

# *Has Migration Been Beneficial for Migrants and Their Children?*

*Comparing Social Mobility of Turks in Western Europe, Turks in Turkey, and Western European Natives*

Carolina V. Zuccotti  
*University of Brighton*

Harry B. G. Ganzeboom  
*VU University Amsterdam*

Ayse Guveli  
*University of Essex*

The study compares the social mobility and status attainment of first- and second-generation Turks in nine Western European countries with those of Western European natives and with those of Turks in Turkey. It shows that the children of low-class migrants are more likely to acquire a higher education than their counterparts in Turkey, making them more educationally mobile. Moreover, they successfully convert this education in the Western European labor market, and are upwardly mobile relative to the first generation. When comparing labor market outcomes of second generations relative to Turks in Turkey, however, the results show that the same level of education leads to a higher occupation in Turkey. The implications of these findings are discussed.

## *INTRODUCTION*

In the 1960s and the early 1970s, facilitated by labor import contracts, a number of Western European industries hired Turkish workers. Although migration of Turks was intended to be temporary and contracts were phased out after 1974, many labor migrants stayed and their numbers subsequently bolstered by family reunification and chain migration. Turkish-origin residents are now the largest extra-communitarian migrant group in Western Europe.

Much of the research on first- and second-generation migrants in Europe concerns the integration of the Turkish-origin population in

destination societies. Such studies center on educational and labor market achievements of migrants, in comparison with natives<sup>1</sup> and/or other migrant groups (Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 2007 and related articles from the same journal issue; Euwals et al. 2010; Heath and Cheung 2007; Kristen and Granato 2007; Van De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen 2007; Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008; Phalet and Heath 2010; Kogan 2011). They trace different forms of assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 2003) and note how “ethnic penalties” (Heath and Cheung 2007) evolve over time and over generations. However, this may not be the perspective that migrants themselves find most relevant. People do not move to compete with other groups in the destination society but to improve their life chances — and their children’s — relative to what they would have been in the origin society. In other words, to understand international migration and its effects on those building a life abroad, we must consider social origins. In this study, we do so in two different but equally important ways. First, we compare individuals to their parents by studying intergenerational mobility (or rather: intergenerational reproduction) in both education and occupation. Second, we compare Turks who migrated to Western Europe and this group’s second generation to those who stayed in the origin country, Turkey. This latter perspective leads to a counterfactual view of the outcomes of migration: What would be the occupational status of first-generation Turks, along with the educational and occupational status of their descendants, had they not migrated to Western Europe?

Next to the commonly used destination-country perspective, our analysis adds an origin-country perspective, revealing the benefits of migrating in terms of achievements and possibilities for upward social mobility compared to those left behind. We study status attainment and social mobility (or social reproduction) processes among Turks in Turkey, first- and second-generation Turks in Western Europe, and Western European natives, asking the following research questions: To what extent are educational and occupational reproduction patterns different for Turks in Western Europe, Turks in Turkey, and natives in destination countries? What do these differences suggest in terms of how groups are doing in comparative terms, especially how Turks in Western Europe are doing relative to Turks in Turkey?

<sup>1</sup>In this paper, “natives” refers to the majoritarian population.

The analysis draws on a dataset combining the European Social Survey (2002–2010) and European Values Study (2008); the data cover Turks in their most common Western European destinations and in Turkey.

### *TURKS IN WESTERN EUROPE*

Social and economic developments in Western Europe and Turkey made these two areas into receiving and sending migration regions, respectively, in the early 1960s. While Western Europe's economic growth after World War II created a need for a low-skilled labor force, its educational expansion decreased the number of low-skilled job seekers. Lacking spontaneous migration from former colonies and with increasing job vacancies in manufacturing, mining, construction, and the service industry, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Sweden (countries with the largest Turkish population) looked for new sources of manpower. A "guest worker" system was introduced, consisting of formal labor import agreements between these countries and Turkey (Akgündüz 2008).

At the same time, Turkey was transforming. Between the founding years of the Turkish Republic and the 1960s, Turkey witnessed a dramatic population growth, provoking mass movements from rural to urban areas (Kocaman 2008). Urbanization had increased by 17 percent in 1935, 42 percent in 1975, and 70 percent in 2011 (Karadayi 1974; UNDP 2013). Yet Turkey failed to implement large-scale industrialization, and unemployment became an issue together with other social and economic problems, such as big-city ghettos, segregation, and poverty (Kıray 1982). The "excess labor" — mostly workers in agriculture and small industries — had to choose between becoming part of the impoverished urban poor and finding another way to maintain their income and well-being. Temporary migration to Western Europe appeared a good solution; it even became an option for the urban middle-class and low-ranking government officials (Akgündüz 2008).

After labor import contracts ended in 1974, Turks continued to migrate to Western Europe, mainly through family reunion and chain migration. In 1973, the number in Western Europe totaled 1.35 million, of whom 900,000 were workers and 450,000 dependents. In spite of return flows, the Turkish population in Western Europe rose to about two million in 1980 and three million in 2006 and now stands at four million (Abadan-Unat 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of Turkey 2015; UNDP 2013). As this is based on figures that only include Turkish citizens, there are likely many more persons of Turkish descent in Western Europe. Among the countries cited above, the majority of Turks reside in Germany, with substantial numbers in France and the Netherlands and sizable groups in other Western European countries.

## *THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS*

### *Introduction*

Practically from the beginning of migration studies, a concern for scholars has been how migrants and their descendants are doing compared to native or majoritarian populations in destination countries. This concern led to the development of assimilation and segmented assimilation theories (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 1997, 2003; Zhou 1997), which seek to explain how migrants integrate — or not — into the host society and when they acquire — if at all — the same opportunities as the majoritarian population over time. The concept of “ethnic penalties” emerged as part of this debate in the European context. It refers to the difference remaining in outcomes between migrants and native populations after background characteristics are taken into account (Heath and Cheung 2007; Phalet and Heath 2010).

We take a somewhat different approach; for a comprehensive view of the outcomes of migration, we need to compare migrants and their children with those left behind (Guveli et al. 2015). With the exception of studies related to the “selection of migrants” (Borjas 1987; Feliciano 2005; Dronkers and De Heus 2009) or to earnings (see Massey et al. 1993 for a review), the literature has barely scratched the surface of this issue.

People usually move in search of a better life, specifically when opportunities in destination societies seem better than those at home (or gains are higher than costs) (Sjaastad 1962). Therefore, it can be expected that migration is usually beneficial for social mobility and career advancement. In fact, one of the main objectives of labor migrants is to improve their own and, more importantly, their children’s life prospects in com-

parison with those left behind. This, in many cases, presupposes a wish for intergenerational improvement, whereby children are better off than their parents.

In what follows, we study educational and occupational attainment, as well as processes of social mobility, for four groups: first-generation Turks, that is, Turks born and mostly educated in Turkey who migrated to Western Europe; second-generation Turks, that is, Turks born or mostly educated in Western Europe; Turks in Turkey; and natives in Western Europe.

### *Migrants and the OED Model*

To study status attainment and social mobility, we use the Origin-Education-Destination (OED) model, initially developed by Blau and Duncan (1967). This model also serves as a guide for our hypotheses. The OED model (see Figure 1a) follows two forms of reproduction: education and occupation. On the one hand, social origins affect education: Parents influence their children by transferring ability and cognitive skills, helping them with their homework, sending them to better schools, or paying for extracurricular help (OE). On the other hand, social origins affect occupation (destination) both directly and indirectly. In the latter indirect effect, not only do high-status families more successfully position their children in higher education than low-status families (OE), but this education has a value in the labor market, influencing occupational outcomes (ED). In the former, social origins directly affect occupation (OD) in a number of ways: Parents influence their children by giving them job advice, helping them look for a job, providing economic resources (including the transmission of a family business), offering social and relational aptitudes, and supplying a wide range of networks and connections.

We hypothesize each of the three main components of the OED model may play out differently for each group we consider, leading to differences in social reproduction patterns across groups. This is expressed in arrows A1–A3 in Figure 1b,c, which includes the group variable (G): Turks in Turkey, first- and second-generation Turks, and Western European natives. Arrow A1 in Figure 1b expresses differences in educational reproduction (OE); arrow A2 in Figure 1c expresses differences in the direct effect of parental background on occupation (OD); and arrow A3 expresses differences in returns to education (ED).

**Figure 1.** The Origin-Education-Destination (OED) Model and Its Relationship With Groups (G)




Figure 1b,c also shows “average group effects” for education (GE) and occupation (GD), that is, differences created because of specific characteristics of the groups (or processes deriving from those characteristics). In the literature comparing migrants with native populations, these average group effects are usually referred to as “ethnic penalties” (i.e., to the detriment of the migrants) and are often attributed to discrimination (Wrench and Modood 2000; Heath and Cheung 2006); however, omitted factors may also include cultural values, lack of networks, poor language skills, etc. In our analysis, “average group effects” also refers to potential differences between Turks in Western Europe and Turks in Turkey: For example, Turks who leave their home country may be more

motivated and risk-taking than Turks those who stay, giving them a gross advantage in destination countries over those left behind.

An important characteristic of our model is that by assuming differences in social reproduction across groups, we may find that some of the group penalties (or gains) occur only (or to a greater/lesser extent) for some educational levels or certain social backgrounds, indicating the existence of varied explanatory mechanisms. This may be better understood with an example. Looking at the UK, some studies (Platt 2007; Zuccotti 2015a) find that Caribbeans with high-class backgrounds are more penalized in the labor market than those with middle/low-class backgrounds. This might suggest, for example, that on top of discrimination based on skin color — an “average effect” — Caribbeans with high-class parental backgrounds may also lack specific “high-class resources” (ways of behaving and talking, social networks, etc.) necessary to achieve certain qualified occupations.

By following the OED model, we look at differences between groups by studying processes of social reproduction: We explore how OE, ED, and OD relationships vary for each group and how this affects average differences between Turks in Europe and Turks in Turkey/Western European natives.

### *Mechanisms and Hypotheses*

In what follows, we use the OED model to derive our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 refers to first-generation Turks (born and educated in Turkey) and discusses only occupational outcomes; hypotheses 2a and 2b refer to second-generation Turks and discuss both educational and occupational outcomes. A summary of all hypotheses appears in Table 1.

**TABLE 1**  
**HYPOTHESES**

Generation	Outcome studied	Hypothesis
<i>First</i>	Occupation	1. Weaker effect of parental background (OD) and lower returns to education (ED) compared to Turks in Turkey and Western European (WE) natives
<i>Second</i>	Education	2a. Weaker effect of parental background (OE) compared to Turks in Turkey and WE natives
	Occupation	2b. Weaker effect of parental background (OD) compared to Turks in Turkey and WE natives

*Hypothesis 1 (First Generation).* Our first expectation is that social reproduction with respect to the occupational status of first-generation Turks will differ from that of Turks in Turkey and Western European (WE) natives in two respects. First, we expect parents of the former to be less influential (OD) than the parents of the latter two; second, we expect migrants to have lower returns to education (ED), that is, higher educational levels render them less occupational status.

We expect a weaker effect of parental background on occupations (OD) for migrants because when migrating, first-generation migrants leave their parents behind, and with them, resources affecting their occupations. As for the relationship between education and labor market outcomes (ED), the literature consistently shows the educational qualifications of international migrants are not always recognized; hence, they do not have the same effect on occupational outcomes as they do for individuals seeking jobs in their own country (Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004; Kogan 2006; Chiswick and Miller 2007; Heath and Cheung 2007; Kalter, Granato, and Kristen 2007; Algan et al. 2010; Johnston et al. 2010).

How first-generation Turks do with respect to Turks in Turkey will depend on the differences in the role of education and parental background in Western Europe and Turkey. For example, although depending less on parental resources might be detrimental for migrants whose parents have higher social backgrounds, it might be better for those who have left their lower social class parental backgrounds behind, as is the case for most first-generation migrant Turks. As regards the role of education, the match between educational credentials and labor market will probably be weaker for first-generation Turks with a Turkish diploma looking for a job in the Western European labor market than for Turks searching for a job in Turkey. While in terms of income and employment, migrants may find better chances outside their home country, a weaker match between education and occupation might give an overall advantage to Turks in Turkey, especially among those with higher educational levels. Finally, we need to consider unmeasured factors: for example, discrimination in the Western European labor market, which might give an overall advantage to Turks in Turkey, or a very high motivation among migrants, which might give an overall advantage to Turks in Western Europe.

*Hypotheses 2a and 2b (Second Generation).* There is much debate about the fortunes of the children of migrants. Although some studies say



disadvantages might persist over generations (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997) or social mobility might be “blocked” (Pichler 2011), others expect an improvement over time; more importantly, the children of migrants are likely to do better than their parents (Alba and Nee 1997, 2003), especially when arriving parents have low social backgrounds (Zhou et al. 2008), as in the Turkish case.

We hypothesize the children of Turks will not only do better than their parents but will be less dependent on them in terms of education and occupation than Turks in Turkey (and, presumably, Western European natives). We expect to find lower social reproduction levels for Turks in Western Europe than for Turks in Turkey; we expect these to be mainly the outcome of higher educational mobility (weaker OE) (*Hypothesis 2a*) and, to a lesser extent, of a weaker direct effect of parental occupation on individuals’ occupation (OD) (*Hypothesis 2b*). Furthermore, as a consequence of *Hypothesis 2a*, we expect second-generation Turks to be in a better position than those left behind in terms of education.

Migrants want better lives for their children and will invest in them (Dustmann 2008). Indeed, there is evidence of increased educational mobility among second-generation migrants (see Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008 for a review). A German study shows the influence of the father’s education on the chances of children reaching the *Abitur* is smaller for second-generation Turks than for natives (Kristen and Granato 2007). While this implies a higher parental education is less of an advantage for Turks than for natives, it also suggests that a low starting point — common among the descendants of Turkish migrants — might not be as detrimental for Turks.

Motivation and high parental aspirations are often used to explain educational mobility among ethnic minorities (Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008); furthermore, there is evidence that the parents of second-generation Turks have particularly high aspirations for their children (Abadan-Unat 2011). If so, a lower dependence on the (usually low) parental background among Turks in Western Europe means better educational outcomes compared to those left behind. Supporting this statement, a recent study shows Turkish children in Europe perform better (higher PISA test scores) than children in Turkey, given equal parental backgrounds (Dustmann, Frattini, and Lanzara 2012).

Regarding occupational outcomes, the OED model shows that the parental effect on occupation is mediated by the role of education: For

second-generation Turks, and in line with previous findings on social mobility of ethnic minorities (see, e.g., Platt 2007; Zuccotti 2015a), we expect education attainment to be the main gateway to social mobility. However, we also suggest the parental pressure to do well in the destination country might be expressed in the direct encouragement to find a good job and progress in a career; this will be reflected in a weaker direct effect of (the relatively low) parental class on children's occupations (OD). Note that although entrepreneurship among Turks might be a way to keep the relationship between parents and children strong, the number of entrepreneurial parents in our sample is small compared to the number of parents in manual jobs.

In determining how well Turks in Western Europe do compared to those left behind in terms of occupation, if educational mobility is higher for the former and this is, in turn, translated into better positions in the labor market, Turks in Western Europe will probably be advantaged (especially those with lower social backgrounds). However, if "ethnic penalties" are present for the second generation — expressed, for example, in discrimination — this might attenuate the (expected) advantage over those left behind. The low performance for second-generation migrants has been acknowledged by studies exploring access to higher status jobs (Crul and Doornik 2003; Simon 2003; Kogan 2006; Heath and Cheung 2007; Silberman, Alba, and Fournier 2007; Heath, Rothson, and Kilpi 2008). Yet most do not consider parental background in their models, generating a possible bias in their conclusions, as in the UK case (Zuccotti 2015a).

### *DATA AND MEASUREMENT*

Our analysis uses the European Social Survey (ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010) and one round of the European Values Study (EVS 2008). Taken together, these six surveys cover almost all European populations and Turkey, making it possible to compare Turkish first and second generation migrants, Turkish non-migrants, and Western European natives. While primarily social attitudes surveys, ESS and EVS stand out for their detailed inventory of migration status, with questions on country of birth of respondents and their parents, period of arrival, nationality, and language spoken at home. Both have relatively good

information on parents' educations and occupations and respondents' corresponding status. There are minor differences in how data are collected and processed, both between ESS and EVS and between ESS rounds.

Our four main comparison groups are as follows: Turks in Turkey;<sup>2</sup> Turks in Western Europe, comprising first generation (born *and* mostly educated in Turkey) and second generation (born *or* mostly educated in Western Europe); and Western European natives. For ESS 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 and EVS, we consider Turkish migrants as those individuals interviewed in Western Europe who were born in Turkey, or have at least one parent born in Turkey (more than 90 percent have two parents born in Turkey) or have Turkish citizenship. For ESS 2002, we define Turks as those who speak Turkish as a first or second language, or are Turkish citizens, or were born in Turkey. ESS 2002 only asked for the *continent* of birth of parents, an ambiguous measure, as 12 percent of Turks live in the European part of Turkey. Western European natives and Turks in Turkey are those who, along with their parents, were born in one of the Western European countries in our sample or in Turkey, respectively. We restrict our analysis to nine countries where Turkish migrants are found by ESS or EVS: Germany, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. We exclude Bulgaria and Greece because persons of Turkish descent in these countries are generally not labor migrants; we exclude Luxembourg because it has few Turks. All countries are available in both surveys and all rounds, except Austria, which is not available in ESS 2008 and 2010, and Turkey, which is not available in ESS 2002, 2006, and 2010. Information on the total number of respondents per survey/round and country appears in Table S1, in the online version of this article.

<sup>2</sup> "Turks in Turkey" include those living in rural areas and those in cities (which include rural-urban migrants as well: recall that urbanization has greatly increased in the past 40 years). Moreover, it includes ethnic minorities, such as Kurds, as well. We ran tests (available upon request) to explore these sub-group differences and found that the comparison of Turks in Western Europe and Turks in Turkey leads to similar results, independently of the rural/urban location of Turks in Turkey and their ethnic belonging. Note, however, that — by including social origins in our analysis — a key assumption is that Turks in Western Europe compare themselves with Turks in Turkey with similar socioeconomic backgrounds.

Although ESS and EVS are part of large-scale projects with standardized procedures for collecting data, for which high comparability can be expected, a possible weakness is the representation of migrants, including Turks. For example, as questionnaires are only in the language of the country, lower educated and more recent migrants may be underrepresented in the sample. Three comments on this are as follows: First, although we are studying first and second generations, the crucial comparisons are with the latter group, as their outcomes express longer-term processes of integration and are more interesting when compared to Western European natives and Turks in Turkey. Second, even if only the better-off Turks (in terms of education and occupation) are present in the sample, we are making use of a crucial variable to control for this: parental background. Finally, our results go in the same direction as those of a previous cross-national study on “ethnic penalties” (Heath and Cheung 2007). Specifically, when looking at access to managerial and professional occupations (I and II in the EGP class scheme)<sup>3</sup> for second-generation Turks and Western European natives (only in ESS rounds) and controlling for age and education, we find a negative effect — or “ethnic penalty” — for second-generation Turks compared to natives.

Our criterion for defining first- and second-generation Turks is place of education. We use a “majority” rule whereby individuals are assigned to the first generation if they were born *and* completed most of their education (>50%) in Turkey and to the second generation if they were born *or* mostly educated in Western Europe. For individuals born in Turkey, the differentiation between first and second generations uses the person’s age, age of arrival in the destination country, and estimated age when education was finished. We approximate the years of education necessary to finish a certain educational level, assuming individuals enter the educational system at age six.<sup>4</sup> For example, a person who finished upper secondary education (around age 18) and emigrated at age 15 is considered to have done most of his/her studies in Turkey but if emigrating at age

<sup>3</sup>We created the EGP (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) classes I and II using syntax in: <http://www.harryganzeboom.nl/isco88/index.htm>.

<sup>4</sup>Following UNESCO (2006), age limits are as follows: not completed primary education (6–9 years old); primary education or first stage of basic education (6–12 years old); lower secondary or second stage of basic education (6–15 years old); (upper) secondary education (6–18 years old); post-secondary non-tertiary education (6–20 years old); first stage of tertiary education (6–22 years old); and second stage of tertiary education (6–26 years old). When ISCED was missing, we used the declared years of education.

**TABLE 2**  
**DISTRIBUTION OF COMPARISON GROUPS BY SURVEY/ROUND AND COUNTRY (PERCENTAGE). POPULATION 18-65<sup>a</sup>**

	Turks in Turkey	Turk 1st	Turk 2nd	WE natives
Survey/round				
ESS1	0.0	18.4	16.5	19.7
ESS2	29.4	18.8	19.9	19.0
ESS3	0.0	16.7	18.2	18.8
ESS4	35.3	17.5	15.2	15.4
ESS5	0.0	15.8	18.9	14.4
European Values Study	35.3	12.8	11.4	12.8
Country				
Austria	0.0	8.5	13.1	8.7
Belgium	0.0	9.4	10.4	10.2
Switzerland	0.0	18.4	10.1	8.8
Germany	0.0	26.9	36.0	16.5
Denmark	0.0	6.8	5.4	10.8
France	0.0	2.6	4.0	10.6
The Netherlands	0.0	15.4	14.5	12.1
Norway	0.0	4.7	1.3	11.7
Sweden	0.0	7.3	5.1	10.7
Turkey	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	2,198	234	297	55,329

Note: ISEI, International Socio-Economic Index; WE, Western European.

<sup>a</sup>The sample is restricted to individuals with valid ISEI, education, and parents' ISEI.

10 is considered to have done the majority in Western Europe. This variable is easily constructed in ESS 2010 and EVS, as they collect the precise age of arrival. For other ESS rounds, the variable was approximated.<sup>5</sup>

Table 2 shows the distribution of the four comparison groups by survey/year and destination country. The proportion of first- and second-

<sup>5</sup>Instead of the exact variable, we use crude categories: arrived last year; between 1 and 5 years; between 6 and 10 years; between 11 and 20 years; and between 21 years and more. For the first two categories, we assume education was mostly done in Turkey. For the latter three, we *approximate* the likelihood of having finished more than 50 percent of education in the country of destination by creating a continuous variable running from 0 to 1. Consider a 23-year-old person with primary education who emigrated between 11 and 20 years ago. This person studied between the ages of 6 and 13 and arrived in Western Europe between the ages of 3 and 12 (approximate values). In total, primary studies take around 7 years. If the person emigrated at 10, 11, or 12 years old, we assume he/she completed most education in Turkey (at least 4 years of 7). If the person emigrated at 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 years of age, we consider most studies were completed in Western Europe. She/he receives a value of 7/10 (or 0.7): in seven of the 10 possible ages of arrival, she/he did most of his/her education in Western Europe. This continuous variable is later dichotomized: Those with values up to 0.5 are assigned to the first generation and those higher than 0.5 to the second generation (around 30% of all Turks have intermediate values).

generation Turks is similar in all data sources. Note: Although our respondents are disproportionately situated in Germany, Turks in Germany are underrepresented (when compared to Turkish figures)<sup>6</sup>; this is the logical consequence of the ESS/EVS sampling design.

The time of arrival is a key piece of information. The vast majority of first-generation Turks in our data (around 70%) arrived in 1980 or later, probably migrating as part of family reunion or chain migration processes. Among second-generation Turks born in Turkey rather than the destination country (36%), around 78 percent arrived before 1980, thus living more than 20 years in the destination country.<sup>7</sup>

Respondents and their parents' educational qualifications are measured with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97), which ranges from 0 (incomplete primary) to 6 (postgraduate level of tertiary education). We scale these into approximate years of education<sup>8</sup> and replace the missing cases with the stated years of education completed (for respondents only). We prefer qualifications scaled by duration over stated duration, following Hout and DiPrete (2006). In EVS, only the father's education is collected, except for households headed by single mothers. For parents in ESS, we consider the maximum value of father and mother. In all surveys, the reference time for parental information is when the respondent is 14 years old.

Respondents' occupations (current or last) are measured with the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), available for all countries and years: These have been transformed into the International Socio-Economic Index [ISEI] of occupational status (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996), which varies between 16 and 90. For parental occupations, in EVS the respondent is asked about the father's occupation (for single-mother households, the mother's occupation), and in ESS, both the father and mother's occupation. In all surveys, ISCO codes are available for most cases, but ESS also has crude self-classification scores, which are converted into their approximate ISCO equivalent. For ESS, we convert both detailed ISCO and crude measures into ISEI scores (for father and mother),

<sup>6</sup>Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Abadan-Unat 2011).

<sup>7</sup>Values refer to individuals with valid International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI), education, and parents' ISEI.

<sup>8</sup>Not completed primary education (3.25 years); primary education or first stage of basic education (6.5 years); lower secondary or second stage of basic education (9.5 years); (upper) secondary education (13 years); post-secondary non-tertiary education (14.25); first stage of tertiary education (16.5 years); and second stage of tertiary education (20.5 years).

we then take the average between both ISEI versions (for father and mother), and finally, we consider the maximum value between both parents.

Analysis is based on OLS regressions, with separate models for men and women. Educational attainment covers people between 25 and 65, while occupational attainment covers those from 18 to 65. We exclude those older than 65, given the very few older Turks in Western Europe.

### ANALYSIS

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables broken down by comparison group and gender. Parental education and occupational status are higher for first-generation Turks than for those who stayed behind; this also applies to their education. These values point to a positive selection of Turks in Western Europe. As for occupational status, despite differences in education and parental backgrounds favoring migrants, first-generation Turks have either similar (men) or lower (women) occupational status than their counterparts in Turkey. Unlike Turks in Turkey, the first generation maintains the level of their parents' occupational statuses. Finally, we observe an wide gap in ISEI when comparing them to Western European natives, as most previous literature has shown.

Table 3 reveals that second-generation Turks have clearly moved up the educational hierarchy relative to those left behind and to their parents but have not quite reached the level of Western European natives. For occupational status, second-generation Turks are collectively quite mobile

**TABLE 3**  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY COMPARISON GROUP AND GENDER (MEANS)

	Men				Women			
	Turks in Turkey	Turk 1st	Turk 2nd	WE natives	Turks in Turkey	Turk 1st	Turk 2nd	WE natives
Parents' education	6.4	7.9	9.2	11.6	6.2	8.5	8.7	11.5
Education	9.5	10.7	12.3	13.6	7.9	10.2	11.9	13.4
Parents' ISEI	30.8	34.3	33.8	43.7	33.1	33.6	32.4	43.5
ISEI	36.3	35.8	38.1	46.0	42.0	31.8	39.9	44.6
Age	39.1	41.2	31.1	43.4	34.9	39.3	29.5	43.5
Total 25–60 <sup>a</sup>	1,549	152	123	24,685	1,963	100	88	25,796
Total 18–60 <sup>b</sup>	1,540	154	170	27,273	658	80	127	28,050
Total 18–60 <sup>c</sup>	1,890	162	190	28,605	2,382	110	155	29,606

Notes: ISEI, International Socio-Economic Index; WE, Western European.

<sup>a</sup>Total sample 25–60 with valid education and parents' education and ISEI (total for the first two percentage rows).

<sup>b</sup>Total sample 18–60 with valid education, ISEI, and parents' ISEI (total for the last three percentage rows).

<sup>c</sup>Total sample 18–60 with valid education and parents' ISEI.

relative to their parents and are approaching (but not quite reaching) the level of Western European natives. Despite their higher levels of education, the occupational status of second-generation male Turks is only slightly higher than that of those left behind, while the women have even lower status than their compatriots at home. Note: In Turkey, the number of women with a valid ISEI score — implying they are either currently employed or have been in the past — is relatively smaller ( $N = 658$ ). While in Turkey, more than 70 percent of women have never worked (or do not declare so in these surveys), in Western Europe this drops to around 18 percent for second-generation Turkish women. In addition, lower educated women in Turkey are more likely to be out of the labor market than higher educated women (figures available upon request).

Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the regression models for education and occupation for the four comparison groups, differentiated by gender. The age of the respondent is set at 35; the independent variables (parents' education and occupation, respondents' education) are standardized into  $z$ -scores, so they have equal standard deviations, making coefficients comparable.<sup>9</sup> All models control for survey/year dummies (not shown). Although we are interested in the average situation of Turks in Western Europe, we explored country effects by adding country dummies (see Tables S2 and S3); the models with country dummies were very similar to the ones presented.<sup>10</sup> For the purposes of this study and ease of interpretation, we discuss the tables without country dummies. Finally, Figures IIa–IIIb add graphical illustrations to key findings in Tables 4 and 5: Figure IIa,b shows educational mobility for the various groups (based on Models 3a and 3b from Table 4); and Figure IIIa,b shows returns to education (based on Models 4a and 4b from Table 5).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup>Although group distributions are different, the results are the same with non-standardized coefficients.

<sup>10</sup>We did find, however, some country differences. Regarding educational outcomes, only the Austrian case is different from the rest: Here, second-generation Turks do not seem to gain an educational advantage over those left behind. The results on occupational attainment show Turks in Germany (especially the first generation) are particularly disadvantaged in terms of occupational status compared to Turks in Turkey; the opposite is observed in Austria and the Netherlands.

<sup>11</sup>Predicted values in Figures IIa–IIIb refer to individuals who are 35 years old; variables not observed in the figures are set to the mean. To construct the figures, we use **margins** and **marginsplot** commands in STATA (version 13.1; StataCorp, 4905 Lakeway Drive, College Station, Texas 77845, USA).



Table 4 shows *first-generation Turks* to have significantly higher levels of education than Turks in Turkey (the reference group in all models) (Models 1a and 1b, Table 4); this difference remains statistically significant even after controlling for parental background (Models 2a and 2b). Although we do not focus on educational outcomes of first generations in our theoretical background and hypotheses, it is interesting to note they are a positively selected group (Models 2a and 2b) but at the same time disadvantaged when compared to Western European natives. Models 3a,3b add an interaction between parental education and group; they reveal (even if only the female model is discussed) the education of first-generation Turkish women depends significantly less on their parents' education (expressed by the negative interaction effect) than does the education of those remaining in Turkey. This leads to a relative advantage for the migrants when considering those with lower parental education (Figure IIb). The results show Turkey to be a much less mobile society in terms of education than Western European countries: The steeper line in Figure IIa,b reveals that the education of individuals depends more on their parents' education.

Following the first generation into the Western European labor market (Table 5), we find first-generation Turkish women to have lower occupational attainment than Turks in Turkey and Western European natives, while men are only disadvantaged relative to the latter (Models 1a and 1b). After controlling for background characteristics (education plays the major role), the effect for first-generation Turkish men becomes significantly negative, denoting a disadvantage compared to Turks in Turkey; a similar effect is seen for women, but they experience a larger disadvantage in general. Note the change in the effect for Western European natives (from positive to negative) which implies that, given equal background conditions (again the effect is driven by education), a higher occupation is obtained in Turkey. This makes the difference between first-generation Turks and Turks in Turkey larger than the difference between the former and Western European natives (Models 2a and 2b).

For social reproduction processes (see interaction effects between parental occupation and group in Models 3a and 3b), we do not find statistically significant differences, although the negative interaction effect points to a lower dependence of first-generation Turks on parental occupation, as compared to Turks in Turkey. This is mainly driven by lower returns to education (see interaction effects between education and group in Models 4a and 4b) — as partially expected in *Hypothesis 1* — for

**TABLE 4**  
**EDUCATION (YEARS) BY COMPARISON GROUP (REF = TURKS IN TURKEY), PARENTS' EDUCATION (PEDUC), PARENTS' ISEI (PISEI), AND AGE<sup>a</sup> (MEN AND WOMEN 25–65). MODELS CONTROL FOR SURVEY/ROUND<sup>b</sup>**

	Men			Women		
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b
Constant	9.74 (0.09)***	11.46 (0.09)***	12.55 (0.14)***	8.40 (0.08)***	10.18 (0.08)***	11.52 (0.13)***
Turk 1st	1.40 (0.27)***	0.80 (0.24)***	0.28 (0.34)	2.47 (0.32)***	1.68 (0.29)***	0.41 (0.36)
Turk 2nd	2.77 (0.30)***	2.00 (0.27)***	0.40 (0.32)	3.70 (0.34)***	3.11 (0.31)***	1.98 (0.37)***
WE natives	4.45 (0.09)***	2.25 (0.08)***	1.14 (0.14)***	6.07 (0.08)***	3.91 (0.08)***	2.57 (0.13)***
PEDUC		1.30 (0.02)***	2.23 (0.09)***		1.24 (0.02)***	2.31 (0.09)***
Turk 1st* PEDUC			-0.23 (0.27)			-0.98 (0.28)***
Turk 2nd* PEDUC			-1.91 (0.28)***			-0.74 (0.31)**
WE natives* PEDUC			-0.97 (0.10)***			-1.13 (0.09)***
PISEI		0.40 (0.02)***	0.40 (0.02)***		0.44 (0.02)***	0.40 (0.02)***
Age	-0.04 (0.00)***	-0.00 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)**	-0.07 (0.00)***	-0.04 (0.00)***	-0.04 (0.00)***
Adj. $R^2$	0.11	0.28	0.28	0.21	0.36	0.37
$N$	26,509	26,509	26,509	27,947	27,947	27,947

Notes: ISEI, International Socio-Economic Index; WE, Western European.

<sup>a</sup>The values are  $B$ -coefficients (SE) from OLS regressions. PEDUC and PISEI are  $z$ -scores and Age centered at 35.

<sup>b</sup>The constant refers to Turks in Turkey in European Values Study.

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; and \* $p < 0.10$ .

first-generation Turks compared to Western European natives and Turks in Turkey, particularly for women (returns to education are the highest in Turkey). These results may be better observed in Figure IIIa,b. Here, we see the higher the educational level, the higher the difference between first-generation Turks and Turks in Turkey. For example, the prediction for men with 12 years of education is 39 ISEI points for first-generation Turks and 42 ISEI points for Turks in Turkey; this three-point difference rises to six points for individuals with 15 years of education. Figure IIIb also shows that gaps are larger among women: Comparisons of individuals with 12 years of education show a gap of 12 points in ISEI; the gap for 15 years of education is 15. However, fewer women have (or have had) a job in Turkey, pointing to possible selection mechanisms for this group.

**TABLE 5**  
**OCCUPATION (ISEI) BY COMPARISON GROUP (REF = TURKS IN TURKEY), EDUCATION (PEDUC), PARENTS' ISEI (PISEI), AND AGE<sup>a</sup> (MEN AND WOMEN 18-65).**  
**MODELS CONTROL FOR SURVEY/ROUND<sup>b</sup>**

	Men				Women			
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b	Model 4b
Constant	35.63 (0.46)***	45.42 (0.40)***	40.52 (0.59)***	44.34 (0.55)***	41.76 (0.65)***	47.94 (0.56)***	45.45 (0.76)***	48.08 (0.70)***
Turk 1st	-0.52 (1.38)	-3.57 (1.16)***	-2.35 (1.55)	-4.32 (1.49)***	-10.21 (1.89)***	-11.03 (1.63)***	-11.26 (2.15)***	-13.05 (2.02)***
Turk 2nd	1.32** (1.11)*	-2.05 (1.11)*	4.10 (1.59)	-1.60 (1.45)*	-2.08 (1.55)	-3.40 (1.33)**	-3.32 (1.98)*	-5.17 (1.82)***
WE natives	9.36 (0.44)***	-2.65 (0.39)***	4.10 (0.57)***	-1.60 (0.54)***	2.83 (0.64)***	-5.83 (0.56)***	-0.88 (0.75)	-5.95 (0.69)***
PISEI		3.21 (0.09)***	6.19 (0.50)***	2.34 (0.47)***		2.57 (0.09)***	5.10 (0.69)***	1.11 (0.65)*
Turk 1st*PISEI			-0.76 (1.44)	2.04 (1.30)			-1.51 (1.96)	0.28 (1.87)
Turk 2nd*PISEI			-4.12 (1.63)**	-1.11 (1.46)			-3.21 (2.00)	-0.20 (1.82)
WE natives*PISEI			-0.68 (0.51)	0.89 (0.48)*			-0.39 (0.70)	1.50 (0.66)**
EDUC		8.34 (0.09)***		7.89 (0.33)***		7.76 (0.09)***		9.54 (0.46)***
Turk 1st*EDUC				-3.29 (1.04)***				-3.88 (1.61)**
Turk 2nd*EDUC				-1.51 (1.39)				-3.41 (1.44)**
WE natives*EDUC				0.55 (0.34)				-1.83 (0.47)***
Age	0.13 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.01)***	0.22 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.01)***	-0.01 (0.01)	0.11 (0.01)***	0.06 (0.01)***	0.11 (0.01)***
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.32	0.13	0.32	0.00	0.26	0.08	0.26
N	29,137	29,137	29,137	29,137	28,915	28,915	28,915	28,915

Notes: ISEI, International Socio-Economic Index; WE, Western European.  
<sup>a</sup>The values are *B*-coefficients (SE) from OLS regressions. EDUC and PISEI are *z*-scores and AGE centered at 35.  
<sup>b</sup>The constant refers to Turks in Turkey in European Values Study.  
 \*\*\* *p* < 0.01; \*\* *p* < 0.05; and \* *p* < 0.10.

Figure II. Education by Parents' Education; (a) men (confidence intervals: 90%; based on Model 3a from Table 4) and (b) women (confidence intervals: 90%; based on Model 3b from Table 4)






Figure III. Occupation (ISEI) by Education; (a) men (confidence intervals: 90%; based on Model 4a from Table 5) and (b) women (confidence intervals: 90%; based on Model 4b from Table 5)



Thus, on average, migration to Europe has not given an occupational advantage to most first-generation Turks over those left behind. Although we do not find a weaker direct effect of parental background on occupations (OD), we find (*Hypothesis 1*) that both men and women experience lower returns to education (ED) in the destination countries, making those with relatively higher education more disadvantaged compared to Turks in Turkey and Western European natives. The gap is even larger when comparing first-generation women with their counterparts in Turkey, suggesting differences in Western European and Turkish labor markets in terms of the value of education (the disadvantage practically disappears for lower educated men).

Moving to the *second-generation Turks*, Table 4 shows, on average (after controlling for age), second-generation Turkish men and women are more educated than their counterparts in Turkey but still less educated than Western European natives (Models 1a and 1b). When controlling for parental education and occupation (Models 2a and 2b), differences with Western European natives vanish for men, but remain statistically significant for women, although differences between the genders in educational achievement are neither large nor statistically significant (tests available upon request). Meanwhile, the positive difference with Turks in Turkey remains. Models 3a and 3b show second-generation Turks are more educationally mobile than Turks in Turkey (and compared to Western European natives). Going to Figure IIa,b, we observe men and women who have parents with lower educational levels (the majority of Turks in Western Europe) are particularly advantaged. For example, while the predicted education for a male Turk in Turkey with parents averaging six years of education is 10.0 years of education, for a second-generation Turk, it is 12.3. Second-generation Turkish women (but not men) are similarly advantaged among those with higher educated parents. This result confirms *Hypothesis 2a*: The majority of second-generation Turks are doing better in terms of education than Turks in Turkey, with a weaker parental effect on education (OE), the main driver.

In Table 5, Models 1a and 1b (which only control for age) show, on average, the occupational status of the second generation has improved compared to the first generation, likely related to their educational improvements in the destination country. When we compare them to Turks in Turkey, we observe an advantage for Turkish men in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the status of the second generation remains lower than that among Western European natives. After controlling education

and parental background (Models 2a and 2b), similar to what was observed for the first generation, second-generation Turks are now disadvantaged with respect to Turks in Turkey. At the same time, differences with Western European natives vanish.<sup>12</sup> In other words, although second-generation Turks may have improved their situation in the destination country, under equal conditions, they would have had a better occupational status in Turkey.

For occupational mobility, Models 3a and 3b of Table 5 show the total contribution of parental occupation, before the mediation of the level of education. For second-generation Turks, the parental background is much less important in determining occupational achievements than for Turks in Turkey or for Western European natives. This can be seen in the negative — and substantial — interaction coefficients for this group (although for women differences are not statistically significant). When education is added (Models 4a and 4b), the difference in the effect of parental occupation reduces substantially for both genders, showing the strong mediating role of education in intergenerational reproduction; however, it becomes statistically non-significant, not giving good evidence of *Hypothesis 2b*. Looking at the returns to education, we see the effect of education is smaller for second-generation Turks than for Turks in Turkey, although differences are statistically significant only for women. When these results are plotted in Figure III, both men and women, particularly the latter, are more disadvantaged with respect to Turks in Turkey (and to Western European natives) at higher educational levels. For example, while among women with 12 years of education the gap between second-generation Turkish women and women in Turkey is four points in ISEI in favor of the latter, among those with 15 years of education the gap jumps to seven points.

<sup>12</sup>Although previous studies (see Heath and Cheung 2007) found ethnic penalties for second-generation Turks in access to the managerial/professional occupations (EGP classes I and II), we believe that the lack of a penalty with respect to Western European natives in our study is connected to two factors. On the one hand, the study of ethnic penalties based on ISEI draws a more favorable picture of second-generation Turks in Western Europe than studies based on access to highly qualified occupations. (Note that we do find penalties similar to those in Heath and Cheung [2007] when we study the access to those occupations in our data — analyses available upon request). On the other, and this is probably the most important factor, we control for the parental social background. In fact, when the class of origin is introduced in both ISEI and EGP estimations, the ethnic penalty disappears, showing that the relatively lower parental background of second-generation Turks helps explain differences with natives (see Zuccotti 2015b for a discussion on this).

All in all, the second generation is doing better than the first generation in terms of occupation and is integrating into the European labor market. These Turks are much less dependent on their parents' background than those in Turkey, especially in terms of education (OE), allowing them to reach higher educational levels and get better jobs. Migration thus gives an initial advantage to the descendants of those with lower social backgrounds, as the children can separate their outcomes from their origins. This general advantage in terms of occupation vanishes once we control for education. In fact, in Turkey, education has an overall greater value when accessing occupations, compared to Western Europe. Consequently, even if second-generation Turks are not disadvantaged with respect to Western European natives in equality of educational outcomes, they obtain lower occupational statuses than Turks in Turkey, on average. For women, there are significantly higher returns to education (ED) in Turkey, compared to both Western European natives and second-generation Turks; this increases the gap among the higher educated. A similar pattern is observed for first-generation women (however, remember that the working women in Turkey are a much more selective group).

### *CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION*

Many studies on migrants' integration in Western Europe look for evidence of "ethnic penalties" by comparing migrants with native populations in various outcomes, including education and occupation. We select an alternative perspective, focusing on social origins and comparing to those left behind. Improving with respect to parents and to those remaining in the origin country is, we believe, a priority for migrants who move for economic reasons. This perspective also allows a counterfactual question: What would have happened to migrants and their offspring had they decided to stay? Main findings are summarized in Table 6.

Overall, for first-generation Turks, migration has led to lower occupational status than they would have obtained in Turkey. Their poor performance in the destination countries is no surprise; economic gains, mainly in terms of money, are an important part of the motivation to move, but this often implies sacrifices in occupational status. Their lower returns to education as compared to those of Turks in Turkey and Western European natives (*Hypothesis 1*) might indicate a lack of recognition of their educational credentials, along with discrimination and difficulties



TABLE 6  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Generation	Outcome studied	Main findings
<i>First</i>	Occupation	First-generation Turks in Western Europe are disadvantaged in terms of occupation with respect to Turks in Turkey, and this is especially strong among the higher educated, as expected from <i>Hypothesis 1</i> : For Turks in Turkey (as for Western European natives), education has a greater value in the labor market
<i>Second</i>	Education	Second-generation Turks in Western Europe reach higher educational levels as compared to those left behind; this is thanks to higher (upward) educational mobility, as expected from <i>Hypothesis 2a</i>
	Occupation	Second-generation Turks in Western Europe are disadvantaged in terms of occupation with respect to Turks in Turkey, in particular highly educated women; this is mainly because in Turkey education has a greater value in the labor market. We do not find strong evidence of lower OD effect, as expected from <i>Hypothesis 2b</i>

in the labor market. Moreover, the difference between first-generation Turks and Turks in Turkey is amplified by characteristics of the Turkish labor market itself. On the one hand, given equal education and parental background, in Turkey it is possible to attain higher occupations than in Western Europe, on average. On the other hand, but only for women, returns to education are higher in Turkey (although women are much less likely to have an occupation in Turkey).

Outcomes for the second generation suggest longer-term consequences of migration and help to implement the counterfactual perspective. Here, the comparisons with Turks in Turkey suggest the migration project has mixed results. The second generation is more successful than its Turkish counterparts in educational achievement, mainly driven by a lower dependence on parental education (*Hypothesis 2a*), leading Turks from low-class backgrounds (the majority in Western Europe) to achieve higher education status in Western Europe than in Turkey. This finding supports the classic suggestion that migrants are motivated to achieve a better life for themselves and their children. The second-generation Turks in Europe might also have benefitted from richer cultural capital and gained from educational expansion in European countries since the 1960s, although a similar but slower progress has been taking place in Turkey since 1980 (OECD 2012) (nevertheless, educational expansion does not necessarily generate social mobility in a society).

For occupation, on average, second-generation Turks are doing better than the first generation and better than Turks in Turkey. However,

the advantage over those left behind reverses once education is taken into account, mostly because the value of education in Western European and Turkish labor markets varies: Specifically, given a certain education, an individual gets higher occupational status in Turkey than in Western Europe. For second-generation women, the disadvantage with respect to those left behind is amplified by the existence of higher returns to education in Turkey. Summing up, even though the majority of second-generation Turks do not suffer “ethnic penalties,” they cannot reach the same occupational levels as their counterparts back home. Note: We do not find strong evidence of a lower parental direct effect on occupation for second generation (*Hypothesis 2b*).

Has migration to Western Europe been beneficial for Turks? We are inclined to say yes. The opportunities for the children of low-class Turkish migrants to acquire a relatively higher education and converting this education in the labor market represents a positive outcome. While in Turkey, at the same levels of parental occupation and education, the occupational status is higher on average (particularly for highly educated women), the possibility of a child with a low-class background reaching a higher occupational status through education, thus differentiating him/her from his/her parents, is less likely. Furthermore, among women, there is a gain in access to the labor market. That said, research shows educational outcomes of second-generation Turks vary in different European destination countries (Crul and Schneider 2010), possibly having differential impacts on their labor market careers across European destination countries. Therefore, although educational mobility, the main driving force of the benefits of migration, is a pattern we find for Turks in most Western European countries, more country-specific analyses might illuminate the extent of the advantages and disadvantages of migration.

Our novel origin-country perspective compares migrants and their offspring with their counterparts who stayed in Turkey. The approach has much to offer to international migration studies. For example, researchers can trace the influence of migration on family processes, friendships and networks, cultural, religious and political behavior, values and lifestyles, health, and well-being. Notably, the perspective answers recent calls to avoid methodological nationalism in international migration studies and to search for mechanisms behind migration processes and their impact on the whereabouts of migrants and their descendants, rather than aiming to answer policy-driven research questions of the destination-country nations (Amelina and Faist 2012; Guveli 2015; Guveli et al. 2015). We expect

our work will trigger further research on other aspects of integration, and we anticipate a more complete understanding of the penalties and benefits of migration.

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## SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

**Table S1.** Total number of respondents by survey/round and country.

**Table S2.** Education (years) by comparison group (ref. = Turks in Turkey), parents' education (PEDUC), parents' ISEI (PISEI) and age (men and women 25–65).

**Table S3.** Occupation (ISEI) by comparison group (ref. = Turks in Turkey), education (PEDUC), parents' ISEI (PISEI) and age (men and women 18–65).