring) have been changing across Europe in recent times. The institutions of the European Union [EU] have supported female employment since the 1970s, but initiatives to fill the childcare vacuum that a female workforce leaves behind only started in the last twenty years. How does this harmonization of female employment and childcare policies relate to public opinion formation? This study uses data from the European Values Study between 1990 and 2008 in the 27 EU member states and six non-EU countries, to test whether public support for shared-caring versus shared-earning has diverged/converged across the EU. For shared-earning, where EU policies have been largely harmonized, attitudes have converged, but for shared-caring, where policies have not been harmonized, attitudes remain divergent. These patterns are not observed in non-EU countries.

Introduction
The debate on changing gender roles continues to rage across Europe, from Malta to the United Kingdom, as illustrated by the above quotes. The past fifty years have seen women increasingly entering the workforce, which has created a childcare vacuum in European homes (Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011). The institutions of the European Union [EU] have approached these two aspects of developing gender roles (female employment and shared childcare) very differently. The European institutions have actively encouraged female employment since the 1970s, but the EU has only in the last twenty years begun to address the childcare vacuum caused by women entering the labor force *en masse* (O'Connor, 2005).
The EU's long history of supporting female employment has already been well researched (Mazey, 1988; O'Connor, 2005). Such authors show that the EU's early involvement in policies on anti-discrimination and equal opportunities has meant that policies are largely harmonized and the last twenty years have not seen significant policy developments on female employment at EU level. This early harmonization of female employment policies contrasts with the developments in childcare policies, where slow progress to address needs only started at the European level in the late 1990s (O'Connor, 2005). It remains the case that it depends on the EU country in question, how the 'brain-mulch of childcare' (see quote above) has been taken over from working women by different combinations of family, state and market institutions (Leitner, 2003).
The paper will look at the possible influence of the EU on public opinion by comparing attitude developments in female employment policies (here: 'shared-earning'), which are largely harmonized, to attitude developments in gendered childcare responsibilities (here: 'shared-caring'), where policies remain highly diverse. 'Shared' here refers to sharing

responsibility between partners and/or with the state and/or with the market and/or other actors. Supporting 'shared-caring' thus refers to supporting childcare models where women are not the sole care providers. 'Shared-earning' refers to supporting the ideal of both partners being in paid employment. This study will not focus on a detailed cross-country comparison of the *levels* of support for these ideals, but rather assess the influence of the EU by comparing the cross-country *trends* in developments of these attitudes over time.

This study of attitudes toward the gendered division of labor is steeped in past studies of differences in gender attitudes and policies. Attitudes are defined here as individuals' preferences in a specific situation, e.g. whether an individual thinks that women should work (Lück, 2005). According to previous studies, attitudes change to allow for norms and behaviors to be consistent with institutions and policies (Francois, 2008). But attitudes can also influence policies, as shown by previous authors. Kaufmann (2002), for example, shows how public attitudes about the family become manifest in political debates and in the implementation of policies.

As the EU widens and deepens its integration, it becomes important to see whether the harmonization of policies follows the harmonization of attitudes across European countries, as public support would ensure the legitimization of European policies. This study tests the influence of the EU by comparing the divergence/convergence of attitudes in a strictly harmonized policy area to ones with weak harmonization, and by comparing EU countries (at different stages of membership) with non-EU countries. It thereby answers the question: what has been the influence of EU membership on the divergence/convergence of gender role attitudes between 1990 and 2008?

Gender role attitudes: shared-earning and shared-caring

Mary Wollstonecraft, an 18th century British writer, describes women's dilemma as being fundamentally between paid and unpaid work (Korpi, 2000). According to Korpi (2000), the Wollstonecraft dilemma is centrally about who cares and who earns and there are different solutions to this unpaid care/paid work dilemma. These can be seen in the five dominant family models (excluding single-headed households) identified by Pfau-Effinger (2004: 383) as existing in European countries: '(1) the family economy model [i.e. in agrarian societies with gendered but equally valued division of labor]; (2) the housewife model in the male breadwinner marriage [i.e. separating the sphere of the male earner and female carer]; (3) the part-time carer model in the male breadwinner marriage; (4) the dual breadwinner model with external childcare; and (5) the dual breadwinner model with partner-shared childcare'. These distinctions between family models are made along the lines of earning and caring responsibilities. This study refers to these two dimensions of gender roles as 'shared-caring' (i.e. care is not the sole responsibility of the mother and

can be shared with others actors, e.g. partner, public/private institutions, other family and/or friends) and 'shared-earning' (i.e. partners share their earning responsibilities equally).

In line with previous studies, this study does not expect the relationship between attitudes toward shared-earning and shared-caring to be perfectly inversely related (Lück, 2005; Sjöberg, 2010). According to previous research, when applying the theory of attitudinal ambivalence, there is often tension between the ideals of motherhood and female employment. Sjöberg (2010), for example, shows how this ambivalence varies across countries, depending on the differences in national policies enabling women to realize both motherhood and employment. Indeed, as explained by Lück (2005:10):

> *We might find women who are 'just' supportive of traditional gender roles, or 'just' job-oriented. But we also might find women who want both, a job career and the responsibility for the children... And we even might find women who find none of the two very attractive.*

Measuring these gender attitudes is notoriously difficult. In the past, some studies have used single bipolar scales that included both of these dimensions in one measurement (i.e. measuring the level of egalitarian attitudes defined *both* in terms of work and care), ignoring the theoretical distinction between the two, or the differences in policy development related to the two dimensions (Brogan & Kutner, 1976; Eydal & Rostgaard, 2011; Korpi, 2000; Nordenmark, 2004). Examining gender attitudes with a single bipolar scale does not allow for the attitudinal ambivalence between gender role ideals found in previous studies (Sjöberg, 2010) nor the differences in care versus employment policies. These attitudes should therefore be studied separately.

Indeed, other studies find two distinct dimensions of attitudes regarding the gendered division of labor in line with the above theoretical expectations, when conducting simple factor analyses on the International Social Survey Programme [ISSP], World Values Study [WVS] and the European Values Study [EVS] data (Lück & Hofäcker, 2003; Voicu & Voicu, 2002). These studies using similar items as those used here, argue for moving away from a single bipolar scale on gender equality. This analysis will examine first whether the two dimensions (care and employment) found in previous studies can in fact be found in the data. It will then use a new method for testing the possible differences in divergence/convergence of these attitudes over time.

EU harmonization of female employment and childcare policies and public opinion toward shared-earning and shared-caring

Previous authors have observed that the EU institutions (e.g. the European Commission) have their own agenda on gender and can influence the national gender policies and culture of EU member states (Duina & Breznau, 2002). Such authors have shown that

the EU institutions have generally tried to encourage egalitarian gender norms, for example in family law (Marella, 2006). It can therefore be expected that the EU has influenced gender attitudes toward being more egalitarian. But, it is important to distinguish between the EU's strong initiatives to encourage women's access to the labor market (related to 'shared-earning') versus the EU's weaker initiatives on childcare (related to 'shared-caring').

Actions at EU level for female employment date back to the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, where Article 119 laid down that women should receive equal pay for equal work. In December 1964, gender discrimination was banned (Mazey, 1988), but it was not until the 1970s that women's equal access to employment was implemented in all member states. On 8 April 1976, a landmark judgment by the European Court of Justice (C-43/75*, Defrenne* v *Sabena Airlines)* ruled that Article 119 should have direct effect in member states regardless of national laws (Mazey, 1988). This judgment was coupled with new Directives that guaranteed non-discrimination of women in the labor force, including the Equal Pay Directive in 1975 (75/117/EEC) and the Equal Treatment Directive in 1976 (76/207/EEC) (Mazey, 1988). A few years later, Directives followed on maternal leave (92/85/EEC)[1] and on the length of the work-week (2003/88/EC) (Pascall & Lewis, 2004). These Directives had a direct impact on member states' institutions, encouraging gender equality in employment. This has meant that across the EU, there are now similarly high levels of female employment, in 2010 averaging 63% and ranging from 42% to 75% of women in EU27 (Eurostat, 2013a). Taking into account that the development of policies on female employment took place before the period examined here, this study therefore expects few attitudinal changes in support for shared-earning from 1990 to 2008, with possible convergence in EU countries.

Unlike the many early Directives on female employment, EU activity in childcare is more recent and hesitant (O'Connor, 2005; Pascall & Lewis, 2004). Initiatives have been in the form of intergovernmental co-operation and encouragement rather than direct and binding Directives that characterized the female employment initiatives. Childcare initiatives include the start of the European Commission Childcare Network (1988, 1990, 1996), the Council Recommendation on childcare in 1992 (92/241/EEC) and the European Commission's affirmation in the 1994 White Paper of the importance of family-friendly working arrangements. More commitment at the European level came in the 2002 Barcelona European Council's announcement that by 2010, member states should provide a certain level of childcare (O'Connor, 2005). Although EU involvement

1 Revisions of this Directive started in 2008, but the adoption of these revised measures is beyond the time span of this study, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0373+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, accessed 1 July 2015.

has increased, the abovementioned actions are non-binding, meaning there is scope for much variation in childcare coverage across the EU. Two years after the Barcelona deadline, for example, only ten EU member states had met the Barcelona target of 33% childcare coverage rate for children under three years old and only nine member states have met the Barcelona objective of a 90% coverage rate for children between three years old and the mandatory school age (European Commission, 2012). There is still large variation across countries (Eurostat, 2013c), which reflects a lack of EU harmonization in childcare policies. In 2011, the percentage of children under three years of age in formal day care averaged 14% across EU27, but ranged from 1% of children in the Czech Republic to 68% of children in Denmark (Eurostat, 2013c). Thus there is still large variation across countries, which reflects this lack of EU harmonization in childcare policies. This study therefore hypothesizes: *Shared-earning attitudes in EU countries will have converged more between 1990 and 2008 than shared-caring attitudes.*

Data and methodology

The influence of the EU is examined here by comparing attitudes in EU member states with attitudes in countries that became EU members during the studied period and with attitudes in non-EU member states. To allow further examination of the influence of the EU, the study will compare attitudes regarding a policy area with strict EU harmonization to one with weak EU harmonization. Using data from the European Values Study [EVS] allows for this design.

The EVS is a Europe-wide survey fielded every nine years (EVS, 2008). The EVS is the only Europe-wide survey that includes a range of repeated items on attitudes toward childcare and female employment over the relevant time period.[2] Data from three waves of the EVS (1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 2008-2010) are used here for all 27 EU member states when they participated in the survey, as well the six non-EU countries that were included in at least two of the waves.[3] These data allow for a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences approach (Ashenfelter & Card, 1986), assessing the influence of EU membership on attitudes by including countries that were EU members at every time

2 The European Social Survey [ESS], for example, only started in 2002, which is too long after EU harmonization of many of these policies. Additionally, there are only two questions in the ESS on attitudes toward gender roles, which makes it difficult to show a distinction between female employment and care.

3 Data from the first wave of the EVS in 1981 were not used as too many of the countries and items were missing. A few countries did not participate in the waves included here. In 1990: BY, CY, EL, HR, LU, RU and UA were not part of the survey. In 1999, AT, CY, IE and NO have data missing. CY and NO did not participate, while AT and IE did take part in the survey, but some of items of this study's dependent variables were not included in the data for these countries. CY was only present in one of the survey points, so all the analyses were repeated without this country, but there were no differences in the results.

point (BE, DE, DK, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, UK),[4] countries that became members at the second time point (AT, FI, SE) and at the third time point (BG, CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, MT, PO, RO, SI, SK), with countries that had not entered as at the third time point (BY, HR, IS, NO, RU, UA).
For the 33 European countries, the average number of respondents for all waves was 1242 respondents per country per wave. In the pooled sample of the 33 countries for the three waves, there were 122,962 respondents, 45.4% men and 54.6% women with an average age of approximately 46.

In the EVS, there are five items on the gendered division of labor that were repeated across waves. All items were coded so that higher values indicated more egalitarian gender norms:

1. Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income (0: strongly disagree, 3: strongly agree)
2. Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person (0: strongly disagree, 3: strongly agree)
3. A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children (0: strongly agree, 3: strongly disagree)
4. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (0: strongly agree, 3: strongly disagree)
5. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (0: strongly agree, 3: strongly disagree)

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted on the pooled data for these five items using Principal Axis Factoring with oblimin rotation. To avoid confounding influences of between-country differences and historical changes, the items were first standardized by country and time point. The factor analysis resulted in a clear two-dimensional solution that was in line with the theoretical expectations of two dimensions of attitudes toward gendered division of labor: support for shared-earning and support for shared-caring (see Table 2.1). The finding of two factors is also in line with previous studies using similar items, although these studies do not term these factors as support for shared-earning and shared-caring (Lück, 2005; Lück & Hofäcker, 2003; Saxonberg, 2011; Sjöberg, 2004; Voicu, 2009; Voicu & Voicu, 2002). The factor A items do indeed appear to measure

4 All country codes are in line with Eurostat guidelines on country abbreviations, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country_codes, accessed 1 July 2015.
Countries included: Austria (AT), Belarus (BY), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Russia (RU), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Ukraine (UA), United Kingdom (UK).

whether women as well as men should earn a living. And the three factor B items all measure whether women should be the primary caregiver–the caring wife and mother. The inverse coding of the factor B items indicates that women do not necessarily want (items 3 and 4) or need (item 5) to be the single-carer, but rather that this role can be shared, e.g. with a pre-school carer (item 5). These items measure the acceptance of women wanting and being able to be more than the primary caregiver and whether it is acceptable to share the caring role with other actors. The overall correlation between the two factors was positive and weak, but it differed across survey time points and countries.

Table 2.1. Two-factor pattern matrix from Principal Axis Factoring with oblimin rotation, using standardized values by country and time point, correlation between factors: .173

	Factor loadings	
	A. Shared-earning	B. Shared-caring
Husband and wife should both contribute to income	**0.573**	-0.019
Job best way for women to be independent	**0.591**	0.023
Women want a home and children (reverse coding)	-0.104	**0.778**
Being a housewife just as fulfilling (reverse coding)	0.111	**0.481**
Pre-school age child suffers with working mother (reverse coding)	-0.011	**0.427**
Cronbach's α	0.500	0.562

The differences in these correlations have previously been studied intensively by the work of Sjöberg (2010) mentioned above and are therefore not examined here.

Two unweighted means scales were created by averaging the abovementioned items (unstandardized), where there was a value for at least two items in each scale: the shared-earning scale with two items (mean = 2.069, SD = 0.649) and the shared-caring scale with three items (mean = 1.318, SD = 0.662). The individual level reliability was 0.500 for the shared-earning scale and 0.562 for the shared-caring scale. These rather low reliabilities can be expected with the small number of items in each of the scales. Note however, that individual level reliability is not the same as the reliability of measurement at the aggregate level, which is the concern here and further analyzed below.

In Table 2.2, the observed means of the shared-caring and the shared-earning scales are ranked from highest to lowest for each survey year. The overall means and standard deviations shown are only for the 23 countries included at all three time points. EU countries are indicated in bold in the table, while the differences between EU and non-EU are explored further in the analyses. The overall means show that for shared-earning (1.968, 2.032, 2.115), support is generally higher than for shared-caring (1.118, 1.356, 1.462).

a. SUPPORT FOR SHARED-EARNING, correlation: .650



b. SUPPORT FOR SHARED-CARING, correlation: .727



Figure 2.1. Relationship between support for shared-caring/earning in 1990 and 2008

Table 2.2. Ranked country means over time for two dependent variables (EU countries in bold). Overall means and standard deviations are only of the 23 countries repeated at each time point

Shared-earning index						Shared-caring index					
1990		1999		2008		1990		1999		2008	
PT	2.465	**SE**	2.317	**FR**	2.401	**DK**	1.645	**DK**	1.861	**DK**	2.109
SE	2.239	BG	2.259	NO	2.388	NO	1.522	**SE**	1.702	NO	1.974
SI	2.196	**EL**	2.236	**BG**	2.370	FI	1.479	**NL**	1.621	**SE**	1.838
RO	2.184	**FR**	2.220	**HU**	2.327	**UK**	1.419	**DE**	1.620	**DE**	1.697
FR	2.133	HU	2.215	UA	2.296	**NL**	1.404	**ES**	1.518	**FI**	1.668
CZ	2.109	SI	2.207	**CY**	2.291	**ES**	1.394	IS	1.510	IS	1.633
ES	2.074	RO	2.198	BY	2.280	**IE**	1.312	**UK**	1.508	**ES**	1.565
DK	2.046	SK	2.181	**EL**	2.275	**DE**	1.270	**PT**	1.419	**NL**	1.559
NO	2.029	HR	2.162	**LU**	2.267	IS	1.266	HR	1.401	**FR**	1.541
PO	2.024	PO	2.149	**SK**	2.264	**IT**	1.228	SI	1.392	**UK**	1.515
IT	2.002	CZ	2.140	**LV**	2.260	**BE**	1.217	**FI**	1.373	**BE**	1.499
BG	1.999	LV	2.138	**ES**	2.252	**FR**	1.207	**BE**	1.370	HR	1.496
SK	1.988	**PT**	2.117	**DE**	2.250	RO	1.201	RO	1.323	**SK**	1.487
AT	1.981	**DE**	2.115	**RO**	2.227	SI	1.152	**FR**	1.282	**BG**	1.451
FI	1.981	**BE**	2.085	**SE**	2.211	SK	1.117	**EL**	1.281	**LU**	1.446
DE	1.920	UA	2.079	**BE**	2.209	**PT**	1.092	LV	1.280	**SI**	1.446
LV	1.916	BY	2.055	**DK**	2.201	AT	1.042	**LU**	1.268	**IE**	1.437
HU	1.913	**ES**	2.047	**PT**	2.191	SE	1.036	BG	1.268	**CZ**	1.403
EE	1.910	EE	2.038	**AT**	2.185	CZ	0.948	CZ	1.244	**PT**	1.373
BE	1.892	**DK**	2.034	**CZ**	2.165	HU	0.946	EE	1.239	**LV**	1.370
UK	1.828	LT	2.021	**EE**	2.115	EE	0.822	**IT**	1.198	**AT**	1.349
IE	1.744	**LU**	2.019	**SI**	2.102	BG	0.800	SK	1.189	BY	1.334
LT	1.719	**IT**	1.999	HR	2.093	LV	0.798	HU	1.158	**IT**	1.295
MT	1.695	RU	1.976	**IT**	2.092	PO	0.763	BY	1.150	**HU**	1.283
IS	1.591	**FI**	1.821	RU	2.091	LT	0.763	PO	1.102	**PO**	1.279
NL	1.437	**UK**	1.726	**PO**	2.060	MT	0.740	RU	1.083	**EE**	1.254
BY		MT	1.616	**MT**	1.975	BY		UA	1.082	**RO**	1.251
HR		IS	1.550	**LT**	1.964	HR		LT	1.056	**CY**	1.167
CY		**NL**	1.538	**IE**	1.875	CY		MT	0.964	**EL**	1.114
EL		AT		**FI**	1.835	**EL**		AT		RU	1.095
LU		CY		**UK**	1.825	LU		CY		**LT**	1.090
RU		IE		IS	1.683	RU		IE		UA	1.027
UA		NO		**NL**	1.670	UA		NO		**MT**	1.012
Means	1.968		2.032		2.115		1.118		1.356		1.462
SD	0.217		0.221		0.199		0.255		0.213		0.234

Note: For some time points, countries are missing because they did not participate in the survey or the questions were not included in that wave of the survey for that country.

Figure 2.1 further illustrates the rankings of countries in 1990 and 2008, but also where countries have changed in the time period. The country rankings shown in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1 give the impression that rankings are changing over time. For example, Sweden ranks as one of the top three countries in supporting shared-earning in 1990 and 1999, but drops to the middle of the table in 2008. Despite this observation, the correlations of the rankings of country means indicate great stability across waves. As shown in Table 2.3, the correlation between the country rankings over time is relatively high (for the 23 countries repeated at all time points), for example for shared-caring, the correlation between the means rankings of 1999 and 2008 is 0.896. This indicates that the positioning of the countries is not random across survey points; they are actually very consistent. At the country-aggregated level, the simplex measurement model for three-wave panel data (Alwin, 2007) revealed a reliability of 0.99 for the shared-earning scale and 0.97 for the shared-caring scale. This indicates that these scales provide a very reliable way of studying the attitudinal trends across countries. It is difficult to see a clear pattern in these trends using the observed data. For example, when looking at the standard deviations in Table 2.2, there is no clear increase/decrease in variance over time for shared-earning (0.217, 0.221, 0.199) or for shared-caring (0.255, 0.213, 0.234). The aim of the analyses below is to test the changes in these variances.

Table 2.3. Correlation between country means of shared-earning and shared-caring for repeated countries over time

	A) 1990-1999	B) 1999-2008	C) 1990-2008
Shared-earning index	0.756	0.881	0.650
Shared-caring index	0.749	0.896	0.727

The correlations and standard deviations in the tables above give some indication of the variation in attitudes across countries over time, but relying on these numbers to discuss divergence/convergence has several limitations. Firstly, only (the 23) repeated countries can be included in a comparison of standard deviations and correlations, and secondly, it is not possible to statistically *test* whether the variation is increasing or decreasing. This can only be done with an explicit model of the divergence/convergence in EU versus non-EU countries.

To enable the examination of divergence/convergence, the data were aggregated by country, time point, education, gender and age (e.g. Group 1: Austria-2002-low education-male-old). This aggregation was done to enable a more efficient analysis of country-trends, while still allowing education, gender and age as control variables. While the method developed here could also be used for individual level data in a multi-level

structure, this two-step approach follows the recent caution against using multilevel modeling with small sample sizes and the suggestion to return to meta-analyses to obtain more unbiased estimates and valid standard errors (Bryan & Jenkins, 2015; Hox & Maas, 2005). Separate regression analyses using SPSS 21 were conducted on the aggregated data file with 1050 cases.[5] In this file, weights were created in the form of the inverse of the squared standard error of the mean of the two dependent variables–shared-earning and shared-caring, a common procedure in meta-analysis (Sanchez-Meca & Marín-Martínez, 1998; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). The correlation between these two weights was 0.914; due to this high correlation, the same weight (for shared-earning) was used for all meta-analyses.

In the aggregated dataset, the three survey *time* points were coded as: -1=1990-1993, 0=1999-2001 and 1=2008-2010. The *EU* membership variable was coded in the aggregated dataset as a 0/1 variable, where 1 indicated EU membership *at that time point*. BY, HR, IS, NO, RU, and UA were thus coded as 0 at all three time points, while BE, DE, DK, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, and UK were coded as 1 at all time points. AT, FI and SE have a 1 at two out of three data points, while BG, CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, MT, PO, RO, SI, and SK only have a 1 for the last time point. Gender, age, and education were used to create the aggregated dataset and also included as control variables. *Gender* was coded as female=1 (male=0). *Age* (range: 15-108, mean: 45.96, trimmed mean: 45.54) is included as a dichotomy with younger=1 (older=0), split at the mean (younger<47). The *education* variable included in the EVS for all countries and time points measures at what age respondents completed their education. This age-completed/education-duration variable was re-coded into three categories, broadly corresponding to primary (age 16 or lower when finished education), secondary (age 17-20 when finished education) and tertiary education (age 21 or above when finished education). There were 4451 out of the 122,962 cases with missing values on the education variable, which was partially remedied by replacing missing values with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) one digit codes in the third wave. The few cases with missing values on all of the independent variables were listwise deleted before aggregation.[6]

5 This number is not 33 countries x 3 time points x 3 educational groups x 2 genders x 2 ages = 1188, because of missing data due to including countries that were not present at all survey points as explained in footnote above and because of the omission of dependent variable items for AT and IE (these were 24 cases = 2 countries x 3 educational groups x 2 ages x 2 genders).

6 The percentages of missing values on the independent variables were very low in the individual-level dataset: 1.78% education (2192 cases), 0.37% age (460 cases), and 0.04% gender (49 cases).

To investigate the divergence/convergence of attitudes over time, a 'dissimilarity constraint' was created using a method similar to stereotyped regression analysis (Anderson, 1984). In a preparatory step for this procedure, a separate regression analysis was run for each of the two dependent variables:

$$\mathbf{y} = \boldsymbol{B} + \boldsymbol{B_1}\mathbf{*time} + \boldsymbol{B_{4\text{-}36}}\mathbf{*country} \qquad \text{(Model 0)}$$

In this model, **time** refers to the centered time variable described above and **country** refers to 32 dummy variables representing the 33 countries. The expected values of this model are used to create two constraints (referred to hereafter as '**dissimilarity**') representing how different countries were expected to be at the center of the data for the two dependent variables. To examine the divergence/convergence of attitudes in countries over time, the dissimilarity constraints are interacted with time and other independent variables:

$$\mathbf{y} = \boldsymbol{B_0} + \boldsymbol{B_1}\mathbf{*time} + \boldsymbol{B_{4\text{-}35}}\mathbf{*dissimilarity} + \boldsymbol{B_{37}}\mathbf{*dissimilarity*time} \qquad \text{(Model 1)}$$

$$+ \boldsymbol{B_2}\mathbf{*EU} \qquad \text{(Model 2)}$$

$$+ \boldsymbol{B_3}\mathbf{*EU*time} + \boldsymbol{B_{36}}\mathbf{*dissimilarity*EU} + \boldsymbol{B_{38}}\mathbf{*dissimilarity*time*EU} \qquad \text{(Model 3)}$$

The numbering of the coefficients in these models follows the specification in Table 2.4. All models include country dummies as main effects and therefore the main effect of dissimilarity vanishes. This method implies that the models can control for alternative explanations for the developments in attitudes that are stable across countries, such as access to and quality of affordable childcare. All models also include the three control variables for relevant demographic composition: education, age and gender ($\boldsymbol{B_{39\text{-}41}}$***controls)**.

The interaction term **dissimilarity*time** causes the expected values of the model to follow a regular bundle of country-level regression lines, as shown in Charts 2.1-2.4. The model prevents the regression lines from crossing within the time range of the data, enabling an overall test of whether the lines are moving closer together (i.e. converging) or further apart (i.e. diverging) over time. A negative interaction **dissimilarity*time** indicates convergence (i.e. smaller differences between countries over time), while a positive interaction term indicates divergence (i.e. greater differences between countries over time).

As outlined in the Model formulas above, the analyses were conducted in three steps using the aggregated dataset. Model 1 provides a general test for divergence/convergence over time. Model 2 examines the influence of EU membership on the dependent variables. Model 3 tests the possible influence of EU membership on attitudinal trends by including EU membership as a binary moderator interacted with the dissimilarity constraint, with **time** and with **dissimilarity*time** (i.e. between-country divergence/convergence).

Results

The first part of the analysis examined whether there was a divergence/convergence of attitudes over time in all countries. The results of the analyses in Model 1 of Table 2.4 show that support for shared-earning has increased over time (B_1 = 0.073, p< 0.001), as has support for shared-caring (B_1 = 0.148, p< 0.001). The ranges of the two variables are the same, but the standard deviations are slightly different, preventing a perfect comparability of the two coefficients. Still, a rough comparison confirms expectations that support for shared-caring and shared-earning have both increased, but support for shared-caring has increased more strongly over this time period. The results for the country-dissimilarity interaction with time indicate that there was no significant country-divergence on support for shared-earning (B_{37} =- 0.001, p= 0.956), but that support for shared-caring has been diverging (B_{37} = 0.068, p< 0.05). The results of the control variables (B_{39}-B_{41} in Table 2.4) indicate that the dependent variables are valid measures that can be explained to a great extent by group characteristics in a predictable way: highly educated, women and younger people support shared-caring more while mostly women support shared-earning.

The results of Model 1 show that over all countries there was a divergence of shared-caring attitudes, but no convergence of shared-earning attitudes. The results in Model 2 of Table 2.4 indicate that for shared-earning, there was no effect of EU membership (B_2=- 0.018, p= 0.206), but EU membership did have a positive effect on shared-caring attitudes (B_2 = 0.073, p< 0.001). This means that in EU countries, people are more positive toward shared-caring than in non-EU countries, but there is no such difference for shared-earning.

The final analyses examined the differences in attitudinal developments due to EU membership by comparing the results for shared-earning attitudes with shared-caring attitudes. In Model 3, EU membership was added in interaction with time, in interaction with the dissimilarity term and in interaction with dissimilarity*time (i.e. country divergence). The final model results of the analyses are shown in Model 3 of Table 2.4. The results are also illustrated in Charts 2.1- 2.4, where the model implications of 12 countries that were members of the EU at all time points (BE, DE, DK, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, UK) are compared to those that were not members at the final time point (BZ, HR, IS, NO, RU, UA). The bold lines in the graphs indicate the predicted mean across countries. Country labels have been removed from these charts for clarity.

The results indicate that similar to the first analysis, time had a positive effect on shared-earning attitudes (B_1 = 0.109, p< 0.001) and shared-caring attitudes (B_1 = 0.201, p< 0.001). This result can also be seen by comparing Charts 2.1 and 2.3 with Charts 2.2 and 2.4, which shows that time has a more positive effect on shared-caring than on shared-earning. Similar to the previous analyses, EU membership had no effect on shared-earning attitudes (B_2 =- 0.020, p= 0.159), while it positively affected shared-caring

Table 2.4. Regression analyses on dependent variables: support for shared-earning family model index and support for shared-caring family model index. Country divergence as a main term is included as country dummies. Intercept omitted.

		Shared-earning						Shared-caring					
		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		B (SE)		B (SE)		B (SE)		B (SE)		B (SE)		B (SE)	
B_1	Time	0.073	***	0.077	***	0.109	**	0.148	***	0.128	***	0.201	***
		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.011)		(0.005)		(0.007)		(0.012)	
B_2	EU membership			-0.018		-0.020				0.073	***	0.103	***
				(0.014)		(0.014)				(0.018)		(0.019)	
B_3	*Time					-0.045	***					-0.127	***
						(0.013)						(0.015)	
B_{4-35}	Dissimilarity	a		a		a		a		a		a	
B_{36}	*EU membership					-0.128						-0.015	
						(0.097)						(0.096)	
B_{37}	*Time	-0.001		0.004		0.201	**	0.068	**	0.126	***	0.052	
		(0.027)		(0.027)		(0.054)		(0.025)		(0.028)		(0.047)	
B_{38}	*Time*EU membership					-0.266	***					0.239	***
						(0.064)						(0.066)	
B_{39}	Female	0.117	***	0.117	***	0.117	***	0.097	***	0.096	***	0.097	***
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
B_{40}	Younger	-0.032	***	-0.032	***	-0.032	***	0.153	***	0.153	***	0.153	***
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)	
B_{41}	High education	0.016	**	0.017	**	0.016	**	0.137	***	0.137	***	0.135	***
		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.005)	
Adjusted R2 (df)		0.730 (37)		0.730 (38)		0.737 (41)		0.813 (37)		0.816 (38)		0.828 (41)	

a. country dummy variables not shown. ** p< 0.001,* p< 0.05

attitudes (B_2 = 0.103, p< 0.001). This means that in EU countries there are more positive attitudes toward shared-caring than in non-EU countries at the middle of the data (1999), but there is no such difference in shared-earning attitudes. These results can also be seen in the charts. Chart 2.1 versus Chart 2.3 show that there is no difference in support for shared-earning in 1999 between EU and non-EU countries. Chart 2.2 versus Chart 2.4, on the other hand, show that EU countries are more positive toward shared-caring than

non-EU countries. The effect of being in the EU is decreasing over time, both for shared-earning attitudes (B_3 =- 0.045, p< 0.001) and shared-caring attitudes (B_3 =- 0.127, p< 0.001), which means that EU and non-EU countries are converging. The results also show that EU countries are not more similar in their shared-earning attitudes (B_{36} =- 0.128, p= 0.185) nor in their shared-caring attitudes (B_{36} =- 0.015, p= 0.873) compared to non-EU countries. This result is difficult to see in the charts.

Aside from the comparison between EU and non-EU countries, the results in Model 3 of Table 2.4 also show the development *over time* of attitudes *within* EU countries or *within* non-EU countries. The results show that for *non-EU* countries, shared-earning attitudes are diverging (B_{37} = 0.201, p< 0.001), while shared-caring attitudes are not significantly diverging (B_{37} = 0.052, p= 0.270).[7] For *EU* countries, attitudes toward shared-earning are diverging less, to the point of almost *converging*, compared to non-EU countries (B_{37} + B_{38} = 0.201- 0.266, p< 0.001 = -0.065). By contrast, attitudes in EU countries toward shared-caring are found to be clearly *diverging* (B_{37} + B_{38} = 0.059+.239, p< 0.001 = 0.298). Chart 2.1 shows the convergence in attitudes toward shared-earning for EU member states, with the twelve tightly packed country lines becoming more indecipherable over time. These results strongly contrast with the results in Chart 2.2 showing divergence in support for shared-caring for the six non-EU countries. Chart 2.3 shows the divergence in support for shared-earning in non-EU countries, while Chart 2.4 shows the absence of divergence in support for shared-caring in non-EU countries. These results support the hypothesis of the paper, namely that *between 1990 and 2008, shared-earning attitudes in EU countries have converged more than shared-caring attitudes.*

Conclusion and discussion

This study asked what the influence of EU membership is on the divergence/convergence of gender role attitudes between 1990 and 2008. To assess the influence of the EU, this study included EU countries at different stages of membership, as well as non-EU countries. It compared attitudes about two policy areas with different levels of harmonization.

Female employment (shared-earning) is a policy area with early and strong EU harmonization of policies. The results indicate that for EU countries, attitudes to shared-earning have converged, or grown together, between 1990 and 2008 toward more positive attitudes. In non-EU countries, where there has not been the same policy development, attitudes toward shared-earning were found to be diverging, or growing apart. This

7 Sensitivity analyses were conducted for both dependent variables in these final analyses. Without UA or without RU, the final analysis on shared-caring showed divergence instead of convergence for non-EU countries, but the term remained insignificant. For the final analysis of shared-earning, if IS was excluded, greater convergence was found for non-EU countries and greater divergence for EU countries, but the coefficients were in the same direction and had the same level of significance.



Charts 2.1-2.4. Model implications of shared-earning and shared-caring models for EU12 (BE, DE, DK, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, UK) and non-EU countries (BZ, HR, IS, NO, RU, UA). Country labels have been omitted to better illustrate time trends.

suggests that where policies have been harmonized across the EU, so too have attitudes. This is further supported by comparing shared-earning attitudinal development to developments in attitudes toward shared-caring. Policies on childcare have yet to be harmonized across the EU, and for EU-countries, the attitudes toward shared-caring have in fact been diverging. This divergence is not observed for non-EU countries.

The results thus show that although support for shared-earning and shared-caring have both increased in this twenty-year period, the development patterns of these attitudes vary for different policy areas, as a result of EU membership. The results suggest an influence of EU membership on attitudinal divergence/convergence, meaning that as policies become harmonized at EU level, attitudes appear to converge. Although this study can, of course, not make strong claims for the causal direction of these changes, the results suggest that where policies are *not* harmonized, attitudes diverge as attitudes in member states follow the separate policy strategies that individual countries adopt to deal with demographic challenges. This divergence of public opinion means that public approval of a future common EU childcare policy will prove *increasingly* difficult as time passes. As mentioned by other authors for different EU polices, EU harmonization plans are "feasible only as long as the national publics agree with what is being offered to them" (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010: 323-324). Of course it may be *due* to these diverging attitudes that harmonization of childcare policies

has not taken place; this was not examined in this paper, but could be the topic of further study. As EU integration deepens in this area, it will be interesting to see whether shared-caring attitudes have the same pattern of development as shared-earning attitudes.

There are several lessons learned and extensions for further research stemming from this paper. This study showed that it is indeed useful to examine support for shared-caring and shared-earning as separate dimensions of attitudes toward gendered division of labor. This is underlined especially by the two dimensions having distinctly different development patterns over time that are in line with different patterns of policy harmonization. Further research could usefully expand on the study by examining attitudes against the backdrop of significant harmonization of female employment policies, namely prior to 1990. Doing this for all EU countries would require information not currently available with cross-national survey data, but would likely show the attitudinal differences *within* EU countries and *between* EU versus non-EU countries in line with the policy developments discussed in this paper. An additional extension of the study could examine what it is exactly about EU membership that influences public opinion of in-depth case studies–do attitudes change in preparation for membership or as a consequence? Further studies could also usefully verify the validity of the method for examining the divergence/convergence developed here with different attitudinal or policy measures (Søndergaard, 2014b).[8] The results and methodology of this study could be improved by including direct measurements of policies, which is the focus of another study (Søndergaard, 2015),[9] but with family migration policies, not employment/childcare policies.

8 See Study III of this thesis for a version of this study.

9 See Study IV of this thesis for a version of this study.

Study III

Moving Apart? The influence of the EU on public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes in Europe between 2002 and 2012[1]

'These aspects gain importance in light of the recent debates in Europe about an optimal plan for harmonizing various immigration policies at the country level, although these proposed policies are feasible only as long as the national publics agree with what is being offered to them.'
(Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010: 323-324)

1 Thanks go to the research group *Interuniversitaire Werkgroep Sociale Ongelijkheid en Levensloop* for their comments on an earlier draft, 30 September 2014 in Utrecht. A previous version of this paper was presented on 29 August 2014 at the 11th IMISCOE Annual Conference 'Immigration, Social Cohesion and Social Innovation' held 27-29 August 2014 in Madrid.

Summary
This study examines how trends in public opinion about immigration and immigrants are influenced by EU membership, using data from the European Social Survey for 34 European countries (2002-2012). By combining cross-sectional and dynamic information, the study shows that EU membership positively influences both public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes. Regarding public support for immigration, the study shows that attitudes are diverging between countries, and although there is significantly less divergence in EU countries, there is no indication of convergence. For pro-immigrant attitudes, there is also no evidence of convergence in EU countries; *divergence* is only found for non-EU countries. Overall, the results do not suggest that EU membership has led to a convergence of immigration/immigrant attitudes.

Introduction
In a 2000 Eurobarometer survey, 43% of EU citizens favored EU harmonization of immigration policies (Luedtke, 2005: 95) or, in other words, believed that the EU should solve 'the migration problem' (Beutin et al., 2007: 390). But there is great variation in these opinions across member states. In 2000, the percentage of people believing that immigration policies should be harmonized ranged from 15% in Finland to 70% in the Netherlands (Luedtke, 2005: 95).
Since the start of European cooperation, the EU has been key in the regulation of *internal* migration (i.e. the movement of EU citizens between member states, or second-country nationals). Recent recodification of these regulations includes Directive 2004/38/EC on the free movement of people, which ensures generous rights to family reunification for all mobile EU citizens. The EU has only entered the policy area of immigration of non-EU citizens (i.e. third-country nationals), not related to mobile EU citizens, in the last 25 years, because the harmonization of immigration policies became viewed as necessary within this development of an internally free market with shared external borders. Essentially, the *internal* free movement meant that the *immigration* 'space' in the EU had become a shared 'space' (Givens & Luedtke, 2004: 146). In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht identified immigration as an area of 'common interest' (Urth, 2005: 163), and in 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam officially moved immigration within Community competences (Kostakopoulou, 2000). This harmonization of immigration policies for third-country nationals not related to mobile EU citizens has, however, been met with strong political, as well as public opposition (Givens & Luedtke, 2004). The public opposition has increasingly become of interest to EU institutions and EU scholars due to the increased focus on the transparency of the institutions and the suggestion that divergent public opinion may be related to the difficulties encountered in the harmonization of EU immigration policies (Luedtke, 2005).

Previous authors have linked public opposition to the EU harmonization of immigration policies for third-country nationals not just to the views about EU harmonization mentioned in the first paragraph, but also to persistently divergent opinions on immigration across the member states (Luedtke, 2005). Although there are differences in the methodology used by previous studies (cf. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010), overall, research has generally found low levels of support for *increased* immigration across countries (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Facchini & Mayda, 2008; Freeman, 1995; Mayda, 2004; McLaren, 2001; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Simon & Lynch, 1999; Simon & Sikich, 2007). Previous studies also suggest that there is no consistent trend across countries with all attitudes becoming either more positive or more negative. Rather, there is some indication that attitudes are becoming more negative in some countries, while in others, they are becoming more positive (Card et al., 2005; Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 2009). This variation in attitudinal developments across countries is made even more complex, because as pointed out by Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), there is a difference in the development of opinions toward *immigration* (i.e. whether more or fewer people should be let in) versus opinions toward *immigrants* (i.e. how immigrants who are already 'here' should be treated). In their review of the studies conducted on migration attitudes using multinational surveys, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) argue that scholars should separate these different types of attitudes as they reflect very different notions. They suggest that the validity of the results of studies merging these immigration and immigrant attitudes is questionable (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010: 313). Interestingly, this attitudinal distinction reflects the policy distinction made by Hammar (1985) between immigration and immigrant policies. The present study builds on this previous work and examines the distinction between immigration and immigrants when studying attitudinal trends in Europe and shows that it is indeed useful to separate the two.

Most studies of immigration/immigrant attitudes focus on explaining changes in attitudes by individual characteristics such as age or by contextual differences such as the actual inflow of migrants (cf. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010), rather than testing differences in overall country trends in attitudes. Further, previous studies have not looked at whether country trends are affected by supranational influences, such as the EU. As in previous work (Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013),[1] this study examines macro-level trends in public opinion and relates these to EU membership. It could be expected that the harmonization of policies is related to developments in attitudes: where policies become more similar across countries, so too should attitudes. To the best of our knowledge, there is only limited empirical evidence of immigration/immigrant attitudes converging in the enlarged EU. Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet (2009: 360) mention in passing that

1 See Study II of this thesis for a version of this study.

attitudes toward immigration have *not* converged in 17 European countries (EU15 + CH and NO) and Malchow-Møller, Munch, Schroll and Skaksen (2009) suggest that several EU15 countries are diverging from the average views in the EU. These authors do not, however, test directly whether these attitudes are becoming more similar within the EU, i.e. testing convergence, nor do they compare these trends to non-EU countries or distinguish between public support for immigration versus pro-immigrant attitudes. This study asks: what has been the influence of EU membership on the divergence/convergence of immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes between 2002 and 2012?

To answer this research question, the paper first outlines the changes in immigration and immigrant policies across the EU, explaining briefly to what extent policies have become more similar in the EU in the specified time period. This outline does not imply that public opinion is related directly to policy decisions at EU level, but rather this discussion of harmonization is meant to illustrate the similarity of immigration policies compared to immigrant policies. This policy background information is then used to derive different hypotheses for attitudes toward immigration versus attitudes toward immigrants. This study then empirically examines whether these two types of attitudes have developed in EU countries compared to non-EU countries by using a statistical model that explicitly tests for divergence/convergence.

EU harmonization of immigration and immigrant policies

In 1985, Thomas Hammar was the first to distinguish between policies regulating immigration and immigrant policies (Westfall, 2012). He defined immigration regulation policies as 'the rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign citizens' (Hammar, 1985: 52), while an immigrant policy 'refers to the conditions provided to resident immigrants …' (Hammar, 1985: 53). Simply stated, immigration policies are directed at people who are not yet 'here', while immigrant policies are directed at people who are already 'here'. There have been several studies on the relationship between these two types of policies, showing possible tensions and trade-offs. Ruhs and Martin (2008), in particular, show that countries with open/permissive immigration policies tend to have closed/exclusive immigrant policies, while countries with closed/restrictive immigration policies tend to have more open/inclusive immigrant polices. The difference between these two types of policies can also be seen in the different history of the EU harmonization of these policies.

The EU harmonization of immigration and immigrant policies for third-country nationals began in the 1990s and the European competences in immigration, integration and citizenship have since increased (Huddleston, 2008). In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht first opened up for cooperation in the field of immigration, but a watershed moment came in 1997, when the Treaty of Amsterdam moved immigration issues from the Third to the

First Pillar of the Treaty of the European Union. This meant that these policies would no longer be subject to intergovernmental decision-making, but rather be under direct EU competence, similar to other policies in the Community pillar, such as those for mobile EU citizens (Dinan, 2005). In effect, the Treaty linked EU citizens' freedom of movement to the immigration of third-country nationals. With the creation of the Justice and Home Affairs Directorate General, the European Commission was given competences in the fields of external border controls and visas, asylum and the rights of third country nationals, and could now introduce proposals on these issues, subject to Council unanimity (Geddes, 2000; Kostakopoulou, 2000; Urth, 2005). Before this time, any intergovernmental cooperation on immigration that there was, had been negotiated behind closed doors, lacking democratic accountability (Guiraudon, 2001; Kostakopoulou, 2000).

Although there has been some debate about the *results* of harmonization, many authors argue that the EU is an emblem of economic globalization and transnational discourse on human rights (cf. Luedtke, 2005) and the *intended* direction of EU harmonization would therefore be toward more openness of immigration and immigrant policies. This approach has previously been referred to as the 'globalist' perspective, contrary to the 'state-centric' approach, which argues that EU influence results in fewer rights for immigrants (cf. Luedtke, 2005). A clear example of the globalist approach of increasing rights for immigrants through the harmonization of immigrant policies is Directive 2000/43/EC on Racial Equality. This 2000 Directive prohibits all forms of discrimination, including all forms of discrimination based on race, e.g. in employment (Guiraudon, 2001). Another example of the expansion of rights is the harmonization of family reunification policies for third-country nationals. This is one area of migration policy that can be considered *both* an immigrant policy–regulating the rights of already present migrants' ability to be reunited with their families, and an immigration policy–regulating the entry of new (family) immigrants. The main objective of Directive 2003/86/EC on Family Reunification was to *facilitate* family reunification for non-EU citizens, modeling their rights to those of mobile EU citizens (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Boeles et al., 2009; Niessen, 2009). This objective can be seen for example in the fourth preamble to the Directive: 'Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the member states, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion, a fundamental Community objective stated in the Treaty' (Council of the European Union, 2003). This support for family reunification for third-country nationals is clearly in line with a globalist perspective of the EU. Overall, with this perspective, EU harmonization would result in similarly *open* immigration and immigrant policies across member states. The fact that the end result of the Family Reunification Directive differed significantly from its original objective, brings to light the difficulties that may arise in the

harmonization process. In the negotiations of the Family Reunification Directive, some member states argued for stricter conditions for third-country nationals than for mobile EU citizens, to the extent that when the Directive came into effect in 2005, it was a merely an 'instrument of minimum harmonization' (Boeles et al., 2009: 182). The Directive's main purpose is still to facilitate family reunification, but the final version leaves member states much discretion about the rights they grant third-country nationals to family reunification. For example, member states maintained the right to demand family migrants to comply with language and economic requirements (Block & Bonjour, 2013: 206; Boeles et al., 2009; Niessen, 2009). Consequently, there are still large differences in family reunification policies across EU member states.

The extent of the difficulties encountered in harmonization have been shown by previous authors to differ between immigrant and immigration policies. A study by Givens and Luedtke (2004) includes the differences in the attempts to harmonize immigration and immigrant policies. The authors do a systematic analysis and present an exhaustive typology of policies. Givens and Luedtke (2004: 155) conclude from this analysis that the harmonization of policies regulating the conditions of immigrants has been met with fewer difficulties than the harmonization of immigration control policies. Givens and Luedtke (2004: 159) define immigration control policies as external border controls, visas, free movement of third country nationals, and asylum. Despite these being policy issues within the First Pillar of the Amsterdam Treaty and the EU institutions therefore have extensive powers to develop policies, the authors show the resistance to the harmonization of these policies and the resulting partial harmonization of immigration policies. The authors define integration issues as anti-discrimination policies and internal border controls and free movement and residence rights for second country nationals.[2] Using these definitions, the authors show that many anti-discrimination policies in areas such as employment and education have been harmonized, thereby expanding the rights of immigrants across the EU (e.g. COM(1999)566 proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin), whereas immigration policies are more often not accepted by the Council (e.g. COM(2002)71 on residence permits issued to victims of trafficking who cooperate with the authorities).

There are few hypotheses for why there is a difference in the resistance to the harmonization of immigrant versus immigration policies. It may be because immigration control policies have greater political salience and national politicians want to maximize on the political

2 The authors thus do not include regulations on other issues that may also be included as integration policies such as naturalization, and political or cultural rights for immigrants. These issues still remain within the remit of the nation state. The authors also only include the Family Reunification Directive as an immigration control issue, whereas the Directive could also be framed as an integration issue, as outlined above.

capital that it provides (Givens & Luedtke, 2004). Because national politicians can capitalize on these instances of high political salience, they will block EU harmonization to protect national sovereignty (Givens & Luedtke, 2004: 150). Another hypothesis for why immigration policies are more difficult to harmonize than immigrant policies towards more openness, is that it is harder for governments to deny rights to an already present population (Westfall, 2012). As explained by Westfall (2012: 27), 'it is difficult to remove rights from a visible and physically present population with obvious needs…'. Member states are therefore less likely to resist EU harmonization toward the inclusive *immigrant* policies posited by 'globalists'. At the same time, there can be more resistance to open *immigration* policies, as it is easier for governments to argue legislating restrictively against an absent population (Westfall, 2012).

Whether whole or partial, the harmonization of immigration and immigrant policies has not resulted in either immigration or immigrant policies becoming the same across *all* of the EU. This is not just because of the 'minimum harmonization' referred to above, allowing countries to have different policies, while still complying with Directives such as the Family Reunification Directive. It is also because only very few EU directives and regulations on immigration/immigrants adopted since 2002, apply to all EU member states. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom have opt-out possibilities, which they use in different combinations (Carmel & Paul, 2013). These countries opted out of Article IV of the Amsterdam Treaty and are therefore not automatically bound by the EU's harmonization of immigration policies. While several studies have shown that opt-out countries do not lose their bargaining power in EU policymaking (Kaeding & Selck, 2005; Naurin & Lindahl, 2010; Selck & Kuipers, 2005), it can be expected that policies on immigration are not as similar in these countries as in those bound by these Directives.

The EU and divergence of public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes

This study refers to public opinion as 'attitudes', defined in line with other authors, as individuals' preferences in specific situations (Lück, 2005). Survey questions measuring attitudes toward immigration include questions such as the following from the European Social Survey [ESS]: 'Would you say it is generally bad or good for the [COUNTRY'S] economy that people come to live here from other countries?' Previous studies have focused on explaining the origins of these types of attitudes with individual-level predictors such as education or age, or contextual determinants such as the size of the immigrant group (cf. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010), while studies looking at the possible influence of law and policy are rare.

Normative theories on the influence of law and institutions suggest that laws not only influence conduct and beliefs through sanctions, but can also exert this influence just because they convey a consensus about a topic (Albiston et al., 2011). Law-making can

be based on an actual consensus of public opinion or can be driven by a small elite, but if the legal system is legitimate, then a law will be *perceived* as expressing a consensus. In line with social-psychological hypotheses, a majority opinion conveyed by laws will influence individual beliefs because attitudes will change toward the perceived consensus to avoid cognitive dissonance (Albiston et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2008). Previous studies have indeed shown that attitudes often change to allow for norms and behaviors to be consistent with institutions and policies (Albiston et al., 2011; Bilz & Nadler, 2013; Francois, 2008). The 'globalist' theoretical perspective of the EU suggests a liberalizing influence. It suggests that EU membership would result in more open policies across the member states and therefore more open attitudes. This positive influence of EU membership has previously been demonstrated in the new Eastern European members states, where EU-entry reduced support for the radical right through membership reducing anxiety about the countries' economic transition (Bustikova, 2014: 15). This paper looks at the possible influence of the EU on attitudes toward accepting newcomers, or: public support for immigration. It also looks at attitudes regarding the treatment of the already-present immigrant population, or: pro-immigrant attitudes. These attitudes will be examined, taking into account the proposed greater harmonization of immigrant policies versus immigration policies. The study expects a greater convergence of pro-immigrant attitudes and less convergence of public support for immigration, because immigrant policies are proposed to be more harmonized than immigration policies. This will be explored further by looking additionally at countries bound by EU immigration cooperation, assuming these countries will show even greater convergence of policies. This study will also test the implication of 'globalist' theory that the influence of the EU is toward greater acceptance of immigration and immigrants.

The above expectations can be summarized in the following hypotheses:

H1. Public support for immigration and pro-immigration attitudes will be more positive in EU countries than in non-EU countries.

H2. Between 2002 and 2012, pro-immigrant attitudes will have converged more than public support for immigration in EU countries

H3. Public support for immigration and pro-immigration attitudes will have converged more in countries that are part of the EU immigration cooperation, than in countries that have opted out.

Data and methodology

The data used here on public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes are from the European Social Survey [ESS] and cover developments in public opinion between 2002 and 2012. ESS is fielded every two years. Over the six survey waves, the number of participating countries totals 34, but ranges from 22 in 2002 to 27 in 2008,

with approximately 280,000 respondents across all waves. Unlike other studies (e.g. Meuleman et al., 2009), not just the attitudes of the majority of the population are included here, but rather all residents included in the survey. Some studies exclude the small number of immigrants participating in the surveys because they are often trying to explain the origins of these attitudes at the individual level. In contrast, this study looks at overall trends in attitudes across an entire population, examining possible influences of law and policies and therefore includes all respondents. The ESS data provide an excellent opportunity for studying the influence of the EU, as the survey includes respondents from nine countries before and after accession to the EU, as well as older EU countries and a wide range of non-EU countries in Europe. This combination of a cross-sectional comparison of EU countries with non-EU countries, its longitudinal design comparing countries before and after accession, enables a difference-in-differences approach (Ashenfelter & Card, 1986) allowing a test of the influence of EU membership on attitudes.

The standard survey includes six items on immigration and immigrants, all coded in the direction of greater support, (ESS, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012):

1. Allow many/few immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as majority
   0 'Allow none' 1 'Allow a few' 2 'Allow some' 3 'Allow many to come and live here'
2. Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority
   0 'Allow none' 1 'Allow a few' 2 'Allow some' 3 'Allow many to come and live here'
3. Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
   0 'Allow none' 1 'Allow a few' 2 'Allow some' 3 'Allow many to come and live here'
4. Immigration bad or good for country's economy.
   0 'Bad for the economy' 10 'Good for the economy
5. Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants.
   0 'Undermined' 10 'Enriched'.
6. Immigrants make country worse or better place to live.
   0 'Worse' 10 'Better'.

These items are designed for cross-country comparison, explicitly with the intention of being understood in the same way across countries. As mentioned above, it is important to make the theoretical distinction between attitudes toward immigration versus immigrants. The first three questions are suggested by previous studies to measure public support for *immigration* (Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, & Schmidt, 2008) or the rejection of further immigration (Meuleman & Billiet, 2012; Meuleman et al., 2009). These questions (items 1-3 above) have been shown to differ from items 4-6, which previous authors have referred to as attitudes toward *immigrants* (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010), (ethnic) threat perceptions (Coenders, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2003; Meuleman & Billiet, 2012; Schneider, 2008), or the consequences of immigration (Card et al., 2005; Sides

& Citrin, 2007). According to Ceobanu and Escandell (2010: 313), opinions about immigrants and immigration should be studied separately because they reflect different notions, 'one as reactions toward people and the other as reactions about the phenomenon of immigration'. Though question 4 mentions 'immigration' (rather than 'immigrants'), the phrasing of the question does refer specifically to the economic impact of immigrants already within the country's borders, rather than those who are yet to come and could therefore be expected to belong to the immigrant category. Additionally, all three 'immigrant' questions address aspects that are part of Banting and Kymlicka's (2013) index of multicultural policies. For example, 'funding of ethnic group organization to *support cultural activities*', an item in this multiculturalism index (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013:7, emphasis added), is closely related to item 5 expressing whether cultural life is enriched by immigrants.

Principal axis factoring with oblimin rotation was run on the six items, using values standardized by country and time point to control their possible confounding influences. This analysis clearly showed a two-factor structure, with a correlation of 0.673 between the two factors. The rotated sum of squared loadings was 2.987 for factor 1 and 2.856 for factor 2, suggesting that both dimensions are almost equally strongly represented in the set of items. The results of the factor analysis as shown in Table 3.1 are in line with the suggestion by Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), namely making a distinction between the first three items on immigration and the last three items on attitudes toward immigrants. The first three questions will be referred to here as 'support for immigration', and the latter three as 'pro-immigrant attitudes'. The results indicate that question 4 unmistakably loads on the 'pro-immigrant' factor despite the possible ambiguous wording. The three standardized items on immigration form a single scale with high internal reliability (Cronbach's α= 0.874), as do the three items on pro-immigrant attitudes (Cronbach's α= 0.836) which would not increase had any of the items been excluded. Previous authors have examined the metric and scalar invariance of the support for immigration items and have found that these attitudes are well-measured and that the means can be compared across countries and time (Meuleman et al., 2009). The support for immigration scale averaging the first three items, ranges from 0 to 3, has a mean of 1.599, and a standard deviation of 0.328. The second un-weighted mean scale on pro-immigrant attitudes created of the last three items, ranges from 0 to 10, has a mean of 5.102, and a standard deviation of 0.907. These means are shown in Table 3.2, differentiated by time and countries, ranked from most to least positive toward immigration/immigrants. The two scales are calculated using an available case method for persons with missing information. The number of missing values for the two scales was very low, 2.7% for support for immigration and 2.1% for attitudes toward immigrants, so using a complete-case strategy should not influence the results.

Table 3.1. Pattern matrix of two-factor structure from principal axis factoring, with oblimin rotation*

	Factor loadings	
	Support for immigration	Pro-immigrant
2. Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	0.974	
3. Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	0.798	
1. Allow many/few immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as majority	0.734	
6. Immigrants make country worse or better place to live		0.844
5. Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants		0.804
4. Immigration bad or good for country's economy		0.726
Cronbach's α	0.874	0.836

*Items are standardized by country and time point. Correlation between the two factors is .673.

Country-means of the two scales were first simply examined across the six time periods. The overall means and standard deviations in the bottom row of Table 3.2 refer only to the sixteen countries included at all six ESS time points (BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, NL, NO, PO, PT, SE, SI, UK).[3] The means show that support for immigration is slightly increasing over this time period (from 1.609 to 1.654), as are pro-immigrant attitudes (from 5.210 to 5.417). Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between support for immigration in 2002 and 2012 and the relationship between pro-immigrant attitudes in 2002 and 2012, to illustrate the changes in countries over the studied time period. The countries' rankings remain relatively stable, however, as demonstrated by the high correlations between the scale means over time in Table 3.3.

The correlations in the country mean rankings imply great consistency in these scales: the correlations between time points are high and the same countries display more positive attitudes, e.g. Sweden, while other countries consistently display more negative attitudes, e.g. Hungary. The standard deviations in Table 3.2 nevertheless show that these means do change in an important way, namely as an increase in the differences between countries. The standard deviations give the first indication of divergence in both public support for immigration (from 0.221 to 0.282) and pro-immigrant attitudes (from 0.501 to 0.593). These findings are in line with previous studies such as Meuleman et al. (2009: 360)

3 All country codes are in line with Eurostat guidelines on country abbreviations: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Countrycodes, accessed 1 July 2015. Countries included: Albania (AL), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99 (XK), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Russia (RU), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), Turkey (TR), Ukraine (UA), United Kingdom (UK).

which state that 'one can hardly speak of a universal shift toward a climate that is more supportive of immigration, as the evolution of attitudes varies greatly across countries'. This variation in attitudinal shifts across countries has, however, not been tested directly in previous studies of immigration/immigrant attitudes. These attitudinal shifts can be seen to some extent with the standard deviations listed in the table above, but this approach has several limitations. Firstly, only repeated countries can be included in a comparison of standard deviations, and secondly, it is not possible to *test* directly with a p-value of one coefficient whether the variation is increasing or decreasing. This can only be done with an explicit model for the development of attitudes with powerful testing of divergence/convergence in EU versus non-EU countries.

To enable the examination of attitudinal development patterns across countries, the data were aggregated by country, time point, education, gender, and age (e.g. Group 1: Austria-2002-low education-male-old). This aggregation was done to make a more efficient analysis of country trends, while still allowing for the use of education, gender, and age as control variables. This method could also be used for individual-level data in a multi-level structure, but is developed here for clarity in an aggregated dataset with countries as fixed effects. Separate regression analyses using SPSS 21 were conducted on the aggregated data file for the two dependent variables: support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes. In all analyses, the data were weighted by the inverse of the squared standard error of the means of the two dependent variables; a common procedure in meta-analysis (Sanchez-Meca & Marín-Martínez, 1998; Snijders & Bosker, 1999).

In this dataset, the six biennial survey *time* points were coded so that 0 is at the center of the data, i.e. -2.5=2002, -1.5=2004, -0.5=2006, 0.5=2008, 1.5=2010, 2.5=2012. The *EU* membership variable was coded as a 0/1 variable, where 1 indicated EU membership at that time point. CH, HR, IL, IS, NO, RU, TR, UA, XK and AL were thus coded as 0 at all six time points, while AT, BE, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE and UK were coded as 1 at every time point. CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, PO, SK and SI have 1 at four out of six data points (as the countries joined the EU in May 2004), while BG only has a 1 at half of the data points (Bulgaria only joined in 2007). Gender, age, and education are included as control variables. Gender is coded as female=1 (male=0). *Age* is included as a dichotomous variable with younger=1 (older=0), split at the mean (younger<48). For education, the ESS fully harmonized variables on the highest level of education (*edulvla, edulvlb*) were used and recoded into three levels (0=low, 1=middle, 2=high). The few cases with missing values in the individual-level dataset on the independent variables (3071 cases or 1.1% for education, 1397 cases or 0.5% for age and 292 cases or 0.1% for gender) were listwise deleted before aggregation.

Table 3.2. Support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes means, ranked at each time point by most to least positive attitudes. The means and the standard deviations are only for the 16 countries included in all waves.

Support for immigration												Pro-immigrant attitudes											
2002		2004		2006		2008		2010		2012		2002		2004		2006		2008		2010		2012	
SE	2.116	SE	2.115	SE	2.176	SE	2.215	SE	2.245	IS	2.197	LU	6.571	SE	5.987	SE	6.110	SE	6.216	SE	6.523	IS	6.375
CH	1.852	UA	1.904	PO	1.928	PO	1.953	PO	1.939	SE	2.185	SE	6.231	LU	5.914	FI	6.013	FI	6.083	CH	5.882	SE	6.314
IE	1.781	CH	1.816	IE	1.805	NO	1.853	BG	1.854	DE	1.962	FI	5.942	FI	5.840	PO	5.985	CH	5.992	PO	5.871	FI	6.067
IT	1.748	IE	1.777	UA	1.800	BG	1.821	NO	1.838	NO	1.911	CH	5.842	IE	5.781	IE	5.883	PO	5.947	FI	5.799	PO	6.054
NO	1.735	NO	1.752	NO	1.788	DE	1.813	DK	1.765	PO	1.909	AT	5.362	CH	5.647	CH	5.757	DK	5.678	DK	5.706	NO	5.893
DE	1.689	SK	1.741	CH	1.763	CH	1.799	CH	1.761	IT	1.781	DE	5.358	ES	5.521	DK	5.756	NO	5.662	NO	5.595	CH	5.859
IL	1.681	PO	1.738	SK	1.739	DK	1.727	DE	1.755	CH	1.764	NO	5.349	PO	5.451	BG	5.611	NL	5.552	NL	5.544	AL	5.821
DK	1.650	ES	1.655	DK	1.713	HR	1.713	UA	1.720	DK	1.751	DK	5.346	DK	5.354	NO	5.491	IL	5.455	ES	5.347	DK	5.797
PO	1.642	DK	1.630	BG	1.695	UA	1.712	HR	1.684	ES	1.703	PO	5.308	NO	5.284	NL	5.465	IE	5.437	BG	5.340	DE	5.743
ES	1.611	IT	1.607	BE	1.634	BE	1.692	SI	1.661	BG	1.697	IE	5.291	NL	5.088	ES	5.442	DE	5.432	DE	5.246	NL	5.633
BE	1.590	AT	1.592	SI	1.562	NL	1.680	NL	1.637	LT	1.696	ES	5.269	DE	4.932	BE	5.041	BG	5.380	BE	4.903	ES	5.581
SI	1.583	SI	1.566	DE	1.550	IE	1.653	BE	1.567	AL	1.688	NL	5.175	AT	4.849	SK	4.965	ES	5.235	IE	4.899	IE	5.214
NL	1.578	UK	1.541	FR	1.516	SI	1.638	FR	1.560	UA	1.680	IL	5.072	BE	4.828	DE	4.946	BE	5.184	HR	4.835	BG	5.181
FR	1.522	NL	1.539	AT	1.514	SK	1.623	ES	1.537	SI	1.657	IT	5.042	UA	4.793	AT	4.765	FR	5.005	FR	4.834	LT	5.164
LU	1.511	BE	1.539	NL	1.506	FR	1.576	RU	1.512	NL	1.640	FR	4.925	FR	4.736	FR	4.756	PT	4.944	EE	4.734	IT	5.076
UK	1.495	DE	1.536	ES	1.500	FI	1.543	IE	1.483	BE	1.636	BE	4.894	UK	4.701	PT	4.704	EE	4.728	PT	4.666	EE	5.067
FI	1.477	FR	1.509	FI	1.460	IL	1.505	EE	1.465	FR	1.625	PT	4.727	SK	4.657	SI	4.632	HR	4.719	IL	4.657	BE	5.024
CZ	1.463	LU	1.509	UK	1.447	UK	1.476	SK	1.457	IE	1.554	UK	4.694	SI	4.597	UK	4.552	SI	4.657	UK	4.639	SI	4.905
AT	1.376	FI	1.443	RU	1.444	RU	1.457	IL	1.445	FI	1.540	SI	4.652	IT	4.432	EE	4.531	SK	4.645	HU	4.459	FR	4.802
PT	1.258	CZ	1.328	EE	1.335	ES	1.387	UK	1.411	EE	1.481	CZ	4.397	EE	4.328	UA	4.488	UK	4.635	SI	4.444	IL	4.783
HU	1.160	EE	1.255	PT	1.135	EE	1.366	FI	1.381	XK	1.426	HU	4.363	CZ	4.289	CY	4.035	CY	4.446	SK	4.433	UK	4.678
EL	1.031	PT	1.147	CY	1.060	CY	1.292	PT	1.239	SK	1.397	EL	3.544	PT	4.272	HU	4.020	UA	4.376	UA	4.372	HU	4.663
BG		EL	1.086	HU	1.036	CZ	1.264	CZ	1.226	UK	1.375	BG		HU	4.214	RU	3.415	CZ	4.291	CZ	4.028	UA	4.640
CY		HU	1.067	CZ		PT	1.206	HU	1.207	IL	1.331	CY		TR	3.721	CZ		HU	4.125	CY	3.816	PT	4.441
EE		TR	1.016	EL		HU	1.173	CY	1.073	RU	1.328	EE		EL	3.700	EL		TR	3.809	RU	3.717	SK	4.356
HR		BG		HR		EL	1.058	EL	1.038	CZ	1.209	HR		BG		HR		RU	3.752	EL	3.040	XK	4.271
LT		CY		IT		TR	1.009	AT		HU	1.141	LT		CY		IT		EL	3.392	AT		CZ	4.171
SK		HR		LT		AT		IT		PT	1.114	SK		HR		LT		AT		IT		RU	3.592
RU		LT		LU		IT		LT		CY	0.878	RU		LT		LU		IT		LT		CY	3.191
TR		IL		IL		LT		LU		AT		TR		IL		IL		LT		LU		AT	
UA		RU		TR		LU		TR		EL		UA		RU		TR		LU		TR		EL	
XK		XK		XK		XK		XK		HR		XK		XK		XK		XK		XK		HR	
IS		IS		IS		IS		IS		LU		IS		IS		IS		IS		IS		LU	
AL		AL		AL		AL		AL		TR		AL		AL		AL		AL		AL		TR	
Mean	1.609	Mean	1.586	Mean	1.595	Mean	1.649	Mean	1.624	Mean	1.654	Mean	5.210	Mean	5.139	Mean	5.285	Mean	5.362	Mean	5.272	Mean	5.417
SD	0.221	SD	0.248	SD	0.279	SD	0.265	SD	0.264	SD	0.282	SD	0.501	SD	0.553	SD	0.630	SD	0.585	SD	0.607	SD	0.593

a. SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION, correlation: 0.875



b. PRO-IMMIGRANT ATTITUDES, correlation: 0.888



Figure 3.1. Relationship between support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes in 2002 and 2012.

Table 3.3. Correlations between mean attitudes across the 16 repeated countries over six time points, pro-immigrant attitudes above the diagonal and support for immigration below the diagonal

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
2002		0.907	0.878	0.937	0.917	0.888
2004	0.972		0.945	0.871	0.823	0.845
2006	0.935	0.961		0.943	0.862	0.855
2008	0.891	0.871	0.938		0.930	0.904
2010	0.867	0.859	0.900	0.952		0.941
2012	0.875	0.855	0.874	0.927	0.945	

To investigate the divergence/convergence of attitudes over time, a 'dissimilarity constraint' was created using a method similar to stereotyped regression analysis (Anderson, 1984). In a preparatory step for this procedure, a separate regression analysis was run for each of the two dependent variables:

$$\mathbf{y} = B + B_1 * \mathbf{time} + B_{4\text{-}37} * \mathbf{country} \quad \text{(Model 0)}$$

In this model, **time** refers to the centered time variable described above and **country** to 33 dummy variables representing the 34 countries. The expected values of this model are used to created two constraints (referred to hereafter as '**dissimilarity**') representing how different countries were expected to be at the center of the data for the two dependent variables. To examine the divergence/convergence of attitudes in countries over time, the dissimilarity constraints are interacted with time and other independent variables:

$$\mathbf{y} = B_0 + B_1 * \mathbf{time} + B_{4\text{-}37} * \mathbf{dissimilarity} + B_{39} * \mathbf{dissimilarity} * \mathbf{time} \quad \text{(Model 1)}$$

$$+ B_2 * \mathbf{EU} \quad \text{(Model 2)}$$

$$+ B_3 * \mathbf{EU} * \mathbf{time} + B_{38} * \mathbf{dissimilarity} * \mathbf{EU} + B_{40} * \mathbf{dissimilarity} * \mathbf{time} * \mathbf{EU} \quad \text{(Model 3)}$$

The numbering of the coefficients in these models follows the specification in Table 3.4. All models include country dummies as main effects and therefore all other country effects are held constant and the main effect of dissimilarity vanishes. This method implies that the models can control for alternative explanations for the developments in immigration/immigrant attitudes across countries, such as the stock of immigrants or economic conditions. All models also include the three control variables: education, age and gender ($B_{41\text{-}43}$***controls**).

The interaction term **dissimilarity*time** causes the expected values of the model to follow a regular bundle of country-level regression lines, as shown in Charts 3.1-3.4. The model prevents the regression lines from crossing within the time range of the data, enabling an overall test of whether the lines are moving closer together (i.e. converging) or further apart (i.e. diverging) over time. A negative interaction **dissimilarity*time** indicates convergence (i.e. smaller differences between countries over time), while a positive interaction term indicates divergence (i.e. greater differences between countries over time).

As outlined in the Model formulas above, the analyses were conducted in three steps using the aggregated dataset. Model 1 provides a general test for divergence/convergence over time. Model 2 examines the influence of EU membership. Model 3 tests the possible influence of EU membership on attitudinal trends by including EU membership as a binary indicator interacted with the dissimilarity constraint, with **time** and with **dissimilarity*time** (i.e. between-country divergence/convergence).

Results

Model 1 examines whether there has been general divergence/convergence over time of attitudes over all countries. The results for Model 1 in Table 3.4 show that overall, public support for immigration has not become significantly more negative or more positive over time (B_1 = 0.000, p> 0.05), but that there is significant country divergence in support for immigration (B_{39} = 0.047, p< 0.001). These results confirm the impression from the standard deviations, namely that overall, countries are becoming more different from each other in their support for immigration. The results further show that pro-immigrant attitudes have not changed uniformly in this time period (B_1 = 0.005, p> 0.05). Also, similar to the above results and indications from the standard deviations, country differences in pro-immigrant attitudes are increasing, i.e. diverging (B_{39} = 0.057, p< 0.001). The results of the control variables shown in Model 1 of Table 3.4 indicate that the dependent variables are valid measures that can be explained to a great extent by group characteristics in a predictable way. For example, highly educated and younger people show greater support for immigration (Coenders et al., 2003). Previous studies have found differing results for the influence of gender and the results of the present study are in line with those that find no significant effect of gender (Coenders et al., 2003; Ward & Masgoret, 2008).

The results of the first part of the analysis show that there is general divergence across countries in both types of attitudes. The second part of the analysis looks at whether attitudes may be influenced by EU membership. The results for Model 2 in Table 3.4 indicate that EU membership is positively related to support for immigration (B_2 = 0.064, p< 0.001) as well as to pro-immigrant attitudes (B_2 = 0.176, p< 0.001), meaning that in EU countries, people are more positive toward immigration and more pro-immigrant. There is still general divergence in support for immigration (B_{39} = 0.052, p< 0.001) and pro-immigrant attitudes (B_{39} = 0.064, p< 0.001), even when controlling for EU membership.

The final analyses examine the differences in attitudinal developments due to EU membership, comparing the results for the two types of attitudes. Thus, in Model 3, EU membership is added, in interaction with time, in interaction with the dissimilarity term, and in interaction with dissimilarity*time (i.e. country divergence/convergence).

Table 3.4. Models predicting support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes.

		Support for immigration						Pro-immigrant attitudes					
		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
		B (SE)		B (SE)		B (SE)		B (SE)		B (SE)		B (SE)	
B_0	(Constant)	1.449	***	1.384	***	1.316	***	4.838	***	4.662	***	4.532	***
		(0.014)		(0.022)		(0.026)		(0.036)		(0.057)		(0.073)	
B_1	Time	0.000		-0.003		-0.036	***	0.005		-0.004		0.006	
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.013)	
B_2	EU			0.064	***	0.132	***			0.176	***	0.198	***
				(0.017)		(0.019)				(0.044)		(0.048)	
B_3	*Time					0.040	***					-0.010	
						(0.006)						(0.014)	
$B_{4\text{-}37}$	Dissimilarity	a		a		a		a		a		a	
B_{38}	*EU					0.004						0.237	**
						(0.076)						(0.076)	
B_{39}	*Time	0.047	***	0.052	***	0.143	***	0.057	***	0.064	***	0.053	**
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.025)		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.018)	
B_{40}	*EU*Time					-0.106	***					0.002	
						(0.026)						(0.020)	
B_{41}	Female	0.007		0.007		0.007		-0.059	***	-0.059	***	-0.059	***
		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.016)	
B_{42}	Younger	0.153	***	0.153	***	0.153	***	0.243	***	0.243	***	0.244	***
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.017)	
B_{43}	High educ	0.182	***	0.182	***	0.181	***	0.580	***	0.581	***	0.581	***
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.011)	
Adjusted R2 (df)		0.843	(38)	0.844	(39)	0.848	(42)	0.856	(38)	0.857	(39)	0.858	(42)

a. the main effect of dissimilarity vanishes because of the effects of country dummy variables (not shown). ** p< 0.001,* p< 0.05

To illustrate this three-level interaction model's implications, Charts 3.1-3.4 compare the results of this model for countries that have consistently been in the EU throughout this time period, including the opt-out countries (AT, BE, DK, DE, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK) with those that have not joined the EU in this period (AL, CH, HR, IS, IL, NO, RU, TR, UA, XK). The bold lines in these charts indicate the predicted means within these two groups of countries. Country labels have been removed from these charts to show the overall trends more clearly over time. Note that the attitudes are measured on different scales and therefore cannot be compared directly across the charts. Note also, that the final model results are of course partly driven by the nine countries that joined the EU during this period, but visual comparisons with these countries are less obvious and they are therefore excluded.

The four charts illustrate firstly that the level of support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes is slightly higher in EU countries than in non-EU countries (comparing Charts 3.1 and 3.2 with Charts 3.3 and 3.4). The specifics of this difference are found in Table 3.4 (Model 3), showing greater support for immigration in EU countries (B_2 = 0.132, p< 0.001) and more pro-immigrant attitudes (B_2 = 0.198, p< 0.001). This result thus supports *H1: public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes are indeed more positive in EU countries than in non-EU countries.*

Chart 3.1. Support for immigration in EU countries



Chart 3.2. Pro-immigrant attitudes in EU countries



Chart 3.3. Support for immigration in non-EU countries



Chart 3.4. Pro-immigrant attitudes in non-EU countries



Charts 3.1-3.4. Model implications from Model 3 for support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes in EU member states (AT, BE, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK) and non-EU member states (AL, CH, HR, IL, IS, NO, RU, TR, UA, XK). Country labels have been omitted to better illustrate time trends.

Table 3.4 further shows that for support for immigration, the positive effect of being in the EU is increasing over time (B_3 = 0.040, p< 0.001), but this is not the case for pro-immigrant attitudes (B_3 =- 0.013, p> 0.05). This difference is hard to see in the charts, but Charts 3.1 and 3.3 do include the small negative effect of time on support for immigration, while Charts 3.2 and 3.4 show no main effect of time on pro-immigrant attitudes. This is also shown in the results in Table 3.4 (Model 3), where over time, overall support for immigration is decreasing by B_1 = -0.036, p< 0.001, but pro-immigrant attitudes have not increased or decreased significantly (B_1 = 0.006, p> 0.05). Table 3.4 further shows that EU countries are not more similar in their support for immigration than non-EU countries (B_{38} = 0.004, p> 0.05) and pro-immigrant attitudes are more dissimilar in EU-countries than in non-EU countries (B_{38} = 0.237, p< 0.05) at the center of the data.

As for divergence/convergence, the results show that in non-EU countries, support for immigration is diverging in this time period (B_{39} = 0.143, p< 0.001). Chart 3.3 shows this divergence in non-EU countries. For *EU* countries, support for immigration is diverging less, but still significantly diverging (B_{39} + B_{40}, p< 0.001 = 0.143 - 0.106 = 0.037). Chart 3.1 shows this divergence of support for immigration in the constant-EU countries. Pro-immigrant attitudes are also found to be diverging in non-EU countries (B_{39}= 0.053, p< 0.001), but are *not* found to be diverging in EU countries (B_{39} + B_{40} = 0.053 + 0.002= 0.055 p> 0.05). Chart 3.2 shows the lack of divergence of pro-immigrant attitudes in EU countries, while Chart 3.4 shows the small divergence of pro-immigrant attitudes in non-EU countries. All these results suggest *some* support for H2 because support for immigration is diverging in the EU, while pro-immigrant attitudes in the EU are not. But because pro-immigrant attitudes have not converged, *H2* cannot be confirmed*: in EU countries between 2002 and 2012, pro-immigrant attitudes have not converged more than public support for immigration.*

To examine the possible influence of opting out of EU's immigration cooperation (H3), the final analyses were repeated, taking into account the special position of DK, UK and IE. Without these countries, the influence of EU membership decreases slightly in both analyses, but the divergence/convergence results do not change. It was expected that excluding the opt-out countries would show *greater* convergence of attitudes within the EU countries cooperating on immigration, but this is not the case. Including the opt-out countries as non-EU countries reduces the influence of the EU on support for immigration, but increases the influence of the EU on pro-immigrant attitudes. There is also less divergence in EU countries and more divergence in non-EU countries for support for immigration. The divergence/convergence results for pro-immigrant attitudes do not differ depending on the opt-out specification. This lack of clear differences between the opt-out countries and the rest could indicate that policies and attitudes in opt-out

countries are influenced by being a part of the decision-making process, despite not being bound by the Directives. There is thus no support for *H3*: *public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes do not appear to have converged more in countries that are part of the EU immigration cooperation, than the countries that have opted out.*

All analyses were also repeated without the countries only present in one wave (IS, AL and XK). Because the model is developed specifically for looking at changes in countries over time, removing these countries should not affect the results. Indeed, removing these countries does not significantly change the results. The pro-immigrant analysis was also repeated without the apparent outliers (TR, SE and IS) and the results remained the same.

Conclusion and discussion

As mentioned in the opening quote, the EU's plans for harmonization 'are feasible only as long as the national publics agree with what is being offered to them' (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010:324). This study asked what the influence of EU membership is on the divergence/convergence of immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes between 2002 and 2012. The study expected a positive influence of the EU and also that pro-immigrant attitudes would be more similar than support for immigration across countries.

The results of the study firstly show a difference in the development of pro-immigrant attitudes and support for immigration. This finding supports previous studies that suggest a substantial difference between these two types of public opinion and thus supports the appeal to researchers to study these two attitudes separately (cf. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010). The results secondly indicate that respondents in EU countries generally showed more support for immigration and more pro-immigrant attitudes than in non-EU European countries. This supports the 'globalist' theories that suggest the EU's positive influence, which is found to be increasing over time for support for immigration. Despite the EU's positive influence, attitudes *within* EU countries were not found to have become more similar. The results show important differences between pro-immigrant attitudes and support for immigration, as expected. Firstly, public support for immigration is found to be diverging. This divergence of immigration attitudes is interesting, as a convergence of attitudes about immigration could be expected because the EU has wide competences to develop policies on immigration control issues. But these diverging immigration attitudes support Givens and Luedtke (2004), who claim there is resistance to the EU harmonization of immigration policies. Secondly, the results of this study show that pro-immigrant attitudes are not diverging. This also supports Givens and Luedtke (2004) and Westfall (2012), who claim less resistance to the harmonization of integration policies and that this is demonstrated by these policies being similarly permissive across countries. The fact that attitudes toward immigrants were not found to be *converging* may be rooted

in the ideas of Givens and Luedtke (2004) only being related to certain integration issues and not others, and many integration issues are still completely within the competences of the nation states. To be able to clarify these results, the direct relationship between specific policies and attitudes must be tested.

Few differences were found in the analyses, depending on the specifications of the three countries that have opted out of the EU's immigration cooperation. Greater similarities in attitudes within the EU were not found without these countries. This may be an indication of the weak harmonization of the immigration policies or that the opt-out countries are still indirectly influenced by EU decisions. Clarification would require further research.

This study took the first steps toward studying the influence of the EU on the divergence/convergence of support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes, but several extensions can be made. One extension would be to further explore the complicated relationship between support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes. This relationship requires a separate study, for as expressed by Simon and Lynch (1999: 465), 'the desire to restrict immigration is not consistently closely related with negative attitudes toward migrants more generally'. This is beyond the scope of this study, but could form a part of future studies. Additionally, this study cannot determine exactly what it is about EU membership that influences these attitudes. In-depth studies could explore if attitudes change in anticipation or as a result of EU membership. Another extension could be to examine the convergence/divergence of attitudes within each European country, e.g. across social groups, and the method developed here could be used for this purpose. A final possible extension could be a direct measurement of immigrants and immigrant policies in countries as they develop over time.

Study IV

Opinionated Family Migration Policies? Examining the influence of pro-immigrant/immigration attitudes and egalitarian gender role attitudes on family migration policies in European countries[1]

'Debates about family migration policies are shaped in fundamental ways by conceptions of what the roles of men and women ought to be, what marriage ought to be …'
(Bonjour & De Hart, 2013: 2)

'Public attitudes towards immigration and immigrant-related issues are perhaps more important for shaping migration policies than factual information…'
(Card et al., 2005: 37)

1 This chapter is co-authored with Harry Ganzeboom and will be submitted for publication in an academic journal after the recently published MIPEX database has been included. With thanks to suggestions received at the 3CI PhD Winterschool 2015 'Changing Europe – Changing Migration' held between 12 and 16 January 2015 in Rotterdam, from reviewer Peggy Levitt and colleagues. A previous version of this paper was presented on 30 March 2015 at the 'Migration as a Family Matter' conference in Amsterdam.

Summary

Despite the harmonizing efforts of the European Union [EU] member states, family reunification policies remain diverse across Europe. This study examines whether the changes in family migration policies stem from persistently divergent public opinion about gender roles and/or immigration/immigrants. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002-2012), the European Values Study (1990-2008) and the Migrant Integration Policy Index database (2007 and 2010), this study examines whether changes in policies in 25 European countries are influenced by these two types of public opinion previously suggested as influencing family migration policies. The study also looks at whether public opinion is influenced by changes in these policies, using a (cross-lagged) panel model. The results do not give any indication that policies influence public opinion, nor that differences in family migration policies across Europe are influenced by changes in public opinion about immigration or immigrants. In contrast, public opinion about roles in the family–namely support for shared-caring–is found to significantly influence family migration policies. More specifically, public support for more gender egalitarian roles in sharing care in the home are found to lead to more restrictive family migration policies. This finding is in line with the arguments in previous studies, that as gender egalitarianism increases, traditional gender role norms of dependency are projected on the migrant other, manifesting in the form of restrictive family migration policies, for example strict income requirements for the sponsor.

Introduction

The extension of European Union [EU] competencies into the field of family reunification for third-country nationals was first suggested in the Conclusions of the European Council in Tampere in 1999 (Kraler, 2010). The aim of the European institutions was to model the family reunification rights for third-country nationals (i.e. non-EU citizens) after the liberal rights granted to mobile EU citizens (i.e. second-country nationals), consolidated in the Free Movement Directive 2004/38 (Kraler, 2010). But throughout the negotiations of the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86 (Council of the European Union, 2003), some member states argued for the possibility of states to institute stricter conditions for third-country nationals than for mobile EU citizens. This opposition meant that when the Family Reunification Directive came into effect in 2005, it was a merely an 'instrument of minimum harmonization' (Boeles et al., 2009: 182), including many optional clauses, leaving much discretion to the member states about the family reunification rights granted to third-country nationals (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Boeles et al., 2009). For example, Article 4 of Directive 2003/86 states that only a sponsor's spouse and minor children are eligible for family reunification; for other family members such as parents, adult children and unmarried partners, member states are free to set

conditions. Additionally, Article 4(5) of the Directive states that member states may set an age limit for sponsors and migrant spouses up to 21 and in Article 7(1)(c) that member states may require a stable income.

The lack of a strict EU Directive means that family reunification policies across member states remain diverse, e.g. in levels of income requirement. Previous authors even suggest that family migration policies are becoming *increasingly* diverse across the EU (Koopmans et al., 2012; Søndergaard, 2014a). Koopmans et al. (2012) in their quantitative study of ten Western- European countries between 1980 and 2008, show that despite the harmonizing influences of the EU such as the Family Reunification Directive, marriage migration policies went from being very similar in 1980 to diverging more at every time point until 2008 (when the study ended). Additionally, family migration policies have been shown to be diverging between 2007 and 2010 (Søndergaard, 2014a).[1]

The reasons given for this lack of harmonization of family migration policies often lie in traditional explanations of migration policymaking, namely 'in terms of a rational balancing of economic interests, electoral pushes, and judicial constraints' (Bonjour & De Hart, 2013: 61). But researchers have pointed out that these traditional theories often cannot explain final policymaking decisions and therefore turn to alternative explanations. One alternative explanation for family migration policymaking is the influence of public opinion. The differences across the EU in family migration policies would thus be explained by differences in public opinion across EU countries. Indeed, some authors suggest that a lack of EU harmonization of immigration policies may be rooted in divergent attitudes about immigration (Luedtke, 2005). This hypothesis is supported by previous studies showing that attitudes toward immigration are diverging in the same period as family migration policies have been found to be diverging (Søndergaard, 2014a, 2014b).[2]

Other authors suggest looking not just at opinions about immigration, but also at whether other opinions influence immigration policymaking. For family migration policies, Bonjour and De Hart (2013: 62) suggest that '[d]ebates about family migration policies are shaped in fundamental ways by conceptions of what the roles of men and women ought to be, what marriage ought to be, what parenting ought to be, and what family ought to be… Such gender and family norms play a crucial role in the production of collective identities, i.e. in defining who "we" are and what distinguishes "us" from "the others."' This argument is presented especially about family migration policies, because this type of migration poses a threat to integration and national identities (Block, 2014; Bonjour & Kraler, 2014). The relationship between gender norms and family migration policies is supported by previous findings that show a divergence of support for sharing

1 See Study I of this thesis for a version of this study.

2 See Study I and Study III of this thesis for versions of these studies.

care roles in the home (Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013).[3]
This study builds on the findings discussed above in looking at whether these different public opinions directly influence family migration policies across Europe. This study asks: *Can divergent public opinion about immigration/immigrants and/or gender roles explain changes in family migration policies across European countries?*

Theoretical framework

Attitudes are defined here in line with other authors, as individuals' preferences in specific situations, e.g. whether an individual thinks that women should work (Lück, 2005). As attitudes are analyzed here at the average country-level, they are generally referred to as public opinion. Policies are defined in two ways, in line with the seminal work by Hammar (1985), on the difference between immigration and immigrant polices. Immigration policies are defined as 'the rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign citizens' (Hammar, 1985: 52), while an immigrant policy 'refers to the conditions provided to resident immigrants…' (Hammar, 1985: 53). Family migration policies include both of these policy areas, as they refer to the rights of the already present *immigrant* (sponsors) by regulating the entry (*immigration*) of their family members (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014). Simply stated, immigration policies are directed at people who are not yet 'here', while immigrant policies are directed at people who are already 'here'. This paper looks at whether an opinion-policy nexus and/or a policy-opinion nexus exist for two types of attitudes suggested to be related to family migration policymaking, namely gender-egalitarian attitudes and/or immigration/immigrant attitudes. The focus of the study is mainly the opinion-policy nexus and this relationship is therefore elaborated more thoroughly.

Opinion-policy nexus

In a bottom-up perspective on policymaking, social attitudes inform voting, with a majority opinion being reflected in majority voting. This majority voting in turn indirectly influences policies (Raven et al., 2011; Risse-Kappen, 1991). This is referred to by Raven et al. (2011) as the opinion-policy nexus. As expressed by Jacobs and Herman (2009: 114), '[o]bviously, there is by definition some link between public opinion and policymaking in democracies. Politicians and political parties cannot systematically act against public opinion and hope to get re-elected.' Indeed, classical studies such as the work by Page and Shapiro (1983) describe how public opinion is a major influence on policy changes in the US. When opinions change, so too do policies after a 1-4 year time lag (Page & Shapiro, 1983).

3 See Study I of this thesis for a version of this study.

Some authors have previously made the case that immigration policies are a special type of policy not influenced by public opinion because decision-making here remains within the domain of elites (Freeman, 1995). This has since been disputed, with authors claiming that immigration has become such a highly salient issue in the public and political debates and that decision-making is no longer taking place behind closed doors. According to Lahav (2004: 1158), the public sets the 'rules of the game' around which elites structure their discourse on immigration. In this vein, the work of Benhabib (1996) suggests a relationship between majority voting and immigration policies. According to the opinion-policy nexus, immigration policies would reflect public opinion if immigration policymakers work in polities characterized by democratic accountability. An example of this increased public scrutiny of immigration policies at EU level is the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, moving immigration out from behind the closed doors of the intergovernmental decision-making sphere (Guiraudon, 2001; Kostakopoulou, 2000).

Gender role attitudes – family migration policy nexus

It could be expected that the opinions influencing immigration policies would be those related to immigration and immigrants, but an increasing number of authors stress the influence of opinions about cultural norms. This is likely related to the findings that attitudes toward immigrants are rooted more in concerns about differences in culture than in economic concerns. For example, in their experimental study, Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004: 43) find that opposition to immigration stems more from immigrants not fitting in culturally rather than not integrating economically. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014:235) in their review of studies about immigration/immigrant attitudes, state that '[s]ome conceptions of the national community and its boundaries can easily accommodate newcomers whereas others cannot.' Aspects of national community and group boundaries that have been suggested recently to be key in family migration policies are gender role norms and marriage norms (Bonjour, 2011; Bonjour & De Hart, 2013; Van Walsum, 2008).

Gender role attitudes refer to attitudes about what roles men and women *should* adopt within the family. These roles refer to how the earning of the family income should be arranged (i.e. single, shared-earning or 1.5 model) and how childcare should be arranged (i.e. one parent or shared between partners, with other family members, and/or with state/market institutions). These views have changed greatly since the 1970s, when women entered the workforce *en masse*, creating a vacuum of childcare in European homes (Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011). Van Walsum (2008) is one author who examined these changes in family norms in the Netherlands, but she made a novel comparison, namely linking changes in family norms to changes in family migration policies.

Van Walsum (2008) traced Dutch family migration policies from 1945 to 2000 and suggested that family norms were used to distinguish the 'national' from the 'foreign'. Interestingly, she observed that while family norms became more egalitarian, these egalitarian family norms were *not* transferred to family migration policies. In fact, an increasingly non-gender-egalitarian view of the family was projected on migrants in the Netherlands. She discussed, for example, the appearance of the gendered notion of 'dependency' in family migration policies, referring to the income and housing requirements for sponsors. These requirements necessitate the sponsor to *provide* for the incoming family member, which is very much in line with the traditional view of the dependency of one (female) spouse on the other (male). Van Walsum (2008:239) points out that the aim of these policies was to prevent the welfare state supporting entire immigrant families, but that another way to prevent migrants from relying on welfare would be to allow for the earnings of the incoming family member to count towards the income requirement. This would mean that neither partner would be expected to provide for the other, but that both can contribute to the family earnings. Such an alternative policy approach would portray very different family norms, namely shared-earning (shared between partners) rather than the breadwinner norm implied by a single income requirement.

Bonjour and De Hart (2013) argue that family norms have played an important role in policymaking on fraudulent and forced marriages since the 1970s in the Netherlands. They trace how the view of a 'proper' Dutch family was a way of 'othering' migrant families and marriages. Also, Bonjour (2011) in her analysis of pre-departure language tests in the Netherlands (Civic Integration Examination Abroad or: *het basisexamen inburgering in het buitenland*) adopted in 2005. argues that migrant women are portrayed as 'weak' and 'vulnerable' dependents. She shows that this policy was framed specifically as aiding the emancipation of migrant women by enabling migrant women to speak Dutch upon arrival, thus enabling them to free themselves from dependency on their supposedly oppressive Muslim husbands. Similarly, Roggeband (2007) argues that a link is made in the Netherlands between women's emancipation and family migration. Elsewhere, Eggebø (2010) shows how gender norms are specifically referred to in the Norwegian political debates on family migration, and Borevi (2014) shows how the legacy of Sweden's gender norms in welfare policies are prevalent in the Swedish family migration debate.

The reasoning that the authors give for this relationship between family norms and family migration law is that the 'family' is an important way for the native population to distinguish themselves from the migrant 'other'. As mentioned above, family migration is especially construed as 'a problem of culture, identity, and belonging' (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014: 4), with the national identity being 'construed in opposition to the perceived culture and identity of migrants, epitomized by the "migrant"—especially "Muslim"—

family. Whereas the "Western" family is imagined as modern, emancipated, and egalitarian, the "migrant" family is associated with tradition, patriarchy, oppression, and even violence' (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014: 4). Family migration is thus part of defining belongingness to a polity (Block, 2014). As egalitarian gender role attitudes develop within a country, they are used as a marker between insiders and outsiders. In line with this argument, gender norms are used specifically because gender role norms are part of the foundation of culture (Bonjour & De Hart, 2013), with women at the center of ethnic and national reproduction (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992). As more egalitarian norms develop, they are used to distinguish between 'us' and 'them' with one manifestation being within family migration policies.

The works of Van Walsum, Bonjour and De Hart all look at changes in family norms within one country over time. Another way to look at the influence of gender norms on family migration policies would be to see whether changes in prevalent norms in different countries over time are reflected in different countries' family migration policies across time. Such an analysis would see whether countries with more egalitarian gender norms such as Denmark have restrictive family migration policies, whereas those with less egalitarian norms such as Italy would have more permissive family migration policies. It could also look at whether as norms become more egalitarian, policies become more restrictive. Such a country comparison can be done using large cross-national surveys and quantitative policy measures. The link between family norms and family migration may indeed be a plausible hypothesis considering the previous findings that family migration policies are diverging (Søndergaard, 2014a)[4] and so too are ideas about sharing care in the home across Europe (Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013).[5] But the possible influence of migration attitudes should also be considered, as these opinions have also been suggested to be diverging (Søndergaard, 2014b).[6]

Immigration/immigrant opinion – immigration/immigrant policy nexus

The above literature on the link between gender norms and family migration policies stands apart from the literature exploring the relationship between immigration/immigrant policies and another type of public opinion, namely opinions about immigration/immigrants. Beutin et al. (2007: 390) provide the following explanation of *this* proposed relationship: 'suppose that the public perceives migration predominately as a phenomenon associated with dead bodies in the Mediterranean, human trafficking, and unemployment. Calls for tighter border controls are often the consequence.'

4 See Study I of this thesis for a version of this study.

5 See Study II of this thesis for a version of this study.

6 See Study III of this thesis for a version of this study.

In her review of eighteen studies looking at the relationship between integration policies and public opinion, Callens (2015: 16) states that a 'consistent and positive relationship emerged in several studies between countries with more inclusive integration policies (i.e. higher MIPEX overall scores) and lower levels of perceived threat and, to some extent, lower levels of negative attitudes towards immigrants'. But authors such as Simon and Lynch (1999) do not find a direct relationship between the attitudes toward immigration and immigrants and countries' immigration policies. Similar to others, they claim that there is no influence of general public opinion, but rather claim that lobbying or pressure groups influence immigration policies (Facchini & Mayda, 2008; Freeman, 1995). Several measurements of immigration/immigrant attitudes are included in this study to further explore the disputed link between these attitudes and policies.

Policy-opinion nexus

The opinion-policy nexus discussed above, where opinions influence policies has been suggested previously only to exist for *newer* social policies (Raven et al., 2011). Only for policies that are not yet institutionally well-established, are politicians open to public opinion. Well-established social policies are not suggested to be open to change from public opinion because policies are locked in 'path-dependency' (Pierson, 2001). For well-established welfare policies, previous studies rather have found a policy-opinion nexus, in other words that policies *influence* opinions (Raven et al., 2011).

That policy influences opinion perspective is also illustrated by normative theories of law. As expressed by Schlueter et al. (2013: 672), 'majority group members adapt their pre-existing attitudes in response to legislative measures, presumably because they recognize that deviations from a social norm produce negative sanctions'. According to normative theories of law, law can influence conduct and beliefs not just through sanctions, but also through conveying a consensus about a topic (Albiston et al., 2011). If a legal system is legitimate, then a law will be perceived as expressing a consensus. This consensus may be an actual consensus of public opinion or it can be driven by a small elite. In line with social psychological hypotheses, a majority opinion conveyed by laws will influence individual beliefs because people's attitudes change toward the perceived consensus to avoid cognitive dissonance (Albiston et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2008).

The perceived consensus conveyed by open immigration/immigrant policies can lead to two different types of reactions in public opinion, according to theories about group conflict and intergroup norms (cf. Callens, 2015; cf. Schlueter et al., 2013). Research on group conflict suggests that permissive integration policies promote group conflict, as majority group members will perceive an extension of rights to a minority group as a threat to the majority's resources. These resources can be economic, but they can also be

cultural, with the majority group seeing a threat to their cultural dominance. The literature on intergroup norms suggests an opposite relationship between public opinion and policies. This literature suggests that policies promote social norms for adequate intergroup relationships, meaning that as integration policies become more open, intergroup relationships will also become more open. In their comprehensive study, Schlueter, Meuleman and Davidov (2013) find a negative association between the permissiveness of a country's integration policies and citizens' perceived group threat, supporting this literature on intergroup norms.

It has been discussed by previous authors that policy-opinion nexus and opinion-policy nexus could reinforce each other (Callens, 2015; Jacobs & Herman, 2009; Meuleman & Reeskens, 2008; Schlueter et al., 2013). For example, positive attitudes toward immigrants may influence inclusive immigrant policies, which then positively influence further attitudes toward immigrants. For gender role attitudes, if there is a negative relationship between gender role attitudes and family migration policies, these restrictive family migration policies might then be used to further distinguish the native population from the migrant 'other'. Including both public opinion and two measurements of integration policies in a cross-lagged model, Schlueter et al. (2013) do not find this reciprocal relationship for general integration policies. The present study builds on such previous studies, but focuses on one type of integration policies, namely family migration policies, and uses a different measurement index for these policies, one that is more sensitive to actual policy changes. It also includes different and additional measurements of public opinion to establish what types of public opinion can influence policies.

Data

This paper asks whether differences in family migration policies can be explained by differences in public opinion on immigration/immigrants and gender roles. The research design relates changes in aggregate public opinion in 25 European countries since 1990 (for gender role attitudes) and since 2002 (for attitudes toward immigration/immigrants), to changes in family migration policies between 2007 and 2010.

To answer this study's research question, it is important to use repeated measurements of family migration policies, as well as repeated measurements of public opinion. Key to establishing causality in the relationship between public opinion and policy formation is having measurements distributed over time so that public opinion items are included before and after policy measurements, and policy measurements are included before and after public opinion items. Additionally, a model must be used that controls for all other differences across countries and over time, other than the studied relationship of public opinion on policies. This can be done using a random-

effects panel regression, which pools cross-sectional between-country and across-time within-country effects to establish the causal relationship between changes in policy measurements and prior (lagged) public opinion. A structural equation cross-lagged panel model is also run, which allows for controlling for several additional prior measurements of public opinion. A cross-lagged panel model also allows for examining a possible reciprocal (cross-lagged) relationship between family migration policies and public opinion and makes it possible to include countries that do not have complete information on all public opinion measurements over time. Both types of panel models allow for including measurements of immigration/immigrant attitudes and gender role attitudes in the same model to be able to test the effects of the different types of public opinion against each other.

All data are at the aggregated level, instead of mixing individual level effects with contextual effects in a multi-level model. Schlueter et al. (2013: 676) find that 54% of the between-country variance in individuals' perceived group threat (measured with items similar to the pro-immigrant attitudes used here) are attributed to differences in immigrant integration policies. Schlueter et al. (2013) still argue for including individual data, but it is also possible to look at these relationships with aggregated data. The macro-level approach in this study follows the recent caution against using multi-level modeling with small samples and the suggestion rather to return to meta-analyses to obtain more reliable standard errors (Bryan & Jenkins, 2015; Hox & Maas, 2005).

Policy variables

For comparing family migration policies over time, this paper uses the **M**igrant **I**ntegration **P**olicy Ind**ex** [MIPEX] database. As discussed at length elsewhere (Søndergaard, 2014a),[7] this database is created by the Migration Policy Group [MPG], a non-profit Brussels-based European organization, with previously the British Council and now the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs [CIDOB]. It continues to be the database that includes the most comprehensive migration policy indicators. The MIPEX database contains 148 indicators measuring national policies on integration for migrants, including 37 family reunification policy indicators.[8] The first complete MIPEX data were collected for policies in 2007 in EU-25, Canada, Norway and Switzerland. For the 2010 data, the database was expanded to include Australia, Bulgaria, Japan, Romania and the USA, bringing the

7 See Study II of this thesis for a version of this study.

8 Data accessed 20 February 2013 via http://www.MIPEX.eu/.

total number of countries to 33.[9] The present study is confined to the 27 European Economic Area countries that are repeated over the two waves and confined further to the countries with public opinion data (see more information below).

Note that five of these countries are not bound by the EU Family Reunification Directive mentioned above, namely CH, DK, IE, NO and UK.[10]
The MIPEX data are collected in every country by informants who are researchers or practitioners of migration law, education and anti-discrimination. These informants score policies based on publicly available data, which are then anonymously peer-reviewed by a second informant or national expert. The informants write comments on all of their evaluations and these comments are freely available (Migration Policy Group, 2011), along with the raw data. Informants have three answer categories for each policy–indicating the level of permissiveness of the policies, coded 0, 50 or 100. These levels are benchmarked against the standards set by EU Directives or Council of Europe Conventions (Huddleston, 2011; Niessen, 2009). A score of 100 means that the country's policy meets the highest level of permissiveness and openness of migration policies.[11]
Not all of the 37 MIPEX indicators on family reunification policies are used here. The Migrant Integration Policy Implicative scale (MIPi) selection discussed elsewhere is used instead (Søndergaard, 2014a).[12] Unlike the scale calculated by the creators of the MIPEX database, all the indicators included in the MIPi scale are examined for homogeneity and dimensionality. The MIPi is then calculated from 22 selected indicators of family migration policies. The overall homogeneity measurement for this scale is 0.528, which

9 The latest version of the MIPEX data has recently been released, so the results of the study here are preliminary, pending further analyses with the new data. Data release date: 30 June 2015. See press release: http://www.mipex.eu/changes-government-and-far-right-emergence-hard-times-integration-policies, accessed 15 July 2015.

10 All country codes are in line with Eurostat guidelines on country abbreviations, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country_codes, accessed 22 April 2015. Countries from the Migrant Integration Policy Index database: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK) , Estonia (EE) , Finland (FI), France (FR) , Germany (DE) , Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK).

11 An example of the coding for these policy indicators is as follows: for indicator 24a on the right to an autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching the age of majority, the most permissive category (100) gives this right automatically. The half-way category (50) grants this right only on limited grounds or under certain conditions (e.g. a fixed period of residence), while the most restrictive category (0) does not grant this right.

12 See Study I of this thesis for a version of this study.

indicates a strong scale (Van Schuur, 2011).[13] This final selection includes policy items from all the original MIPEX subcategories - 2.1 eligibility, 2.2 conditions for acquisition of status, 2.3 security of status and 2.4 rights associated with status. The selection includes items that could be construed as being about gender norms such as the economic resources requirement and the right to autonomous residence permits for partners. For more information and a list of MIPi scores for the countries included in this study, see Søndergaard (2014a).[14]

Public opinion variables

The data used here on support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes are taken from the European Social Survey [ESS] for 2002-2012. ESS is fielded every two years and over the six survey waves, the number of participating countries ranges from 22 in 2002 to 27 in 2008, with approximately 280,000 respondents across all waves. In total, 34 European countries have taken part in the ESS in at least one wave, but only 16 have participated in all six waves. There are six questions on immigration and immigrants in the standard survey (ESS, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). According to Ceobanu and Escandell (2010: 313), opinions about immigrants and immigration should be studied separately because they reflect different notions, 'one as reactions toward people and the other as reactions about the phenomenon of immigration'. The six questions included in the ESS have been shown previously to separately measure attitudes toward

13 21c Eligibility for minor children
21d Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line
21e Eligibility for dependent adult children
22a1 Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad
22a3 Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad
22a4 Pre-departure requirement exemptions
22a5 Conductor of pre-departure requirement
22a6 Cost of pre-departure requirement
22a7 Support to pass pre-departure requirement
22a8 Cost of support for family member abroad
22b1 Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory
22b2 Level of language requirement after arrival on territory
22b3 Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory
22b4 Language/integration requirement exemptions after arrival on territory
22b5 Conductor of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory
22b6 Cost of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory
22b7 Support to pass language/integration requirement after arrival on territory
22b8 Cost of support after arrival on territory
22d Economic resources requirement
23a Duration of validity of permit
23b Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
24a Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority

14 See Study I of this thesis for a version of this study.

immigration and *immigrants* (Søndergaard, 2014b).[15] The first scale including the three questions on support for immigration ranges from 0-3, with a mean of 1.599 and a standard deviation of 0.328. A second un-weighted mean scale created from the three items on pro-immigrant attitudes has a mean of 5.102 and a standard deviation of 0.907. Both scales are calculated for each individual where at least one item was available. The three standardized items on immigration form a single scale with high internal reliability (Cronbach's α= 0.874), as do the three items on pro-immigrant attitudes (Cronbach's α= 0.836), which do not increase if any items are excluded. The number of missing values on the two scales was very low, 2.7% for support for immigration and 2.1% for pro-immigrant attitudes and should therefore not influence the results. See previous work for the wording of the items and the aggregated means ranked by country from most to least positive toward immigration/immigrants (Søndergaard, 2014b).[16]

Several studies suggest that egalitarian gender role attitudes should be studied by separating attitudes related to female employment from attitudes about women's caring role, because they are often different and sometimes contradictory (Lück & Hofäcker, 2003; Sjöberg, 2010; Voicu & Voicu, 2002). Since the two questions on gender roles included in the ESS are not ideal for making the distinction, data from the European Values Study [EVS] will be used from three waves of the survey, 1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 2008-2010. In the pooled sample of the 33 countries used for the three waves, there are 122,962 respondents. A factor analysis on these items standardized by time and country shows two dimensions of attitudes: items 1-3 on support for shared-earning (both partners earn) and support for shared-caring (caring role is shared between partners, with the state or with other actors). Two un-weighted mean scales were created by averaging the abovementioned three and two unstandardized items respectively, where there was a value for at least two items for each scale. The shared-earning scale has a mean of 2.069 and a standard deviation of 0.649 and the shared-caring scale has a mean of 1.318 and a standard deviation of 0.662. The individual level reliability was 0.500 for the shared-earning scale and 0.562 for the shared-caring scale. The number of missing values on the two scales was under 5% for both scales: 4.9% for support for shared-earning and 4.5% for support for shared-caring and should therefore not influence the results. See previous work for the wording of the items and the aggregated means ranked by country from most to least support for shared-caring and shared-earning (Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013).[17]

15 See Study III of this thesis for a version of this study.

16 See Study III of this thesis for a version of this study.

17 See Study II of this thesis for a version of this study.

Table 4.1 shows the aggregate level Pearson correlations (below the diagonal) and the covariances (above the diagonal) between the two policy indicators (zMIP refers to MIPi, the family migration policy index) and two[18] of the public opinion scales over the available time periods (zIMM refers to support for immigration scale, zCARE refers to support for shared-caring scale). Note that the macro-level variables were standardized by the mean and standard deviations of the *first* time point to better capture the changes over time. This standardized version of the variables is the form in which the variables are used in the random-effects panel regression and the SEM cross-lagged panel model. This method of standardization can clearly be seen in the pairwise means and standard deviations. The pairwise means show that family migration polices become more restrictive from one time point to the next (MIPi 2010 mean: -0.141) and that they become more diverse from one time point to the next (MIPi 2010 SD: 1.175). It is more difficult to make these clear comparisons over time for the shared-caring and support for immigration indices, because the N of these scales changes between time points. The table therefore also includes the means and standard deviations using listwise deletion. These numbers show that support for shared-caring and support for immigration generally increase over time. The standard deviation also increases for support for immigration, while it is more difficult to see a clear pattern in the standard deviations for support for shared-caring.
The correlations of the scales across time points show that the measurements of public opinion are very stable over time (e.g. a correlation of 0.926 between support for immigration in 2006 and 2008). It is also easy to see that the data on support for immigration from 2004 onwards conform rather strongly to the simplex (or 'markov') assumption that requires correlations to go down as the time points are further apart (Alwin, 2007). The correlations *between* these scales are very unlikely to be significant because of the small sample size, but the directions of these correlations are still interesting to examine. They show, for example, that there is a very small negative relationship between family migration policies with support for immigration (ranging from -0.007 to -0.205). This means that countries with more negative views on immigration tend to be countries with more open family migration policies. This is in line with the group conflict theory outlined above. A moderately strong and even significantly negative relationship is found for family migration polices with support for shared-caring (-0.246 to -0.541). This negative relationship is in line with the theoretical expectations that countries with egalitarian gender views have more restrictive family migration policies.
The moderately strong relationship between the shared-caring index and the family migration policy measurements (MIPi) is shown further in Figure 4.1 by illustrating the between- and within-country pattern. Figure 4.1a plots changes in MIPi against changes

18 These selected descriptive data are shown here for illustrative purposes. The full matrix is available on request.

Table 4.1. Pearson correlation below the diagonal, covariances above the diagonal (pairwise)

	zMIP 2007	zMIP 2010	zCARE 1990	zCARE 1999	zCARE 2008	zIMM 2002	zIMM 2004	zIMM 2006	zIMM 2008	zIMM 2010	zIMM 2012
zMIP2007	-	1.129	-0.444	-0.364	-0.236	-0.008	-0.097	0.037	-0.164	-0.092	-0.082
N		25	21	20	24	21	23	20	21	21	22
zMIP2010	0.961**	-	-0.606	-0.556	-0.455	-0.082	-0.146	-0.044	-0.305	-0.253	-0.251
N	25		21	20	24	21	23	20	21	21	22
zCARE 1990	-0.441*	-0.499*	-	0.618	0.694	0.157	0.218	0.035	0.067	-0.024	0.152
N	21	21		19	22	18	20	19	19	19	21
zCARE 1999	-0.439	-0.541*	0.722**	-	0.605	0.378	0.328	0.244	0.354	0.394	0.346
N	20	20	19		22	17	19	16	19	19	19
zCARE 2008	-0.246	-0.396	0.741**	0.856**	-	0.562	0.537	0.592	0.698	0.745	0.656
N	24	24	22	22		20	22	20	22	22	22
zIMM 2002	-0.007	-0.064	0.194	0.454	0.589**	-	1.009	1.011	1.152	1.124	0.895
N	21	21	18	17	20		21	17	19	19	19
zIMM 2004	-0.089	-0.114	0.235	0.383	0.551**	0.938**	-	1.129	1.419	1.157	0.950
N	23	23	20	19	22	21		20	22	21	21
zIMM 2006	0.028	-0.029	0.031	0.251	0.527*	0.920**	0.953**	-	1.172	1.179	1.289
N	20	20	19	16	20	17	20		22	22	22
zIMM 2008	-0.132	-0.205	0.059	0.369	0.613**	0.891**	0.899**	0.926**	-	1.266	1.236
N	21	21	19	19	22	19	22	22		26	24
zIMM 2010	-0.072	-0.164	-0.021	0.411	0.626**	0.867**	0.843**	0.883**	0.950**	-	1.372
N	21	21	19	19	22	19	21	22	26		24
zIMM 2012	-0.061	-0.155	0.129	0.346	0.514*	0.816**	0.771**	0.847**	0.893**	0.939**	-
N	22	22	21	19	22	19	21	22	24	24	
Mean	0.000	-0.141	0.000	0.797	1.217	0.000	-0.146	-0.002	-0.031	-0.061	0.106
SD	1.000	1.175	1.000	0.793	0.942	1.000	1.154	1.157	1.205	1.179	1.295
N	25	25	22	22	26	22	25	23	27	26	29
Mean	0.017	-0.222	0.273	1.145	1.578	-0.014	-0.129	-0.083	0.219	0.161	0.271
SD	1.204	1.486	0.936	0.835	0.885	0.963	1.092	1.254	1.222	1.212	1.293
N	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). zMIP refers to family migration policy index, zIMM refers to support for immigration scale, zCARE refers to support for shared-caring scale.

in public support for shared-caring, for those eight countries that saw changes in their family migration policies. This plot only shows the seven countries where policies changed over the three-year time period. Figure 4.1b plots the mean levels of MIPi against mean levels of support for shared-caring, showing the cross-sectional relationship. Note that the historical relationship is stronger than the cross-sectional relationship. Note also that the cross-sectional relationship may be stronger if exceptional countries are omitted from the small sample; all the final analyses are thus also run with bootstrapped standard errors.

Methodology and results

As explained above, two types of analyses were conducted to evaluate the influence of public opinions on family migration policies, namely random-effects panel regression in Stata 13 (**xtreg** model) and a cross-lagged panel model estimated with SEM in Mplus 7.

Random-effects panel regression

For the panel regression analysis, separate datasets were created for 2007 and 2010 and then combined into one ('long') dataset. In each of these datasets, the public opinion data were included for the preceding period closest to either 2007 or 2010. This was done based on the hypothesis that public opinion influences family migration policy. In the 2007 dataset, the public opinion data point varied depending on the availability of the data. In this dataset, pro-immigrant attitudes and support for immigration were from the 2006 data (the mean of the 2004 and 2006 time points were taken to retain more cases), while support for shared-earning and shared-caring were from the 1999 data. In the 2010 dataset, all public opinion data were from 2008. Only in this second dataset were *all* of the data in line with the expectation mentioned above, namely that public opinion should influence policies with a 1-4 year lag (Page & Shapiro, 1983). Panel regression models include 'between-effects' as differences between countries and 'within-effects' as differences across time within countries. The analyses have 26 observations, representing the 13 countries with complete data for 2007 and 2010. Separate models (Models 1-4) were run including the different measurements of gender role attitudes from the EVS–support for shared-caring and support for shared-earning, and the two measurements of public opinion toward immigration/immigrants separately. A final model (Model 5) was also run, including public opinion toward immigration and public opinion toward gender roles. The models were all run including robust standard errors and bootstrapped standard errors (draw = 400) to take into account the small sample size.

For the research question in this study, a random-effects panel regression model has several limitations by design. Firstly, such a model cannot include all the data available (i.e. all earlier and later public opinion data). Secondly, it cannot look at the possible reciprocal relationship between policy and public opinion mentioned above. Lastly, this method

a. WITHIN-COUNTRY EFFECT, Y = -0.176 + -0.774*X, p = 0.084, adj.R2=0.378



b. BETWEEN-COUNTRY EFFECT, Y = 0.858 -0.705 *X, p = 0.132, adj.R2=0.120



Figure 4.1. Within and between-country effects between the MIPi family migration index 2007-2010 and public support for shared-caring between 1990 and 2008

uses listwise deletion for missing data, which is problematic in analyses with small samples (13 clusters) of complete information for countries.

Table 4.2 shows the results of random-effects panel regression. The first entry is the B, asymptotic standard errors are shown in parentheses, robust standard errors in double parentheses, and bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets.[19] Models 1-4 include each public opinion measurement separately. These results show that support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes have a negative influence on changes in family migration policies. This suggests that the more positive the public opinion is toward immigration/immigrants, the more restrictive family migration policies become. This is in line with the group conflict theory outlined above. Similarly, support for shared-caring and shared-earning also negatively affect family migration policies. This means that the more *egalitarian* public opinion is about the gender division of care and earning in the family, the more *restrictive* family migration policies become. Only support for immigration and support for shared-caring are significant in these separate models. These two scales are therefore included in one model (Model 5). The results show that the negative effect of support for shared-caring remains significant in this model (B=-0.469), while support for immigration does not (B=-0.104). It should be noted that the shared-caring attitudes are measured at an earlier time point than support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes.

Structural equation modeling

Structural equation modeling [SEM] was conducted using Mplus 7 with Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation. A SEM approach has the several advantages over panel regression analysis. Firstly, it allows for considering reciprocal relationships between public opinion formation and policymaking, using a cross-lagged panel design. Secondly, it can incorporate multiple measurement instances of public opinion before the policy measurement, operating as instrumental variables and aiding identification of the causal effects. Thirdly, it can separate measurement error from true change in public opinion using a simplex (or 'markov') assumption, discussed briefly above and elsewhere (Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013),[20] thereby separating measurement reliability from true change. Fourthly, it can take into account data from incompletely observed countries using Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation. This method, which retains more information, has shown to be superior to listwise deletion (Enders, 2001). The N of these models was 25, compared to the 13 clusters in the previous models. This N refers

19 Asymptotic standard errors assume independent observations that are identically distributed (have homogeneous variance). Robust standard errors drop the homogeneity assumption. Bootstrapped standard errors are derived from an empirically generated sampling distribution, with no further assumption than independence (StataCorp, 2015: 2760).

20 See Study II of this thesis for a version of this study.

Table 4.2. Random-effects panel regression, predicting family migration policies (MIPi) from four different public opinions, N=13 complete countries, 26 observations.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Public support for immigration	**-0.322 (0.195)** ((0.207)) [0.201]				-0.104 (0.202) ((0.235)) [0.252]
Pro-immigrant attitudes		-0.423 (0.265) ((0.268)) [0.266]			
Public support for shared-earning			-0.202 (0.188) ((0.273)) [0.236]		
Public support for shared-caring				**-0.518 (0.177) ((0.247)) [0.245]**	**-0.469 (0.200) ((0.268)) [0.270]**
R2-within	0.239	0.231	0.304	0.330	0.367
R2-between	0.001	0.002	0.196	0.194	0.148
R2-total	0.003	0.004	0.146	0.196	0.156

First entry is B. () asymptotic standard error, (()) robust standard error, [] bootstrapped standard error. Statistically significant results in bold ($p < .10$, two tailed). Models estimated with Stata 13.0 **xtreg**.

to the European Economic Area countries with repeated data on MIPi, as well as data for at *least one* time point for *both* the ESS and EVS.[21] Analyses were run without and with bootstrapped standard errors to take into account the small N of the samples (draw number=200); bootstrapped standard errors are shown in the final figure in square brackets and asymptotic standard errors are shown in parentheses. The small N of the data remained a problem, however, and all public opinion data were therefore not included simultaneously in one model. Instead, four different analyses were run, namely for the two measurements of gender role attitudes, with the separate scales on support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes. All models therefore looked at the between-country effects of the different public opinions, as well as the within-country effects across the full span of the public opinion data.

21 The following countries were thus excluded because they had only public opinion data, but not both MIPi scores: AL, BG, HR, IL, IS, RU, TR, UA, XK. Additionally, the following countries were excluded because they did not have public opinion data for ESS and EVS for at least one time point: CH and MT. The final 25 countries are included in the SEM analyses: AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, NL, NO, PO, PT, SE, SI, SK, UK.

The analyses were conducted by first considering the time series of public opinion separately. These analyses of the four public opinion scales were conducted in five steps (Table 4.3), in order to separate measurement error from true change. This is not possible for the two variables measuring family migration policies in 2007 and 2010, as there are only two time points available. As can be seen in Table 4.1, the two time points are correlated 0.961 and the covariance is 1.129, suggesting extremely high reliability of measurement and a divergence of policies across countries in the three-year period. The measurement of the policies is assumed here to be perfect and changes over time are assumed to be only due to true change in policies.

Models A1-A5/B1-B5 include public opinion on support for immigration/immigrants, derived from the ESS. Models A1/B1 constrain the measurement coefficient to be equal, but do not constrain the over-time change coefficients. In Models A2/B2 and A3/B3, constraints are introduced through equalizing both the change and the residual variances across all six time points, implying constant change and constant measurement quality. Models A3/B3 fit equally well as the unconstrained model and have much smaller standard errors. For support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes, the stationarity assumption is thus maintained. Then, because the residual variances of the latent variables are very close to 0, in Models A4/B4 the residual variance is constrained to be 0, implying perfect measurement. In Models A5/B5, cross-lagged panel models are estimated looking at the influence of public opinion toward immigration/immigrants on family migration policies and vice versa. These models were estimated constraining the effects between opinions and policies to be equal, for example, Public Opinion 2008 Policy 2010 = Public Opinion 2006 Policy 2007. Alternative approaches were also tried to take into account the different time lags between the effects. This was done firstly by using mathematical constraints on the effects, e.g. making Public Opinion 2008 Policy 2010 (2 years) constrained to be the square of Public Opinion 2006 Policy 2007 (1 year). Secondly, the inclusion of phantom variables (e.g. Public Opinion 2009) was also attempted (Rindskorpf, 1984), in one version, making all effects over one year and another making a two-year time lag the standard, after some experimentation. However, because the underlying time series of public opinion is arguably not measured sharply enough to warrant a rigorous conclusion about time lags using these alternative approaches, equalizing the differently lagged effects was maintained.

Models C1-C5/D1-D5 refer to models with measurements of support for shared-caring and shared-earning, derived from the EVS. These opinions have been observed three times, with nine-year intervals since 1990. With only three over-time observations, it is still possible to separate true change from measurement unreliability, although with much less statistical power than for the migration attitudes. Similar to the immigration/immigrant models, when constraints are introduced in Models C2/D2, the models show

Table 4.3. Model descriptions and model fit. Italicized models are those with a significantly worse fit than the previous model, using the threshold for one-sided Chi2 difference testing (for one degree of freedom: 2.706). The highlighted model is shown in Figure 4.2.

	Model	Model description	Chi^2	Number degrees of freedom
Support for immigration	A1.IMMI	Unconstrained simplex model + equal measurement	9.521	10
	A2.IMMI	A1 + Equal residual variances of latent	10.696	14
	A3.IMMI	A2 + Stationarity assumption	17.207	18
	A4.IMMI	A3 + Perfect measurement	17.306	19
	A5.IMMI-MIP	Cross-lagged panel model (A4+MIPi)	30.324	30
Pro-immigrant attitudes	B1.MIG	Unconstrained simplex model + equal measurement	42.235	10
	B2.MIG	B1 + Equal residual variances of latent	44.235	14
	B3.MIG	B2 + Stationarity assumption	51.112	18
	B4.MIG	B2 + Perfect measurement	51.173	19
	B5.MIG-MIP	Cross-lagged panel model (B4+MIPi)	55.082	30
Support for shared-caring	C1.CARE	Unconstrained simplex model + equal measurement	0.435	1
	C2.CARE	C1 + Equal residual variances of latent	2.354	2
	C3.CARE	*C2 + Stationarity assumption*	*5.330*	*3*
	C4.CARE	C2 + Perfect measurement	3.438	3
	C5.CARE-MIP	Cross-lagged panel model (C4+MIPi)	7.724	8
Support for shared-earning	D1.EARN	Unconstrained simplex model + equal measurement	0.007	1
	D2.EARN	D1 + Equal residual variances of latent	1.954	2
	D3.EARN	D2 + Stationarity assumption	3.855	3
	D4.EARN	D3 + Perfect measurement	3.879	4
	D5.EARN-MIP	Cross-lagged panel model (D4+MIPi)	17.292	9
Support for immigration with support for shared-caring	E1.IMCA	A5 + C5	86.108	54
	E2.IMCA	*A5 + C4 without panel effects shared-caring*	*96.989*	*55*
	E3.IMCA	A4 + C5 without panel effects immigration	88.469	55
Support for immigration with support for shared-earning	F1.IMEA	A5 + D5	68.685	55
	F2.IMEA	A5 + D5 without panel effects shared-earning	70.614	56
	F3.IMEA	A5 + D5 without panel effects immigration	71.076	56
Pro-immigrant attitudes with support for shared-caring	G1.MICA	B5 + C5	83.378	54
	G2.MICA	*B5 + C4 without panel effects shared-caring*	*95.071*	*55*
	G3.MICA	B4 + C5 without panel effects pro-immigrants	83.710	55
Pro-immigrant attitudes with support for shared-earning	H1.MIEA	B5 + D5	96.373	55
	H2.MIEA	B5 + D4 without panel effects shared-earning	98.540	56
	H3.MIEA	B4 + D5 without panel effects pro-immigrants	97.837	56

that measurement quality can be assumed to be constant across time. This is different from Model C3.CARE, where the change coefficient (stationary assumption) for support for shared-caring shows that the stationarity assumption does not hold across time points (a change of 2.976 in Chi^2 with one degree of freedom is over the threshold for one-sided Chi^2 testing 2.706). As the stationarity assumption for the complete period is not crucial for the subsequent steps, different change coefficients are allowed in Models C4/D4. Models C5/D5 are similarly related to the policy measurements as outlined for immigration/immigrant attitudes, but note that these models are slightly different, since the shared caring/earning opinions are not observed after the last measurement of family migration policies. Consequently there are two instances of effects of lagged public opinion on policymaking to be constrained, but only one instance of the reverse effect, so no additional constraint.

In Models E1-E3 to H1-H3, public opinion toward immigration/immigrants is combined with public opinion toward shared-earning and shared-caring, making it possible to decide which types of public opinion condition family migration policies. Note that in Models E/F/G/H1, the effects between opinions and policies were constrained to be equal, both for opinions toward immigration/immigrant and support for shared-earning and shared-caring (i.e. opinion1999 policy2007 = opinion2008 policy2010 and opinion2006 policy2007 = opinion2008 policy2010 and policy2007 opinion2008 = policy2010 opinion2012). In Models E/F/G/H2, only the panel effects for support for immigration/immigrants on family migration policies are maintained (i.e. the panel effects of shared-caring/earning on policies are removed) and in Models E/F/G/H3, only the panel effects for support for shared-caring/earning on family migration policies are maintained (i.e. the panel effects of support for immigration/immigrants are removed). This approach makes it possible to test models with the two different types of public opinion against each other. The results show that removing the effect of support for shared-caring on family migration policies significantly worsens the models. In Model E1.IMCA, with support for immigration and support for shared-caring, removing the effects of shared-caring meant a 10.881 change in Chi^2 (96.989- 86.108). Similarly, in Model G1.MICA, with pro-immigrant attitudes and support for shared-caring, removing the effect of shared-caring meant an 11.693 change in Chi^2 (95.071-83.378). Both of these are widely over the threshold for one-sided Chi^2 difference testing for one degree of freedom, namely 2.706. This is not the case with the models removing pro-immigrant attitudes or support for immigration, or indeed for those models removing supporting shared-earning. These results thus show the greater importance of attitudes toward gender roles in explaining family migration policies rather than support for immigration/immigrants and that it is specifically public opinion about shared-caring that matters.

The two models with shared-caring (E1.IMCA and G1.MICA) were the only ones that fit significantly better with the inclusion of the cross-lagged opinion-policy effects, yielding significant effects with asymptotic and bootstrapped standard errors and where these effects remained in the different model specifications mentioned above (e.g. phantom variables and time-lagged constraints). The results for SEM model E1.IMCA with support for immigration and shared-caring are shown in Figure 4.2. The results, including pro-immigrant attitudes, were very similar to the model with support for shared-caring, and are therefore not shown. The results for all models are available on request.

Figure 4.2 shows the unstandardized model results for the SEM model of *support for shared-caring* with *support for immigration*. The E1.IMCA model results show no effect of support for immigration on family migration policies (B= 0.023 SE= 0.044 Bootstrapped SE= 0.047). Nor does the model show any influence of family migration policies on support for immigration (B= -0.083 SE= 0.054 Bootstrapped SE= 0.052). The model also does not show any influence of family migration policies on support for shared-caring (B= 0.087 SE= 0.127 Bootstrapped SE= 0.153). However, the model does show a significantly negative effect of public opinion toward shared-care in the family on family migration policies (B= -0.228 SE= 0.052 Bootstrapped SE= 0.108). This is significant both with asymptotic and bootstrapped standard errors. This result indicates that the more a country supports women's care role being shared with other parties, the more restrictive family migration policies are. This is the case, controlling for support for immigration (as well as in the model with pro-immigrant attitudes).

Like the random effects model, the results of the SEM model thus indicate that where there is any influence of public opinion on family migration policies in 2007 and 2010, this is not related to public opinion about immigration (or immigrants, although these results are not shown) but rather to opinions about gender roles, with egalitarian attitudes causing more restrictive family migration policies. Note that the effect is 'more significant' than in the panel regression model. This is due to the inclusion of additional-incompletely-observed countries, as well as first instance measurements of public opinion in the model.

Conclusion and discussion

This paper asked whether divergent public opinion about immigration/immigrants and/or gender roles can explain changes in family migration policies in European countries. The results of the study are preliminary, pending further analyses with the latest version of the MIPEX database. The additional data will help to stabilize the estimated models and also allow for a better discussion of changes in policies over time. The preliminary results do indicate two findings about the relationship between public opinion and family migration policies.



Figure 4.2. Unstandardized model results for Model E1.IMCA on support for shared-caring, support for immigration and family migration policies (N=25). Asymptotic standard errors are shown in parentheses, bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets. Two-sided p<.05 are indicated in bold.

Firstly, no evidence was found for the policy-opinion nexus. This finding contests the literature on intergroup norms and group conflict theory. Schlueter et al. (2013) found evidence of a policy-opinion nexus, showing that integration policies are *negatively* associated with perceived group threat, more in line with the literature on intergroup norms than group conflict theory. This may be because of the different measurements used in this study, e.g. a modified MIPEX and the focus on family migration policies, or because of the additional inclusion of public opinion toward gender roles.

Secondly, evidence was found for the opinion-policy nexus, but only relating to public opinion about gender roles rather than opinions about immigration or immigrants. The results of the analyses gave no indication that public opinion about immigration and immigrants influenced countries' family migration policies in 2007 and 2010. This finding contests the quote at the beginning of the paper by Card et al. (2005): public attitudes toward immigration and immigrant-related issues do not appear to be important for shaping family migration policies. The results here showed rather that public opinion about family norms influences family migration policies, namely that there is a negative influence of support for shared-caring on the openness of family migration policies. These results provide evidence that if public opinion influences family migration policies, it is opinions about gender roles in the family rather than opinions about immigration or immigrants that influence these policies. This finding contests those of Schlueter et al. (2013), who did not find evidence of an opinion-policy nexus when looking at immigration policies, however these authors did not look at family migration nor include public opinion about gender norms. The finding does provide support for the quote at above by Bonjour and De Hart (2013): family migration policies do appear to be partly shaped by gender roles in earning and caring in the home.

The *negative* relationship between egalitarian gender norms and permissive family migration polices is in line with the observation by Van Walsum (2008) that more egalitarian gender norms develop alongside more restrictive family migration policies. This may be because more traditional gender roles are projected on the migrant 'other'. In family migration policies, these traditional gender norms are manifested in the form of income requirements and language requirements, making sponsors 'breadwinners' and making 'dependents' of incoming family members (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014; Eggebø, 2010). An example of this finding is Denmark, a country with very egalitarian gender norms and very restrictive family migration policies in the form of, for example, an income requirement. The overall negative effect of shared-caring on family migration policies was found despite the country differences in the relationship between gender norms and family migration policies. For example, both Denmark and Sweden have egalitarian gender norms, but Denmark has very closed family migration policies, while

Sweden has very open family migration policies. Including a wide range of countries in the analyses shows that there is still an *overall* negative effect across countries, despite exceptions.

This study was a first attempt at a cross-national study across time of the hypothesis put forward by Van Walsum (2008) on the relationship between public opinion toward gender roles and family migration policies. The study showed the value of including different types of public opinion when looking at this opinion-policy nexus. It also showed the usefulness of controlling for a possible opinion-policy nexus. As with any study, however, there are several limitations.

Firstly, the findings here are preliminary, pending further analyses including the latest MIPEX data. This additional data point would also allow for comparing the quality of the MIPi against the MIPex using a simplex model, a procedure which can only be done using three data points. Secondly, the measurement of public opinion should ideally be supplemented with a measurement of people's opinions about the gender norms of migrants and their ideas about family migration policies specifically. None of these measurements is yet available in cross-national surveys across time, however. Thirdly, it should also be noted that working with country-level mean attitudes assumes that there is such a thing as the attitude of the 'majority' and that this is what influences policies. It is of course possible that only certain elements of society influence policies, e.g. the elite, or that politicians only appeal to one section of the population. This could be the subject of further study. Lastly, although this study can be seen as an improvement compared to looking only at single case studies, it still only has a limited sample, which affects the reliability of the estimates of models run. It would be worthwhile to improve all these limitations in further studies.

As well as addressing the above limitations, there are other possibilities for extending this study. One extension would be to look not just at countries' official policies, but also at the application of these policies. Policies may stay the same, while the application of the policies changes (Hammar, 1985) or there may be differences in how these policies are applied by street-level bureaucrats (Ellermann, 2006; Van der Leun, 2003). None of these possibilities is measured here and it would be interesting to see whether the *application* of these policies, rather than the policies themselves, is influenced differently by public opinion. Another extension would be to look not just at the *direct* influences of public opinion on policies, but also at more indirect measures. Some authors show that public opinion can indirectly influence immigration policies through lobbying or pressure groups (Facchini & Mayda, 2008; Freeman, 1995). This potential mediating role of pressure groups and the media would be an interesting addition to the study, but difficult to do for the number of countries included in the study. Additionally, the potential mechanisms for *how* public opinion about gender is used in *othering* migrants could also be examined.

Looking at the direct relationship of opinion-policy, this study does not recognize the fact that even if policymakers aimed to make policies completely in line with public opinion, they would still have to abide by several legal obligations, both European and International Law. This could also be included in a further study. In further cross-national studies, it would also be interesting to include measurements of political systems–does public opinion affect policies in some political systems, but not in others? A final extension would be conducting a similar analysis using other policies and opinions–is it only family migration policies that are not influenced by opinions about immigration/immigrants, while being partly influenced by other seemingly unrelated opinions or are other policies similarly opinionated?

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