

# 6

## Occupational Status Attainment

### Introduction

Over 50 years ago, large-scale Turkish migration to Western Europe started as institutionalised labour migration or the ‘guest worker’ system. At that time, factories, with the help of Turkish government agencies, started contracting Turkish workers to work in those industries suffering from a shortage of domestic employees. Turkish migrant workers took up jobs that were hitherto unknown to them and thus became occupationally mobile, almost by default. But little is, in fact, known about the distribution of the occupational and family backgrounds of these workers. The prevailing view is that recruitment was targeted at unskilled workers, predominantly with rural, if not agricultural backgrounds, whose occupational mobility after migration was, on average, upward (Castles and Miller 2009). However, in line with theories of migrant occupational mobility, the guest-worker system may have also attracted skilled and even professional workers, who gave up their initial calling in favour of better wages (but worse jobs) (Akresh 2008; Chiswick, Lee and Miller 2005). Using the 2000 Families study data, we can investigate how far Turkish migrants were positively selected by comparison with non-migrants from the same region, and even other members of the same families. This, in turn, will help us identify the implications for occupational mobility across generations (Ichou 2014).

In this chapter, we examine occupational status attainment and inter-generational occupational mobility in three generations of Turks in Turkey and Europe. We compare first and last occupations, which for G1 migrants is equal to their occupations before and after migration but not necessarily so for G2 and G3 migrants. We relate migrants’ and non-migrants’ occupations to their own education and their father’s occupation and, thus, test whether international migration is, in fact, strongly associated with inter-generational social mobility. This allows us to identify the gains and losses of migration in terms of occupational status. Specifically, we compare mobility between Generation 1 (G1), a large cohort of 1960s male labour migrants

with a control group of men from the same cohort and regions who did not migrate, G2, the sons and daughters of these ancestors, and G3, the children of the middle generation family members and grandchildren of the G1 ancestors. G2 and G3 may themselves be migrants to Europe, or have been born – or equivalently, for the purposes of this chapter – educated there.

In what follows, we first discuss the merits of occupation as an indicator of social standing, in particular, in the case of international migration. We then introduce Blau and Duncan's (1967) classic status attainment model that relates occupation status attained in first and last jobs to education and to the occupational status of the father. The status attainment model decomposes intergenerational transmission of occupational status into a number of pathways, each of which can be affected by international migration. We outline our expectations of how these will be affected by migration, drawing on theories of international migration and social mobility, before testing the extent to which these expectations are realised in the data. We find that those G1 men who migrated are more likely to be those whose occupation is out of line with their educational attainment (see also Chapter 4). In line with our expectations, we find social mobility is stronger among migrants, but by G3, there is no apparent effect. Our results confirm the importance of education in determining occupational attainment in both G2 and G3; thus, the extent to which migration influences educational attainment is highly relevant for occupational attainment (see also Chapter 5). We conclude, however, that overall, the impact of migration on intergenerational social mobility is very strong for the first generation, but differences between migrants and non-migrants largely disappear by the third generation.

### **Occupation as an indicator of social position**

The primary focus of the chapter is on occupations and the relationship between occupations within and between generations. That is, we investigate occupational mobility, or its reverse, occupational reproduction. Occupations are used by sociologists as the basis for determining a person's position in society, his/her social class or status (see Platt, forthcoming 2016; Guveli et al. 2005, 2006, 2007). Occupations owe their favoured role in the sociological analysis of social inequality and the reproduction of inequality within families to four main characteristics, both conceptual and practical. First, occupation is typically used in everyday social interactions to assess a person's personal standing: 'What do you do for a living?' is a standard question on first meeting around the world. Second, occupations provide a relatively stable measure of people's position in society, compared, for example, to income, which tends to be favoured by economists for measuring both intra- (life course) and intergenerational social mobility (see, e.g. the discussion in Jäntti and Jenkins 2015), but is much more volatile.

Third, occupations are easy to report with relative accuracy. This is true not only of respondents' current occupation, but also for previous occupations and those reported by others. Research has tended to confirm that occupational positions are among the few social characteristics that can be reported accurately after a considerable time and about other persons. Finally, occupational hierarchies, that is, how occupations are scaled relative to one another, have the unique property of being highly stable across national and historical contexts (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Although technological and social change generates new occupational duties and structures and causes others to disappear, the basic structure of occupational hierarchies has an impressive stability that lends itself to comparisons across time and space.

Taken together, these characteristics make occupation the most accessible and relevant indicator of status in society. In addition, many analysts regard occupation as a good approximation of earnings; some would, in fact, be willing to interpret occupation as a better indicator of economic status in society than direct income measures (Erikson and Goldthorpe 2010; Guveli et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; see also the discussion in Jäntti and Jenkins 2015), as incomes are complicated to measure and volatile by nature. However, the link between occupation and income is less meaningful in the case of international labour migration. Turkish labour migrants, like many other economic migrants, were willing to change jobs (via migration) for economic reasons (Borjas 1987) and were not directly motivated by the job to do. But such gains in income could well accompany a loss of social status in terms of occupation.

While occupations are sociology's main instrument to model social stratification, there is substantial debate as to how occupational status is best conceptualised and measured (Platt, forthcoming 2016). First, there has been much discussion of whether social stratification can best be conceptualised as a continuous hierarchy (the social ladder) or a system of discrete categories (social classes). Both approaches have advantages and are supported by empirical results. On the one hand, those who argue in favour of discrete classes (Breen 2004; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) have convincingly shown that 'gaps' exist and patterns of occupational mobility (both intergenerational and intragenerational) cannot be adequately captured without taking into account at least some of this separation between classes. On the other hand, those who favour a continuous hierarchy (see e.g. Lambert, Prandy and Bottero 2007) can use simpler and statistically more powerful methods of analysis. The second conceptual issue of occupational status measurement relates to how social status, whether measured in categories or continuously, is derived from occupational position. Competing claims are made for allocating occupational status on (1) the basis of social prestige, that is, how members of society perceive and evaluate positions (e.g. Treiman 1977); (2) socio-economic status, capturing the resources that occupations bring,

Correlations between occupational and education origins education and occupational destinations

	FaEd	FaOcc	Ed	1stOc	Occ
FaEd	1				
FaOcc	0.516	1			
Ed	0.453	0.438	1		
1stOc	0.332	0.417	0.538	1	
Occ	0.322	0.405	0.596	0.541	1




Figure 6.1 Classic intergenerational status attainment model

Note: Data refer to US men in 1962; FaEd = father's education, FaOcc = father's occupation; Ed = son's education; 1stOc = son's first occupation; Occ = son's subsequent occupation.

Source: Blau & Duncan (1967), pp. 169–170.

empirically derived from mean education and earnings that come with an occupational position (e.g. Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996); and (3) whether people with different occupations accept each other as equals, derived from occupational friendship and occupational homogamy data (e.g. Prandy 1990). While all scalings of occupational positions are strongly related, they are not identical and do not always behave the same way in empirical data. In this analysis, we employ a continuous measure of occupational stratification enabling us to replicate the status attainment model of Blau and Duncan (1967) and take advantage of its statistical properties. More specifically, we use the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI), which is based on how occupational position translates education into earnings and has the benefits of cross-national coverage and comparability (see Ganzeboom, de Graaf and Treiman 1992).

## The intergenerational status attainment model

Occupational attainment and occupational mobility patterns can be usefully analysed using the intergenerational Status Attainment (SAT) model of Blau and Duncan (1967). Figure 6.1 illustrates the SAT, showing how it connects, in a causal framework, five variables: father's education and occupation, and respondent's education, first occupation and most recent (current) occupation. Relationships in this model are conveniently provided in standardised terms, allowing the analyst to compare effect sizes across different parts of the model and calculate (and compare) direct and indirect effects. Although Blau and Duncan estimate these relationships using path calculations, they can also be obtained using straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis on standardised variables, this is the approach we use in this chapter. Despite its apparent simplicity, the SAT model is an informative tool for summarising status attainment and intergenerational mobility patterns.

For men in the United States in 1962, Blau and Duncan (1967) found strong intergenerational links between fathers and sons. The simple associations between father's and son's education is 0.45, between father's occupation and son's first occupation, 0.41, and between father's occupation and son's current job, 0.42. It is useful to keep these (standardised) numbers in mind when assessing intergenerational associations elsewhere, for example, our Turkish generations.

The SAT model's path diagram reveals the extent to which these associations are direct or mediated by other routes in the model. It shows the pivotal role in intergenerational status reproduction of education: fathers transmit their occupational status to their sons predominantly via education (*indirect*). Sons of fathers with high status and high education are likely to obtain a high education themselves (lines from FaOc and FaEd to Ed). Education is a strong determinant of status in both first jobs and current jobs (lines from Ed to 1stOc and Occ). Together, these two steps produce the indirect effects.

Nevertheless, there are substantial *direct* transfers between father's occupation and son's first and current occupation: high status fathers are better able to position their sons higher in the occupational hierarchy than low status fathers, over and above the educational status obtained by these sons. Note, in particular, in the SAT model, a direct effect even occurs for current occupation (FaOc to Occ). Also note that no such role is found for the father's education: his education does not matter for the son's occupational outcomes beyond its influence on the son's education. All of the effect of the father's education on occupational outcomes is, thus, indirect. As a result, in most of our analysis we do not include the father's education.

Finally, the basic correlations from the SAT model suggest continuity between first and current jobs at first appears, perhaps unsurprisingly, rather strong, with an association of 0.54. At the same time, the path diagram reveals that about half of this continuity is produced by earlier conditions, in particular, education and father's occupation. The SAT model thus suggests differences in occupational returns to education arise primarily *after* labour market entry.

The SAT model has been replicated often in different samples and in various societies and contexts (Breen 2004; Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman 1989; Treiman and Yip 1989). This literature confirms the utility of the model for comparative analysis. However, most replications suggest that, in general, the role of first job is much more important than the original SAT model indicated. Instead, in subsequent studies, first job has been found to be a stronger predictor of current job, suggesting the crucial moment for investigating social reproduction is career entry. Before implementing the SAT model in order to understand the influence of migration on social mobility and social reproduction among Turkish migrants, we now elaborate on our expectations for these relationships.

## International migration and intergenerational mobility

A classical hypothesis in the stratification literature is that international migration generates intergenerational mobility (Chiswick et al. 2005). With the SAT model in mind, we can anticipate this may be true for a number of different reasons. Figure 6.2 shows a simplified version of the SAT model between origins, education and destination (OED) and the ways migration can impact the relationships between all of these.

There are several ways in which  $O \rightarrow E$ , the effect of the father's occupation on his offspring's education, might be weakened by international migration (see also the discussion in Chapter 5). For migrants who obtain or complete their education in the destination country, the father's occupational resources and associated cultural resources may be less effective than in the origin country. At the same time, migrant children often have high educational expectations (Kao and Tienda 1995, 1998) and perform educationally better than their often modest origins might suggest (Strand 2014). Both processes would lead to reduced association between background and educational outcomes and, hence, higher mobility among migrants. But even when the education is completed in the country of origin, we can speculate that prospective migrants differ from non-migrants in the association between attained education and parental background. People who are already socially mobile in education may be more likely to become international migrants (Feliciano 2005a).




Figure 6.2 How international migration can influence social mobility

We turn now to  $E \rightarrow D // O$ , the direct effect of education on occupational outcomes, controlled for social origin effects. We can expect this relationship to be weaker among migrants who complete their education in the origin country before moving, because educational credentials are locally valued and credentials lose their value in the new labour market (Feliciano 2005b). This scenario is likely to apply to Turkish first generation labour migrants, but also to those who subsequently migrate for family reunification. However, we also expect this association to be weaker among those who completed their education in the country of destination, given the extensive evidence on 'ethnic penalties' in labour market outcomes among migrants (Heath and Cheung 2007; Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008). At the same time, a body of evidence suggests that once we control for social class background, such penalties often disappear (Platt 2005, 2007; Zuccotti 2015). Overall, then, we expect there is a weaker association between education and outcomes among migrants than among non-migrants.

The direct effect of parental background on occupational outcomes, net of education is shown in  $O \rightarrow D // E$ . This is perhaps most usefully thought of as resulting from direct inheritance of occupations. If direct inheritance is the major mechanism behind the direct effect, there is a clear reason to expect migrants to be more socially mobile than non-migrants: it is hard to transfer property and capital across borders in the case of businesses or farming, and the occupational structures migrants move from and to tend to be different. Therefore, we expect a weaker association among migrants than among non-migrants in this direct effect.

In sum, there are multiple reasons to expect international migration will cause intergenerational mobility. We should note that all these arguments are about social fluidity, that is the (absence of a) statistical association between origins and destinations. The expectations about fluidity do not suggest whether migration leads, overall, to migrants having higher or lower positions in the social ladder compared to non-migrants. For migrants and their children themselves, this may be a crucial issue, although as we have also noted, for labour migrants driven by earnings gains, there may be an accepted trade-off between income and occupational position. In relation to Turkish migration specifically, it is likely that many, particularly those migrating from the sorts of regions we cover in our data, are from very modest, rural and mostly agricultural backgrounds. This implies the occupational distributions at origin are very compressed, and any mobility is likely to be upward.

Expectations of mobility are likely to be influenced by the point where migrants find themselves in the migration chain. Those migrating for family re-unification or born in Europe are likely to be less selected than original labour migrants (McKenzie and Rapoport 2010; see also Chapter 4). At the same time, the transmission of occupational status between migrants and their (migrant) children is likely to be more straightforward than between

migrants and their non-migrant parents. Nevertheless, the points about potential 'ethnic penalties' made above, still apply.

Finally, given today's transnational mobility, close links between Turks in Europe and Turkey, occupational outcomes and migration to or residence in Europe might not be independent. That is, Turks with a foot in both Turkey and Europe may opt to live where their occupational outcomes are optimal.

Against this background, we aim to answer the following four questions. First, how have socio-economic backgrounds (parental occupational status and level of education) shaped the likelihood of migration from Turkey to Western Europe? That is, to what degree can we regard Turkish migrants as positively or negatively selected, and how does this vary over the three family generations? Second, how has migration impacted the occupational status of migrants compared to Turks in Turkey? How has the impact of migration on the occupation status of Turkish migrants changed over the three generations (G1, G2 and G3)? Third, for the first migrant generation, how does occupation prior to migration affect occupational destinations *after* migration? Fourth and finally, what are the differences in intergenerational occupational mobility among migrants compared to non-migrants?

## Sample and measures

### Sample

We draw on a unique dataset (Guveli et al. 2016) that, rather than starting with the country of destination, provides sampling in the country of origin. Specifically, we use the 2000 Families study data, collected by screening five high-migrant sending regions in Turkey between 2010 and 2012. From these five areas, large numbers of labour migrants went to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. The study located 1,580 emigrant men who moved to Europe at this time and identified 412 men from the same regions who stayed behind; it charted the composition of their families and traced their descendants. Interviews with family members to collect individual data or information on the family as a whole took place either face-to-face or by phone.

In this chapter, we draw on the sample of adult family members across the generations covered by the proxy questionnaire (see Chapter 2). We supplement these as appropriate with measures of the same variables (occupation, education, migration) collected in the personal interviews. As noted in Chapter 2, there is a sufficient degree of correspondence between proxy and personal reporting to allow us to use them interchangeably. Our analytical sample comprises adults aged 18 or over covered by the proxy questionnaire and for whom we have valid occupational information. This amounts to 1,627 from G1, 5,132 from G2 and 4,517 from G3. Note that in any given table, the exact numbers may differ slightly because of the variables included and/or small numbers of missing values.



### **Migration status**

The 2000 Turkish Families sample was stratified by whether the ancestor (G1) had or had not migrated to Europe for five years or more (see Chapter 2). This initial status does not fully determine the migration status of his children and grandchildren, although parental migration strongly influences the likelihood of subsequent generations either migrating to or being born in Europe. Using information from the family tree, proxy and personal interview questionnaires, it is possible to construct the migration status of all individual adult family members. We use information on whether migrated and current country of residence to inform the analysis that follows. We should note that we find that some 70 per cent of all G1 migrants returned to Turkey at some stage. These return migrants are potentially problematic for our analysis, as we cannot be entirely sure whether the last occupation they hold refers to occupation after migration to Europe or after return migration to Turkey.

### **Education**

Education was asked about in the 2000 Families proxy questionnaire in a cross-nationally harmonised format derived from the categories most relevant to persons educated in Turkey. These six categories comprise: primary incomplete (0); primary complete (1); low secondary (2); high secondary (3); low tertiary (4); high tertiary (5). We give an ordinal interpretation to the education variable and, in fact, treat the categories (0–5) as a metric scale. Preliminary in-depth analysis shows this to be a fair representation of distances between the educational categories.

Education levels show variation by country. The education level of Turks educated in Turkey is decidedly lower than for Turks educated elsewhere. In our sample, Turks educated in Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands achieved the highest levels of education (cf. also Crul and Vermeulen 2003).

### **Occupation and occupational status**

Occupations were asked about in the proxy questionnaire using a single open-ended question, supplemented with a pre-coded question on self-employment. As well as the three main generations covered in the study (G1, G2 and G3), there was a question about the occupation (except self-employment) of the ancestor's (G1) father. This provides a measure of parental background for G1; we refer to this antecedent generation as G0.

The verbatim occupations have been classified into the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88). ISCO-88 consists of a detailed four-digit code, classifying occupations by major group, sub-major group, minor group and unit groups and allows for over 521 detailed categories. Despite its level of detail, ISCO-88 suffers from limitations in capturing all relevant aspects of occupations. These problems are concentrated in ISCO's limited capacity to accommodate self-employed and

supervisory status. Another weakness – and one that plays a significant role in our research – is the somewhat ambiguous position of farm work in the classification.

Our major measure of occupational status is the International Socio-Economic Index of occupation status (ISEI), constructed by Ganzeboom et al. (1992, 1996), devised for and often used in internationally comparisons, as discussed above. ISEI scores range between 13 (for Kitchen Helper and Unskilled Farm Worker) and 88 (for Judge).

The most obvious problem arises with farm occupations, which are typically inherited by sons from their fathers; there are many of these in the Turkish data, but it is ambiguous where to scale these in ISEI. We must use a hybrid model to accommodate the peculiarities this causes.

## Results

### Occupational distribution

Table 6.1 illustrates the occupational distributions across the generations and for both first and last job, using a discrete (class) measure that yields a qualitative view of occupational differences.

*Table 6.1* First job and most recent job by broad class categories and generation

<b>First job by generation, class categories</b>		<b>G1</b>	<b>G2</b>	<b>G3</b>	
Farmers	Self-employed	57.7%	15.5%	4.2%	
	Salaried	10.5%	2.0%	.8%	
Manual jobs	Self-employed	10.8%	7.3%	5.4%	
	Salaried	12.8%	41.7%	37.6%	
Non-manual jobs	Self-employed	3.9%	7.2%	7.9%	
	Salaried	4.2%	26.3%	44.1%	
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
<i>Number</i>		<i>1,614</i>	<i>5,013</i>	<i>4,459</i>	
<b>Most recent job by generation, class categories</b>		<b>G0</b>	<b>G1</b>	<b>G2</b>	<b>G3</b>
Farmers	Self-employed	82.8%	23.0%	9.3%	3.0%
	Salaried		5.3%	1.4%	.9%
Manual jobs	Self-employed	12.1%	6.0%	8.7%	5.6%
	Salaried		55.8%	43.6%	37.5%
Non-manual jobs	Self-employed	5.1%	5.0%	10.0%	8.7%
	Salaried		4.9%	27.0%	44.3%
Total			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<i>Number</i>		<i>1,516</i>	<i>1,614</i>	<i>5,017</i>	<i>4,336</i>

*Source:* 2000 Families study, proxy data.

As expected, the occupational distributions of ancestors (before migration) and their fathers are heavily dominated by farm occupations. Sixty-eight per cent of the ancestor G1s were in farm occupations before migration, that is, their first job. And for their fathers (G0), this was even higher, at 83 per cent. While the high prevalence of farming is not surprising, given the characteristics of Turkish migration and our sample regions, it is perhaps more surprising that a substantial number of non-farm occupations can be still found among the first jobs of the G1 ancestors and their fathers. A more detailed analysis shows non-farm occupations are found both among migrants and the non-migrant control group. Therefore, we explore whether occupational differentiation conditions the decision to migrate. It seems reasonable to expect that farm workers disproportionately decided to try their luck in Western Europe, as mechanisation of agriculture and related circumstances created a large surplus of workers in the farm sector. Alternatively, better equipped manual workers may have chosen to migrate internationally to capitalise on their skills, while farm work, especially farm ownership, kept others at home.

Analysing the effects of farm background on migration and subsequent occupational attainment suffers from two analytical problems. First, is it possible to measure further differentiation in occupational status among the farm workers that would be relevant for our research problem? Second, how are farm backgrounds (and farm destinations) to be scaled relative to other occupational categories?

Unfortunately, it turned out to be impossible to differentiate the substantial proportion of farm workers among the ancestors' fathers in more detail because the survey did not inquire about status-in-employment for the G0 generation (as we did for the following generations), but only asked for an occupational title. It is striking that Turks seldom distinguished between farm owners and farm workers in the 1960s. Neither the verbatim descriptions of farm occupations (*çiftçi, çiftçilik*), nor an analysis of the influence of status-in-employment for G1 suggests a relevant internal division among the farm population. Farming in Turkey in and before the 1960s was almost exclusively confined to family farms, unskilled work, not requiring skills acquired in formal education. We therefore scale all farmers as Unskilled Farm Workers (ISEI=13). This choice implies that we interpret mobility from farm work to industrial work as *upward* occupational mobility.

Keeping this in mind, we can turn to Table 6.2, showing the ISEI of first and last job by generation and migration status. G0 occupations have a modest mean status, around 25, the level of an unskilled factory worker. Since the farm workers are allocated an ISEI of 13, this means the remaining 17 per cent of non-farm G0s have an average ISEI of 32. The G1 occupations have not, on average, obtained higher status than their fathers, with little status growth between first and last occupations. Below these numbers, we find considerable heterogeneity, especially for the migrants, who frequently

Table 6.2 Mean level of ISEI of occupation in first and last job by generation and migrant status

	G0	G1	G1	G2	G2	G3
	Job	First job	Last job	First job	Last job	First job
Non-migrant	x	26.5	28.1	34.9	35.7	39.5
Migrant to Europe	x	25.1	26.7	30.7	31.6	33.1
Born in Europe	x	x	x	36.9	37.9	37.9
All	24.6	25.3	26.9	33.4	34.3	38.1

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.

replace farm work with factory work, giving them a similar level of occupational status while doing quite different jobs. However, it is interesting to note that for occupational status in most recent jobs, the control group of G1 non-migrants ends up two points higher than the migrant group.

In G2 and G3, we can distinguish three major groups: non-migrants who stayed in Turkey, non-migrants who were born in the EU and stayed there, and those who, like the G1s, migrated from Turkey to the EU. For G2, occupational status favours the EU settlers over the non-migrants: Turks in Western Europe have, on average, better occupations than Turks in Turkey. The group who migrated to Europe in the G2 generation has significantly lower occupational status than either non-migrants or settlers but still holds, on average, better jobs than the G1 ancestors at the end of their career. This is consistent with a pattern of less-selective migration among family migrants and returns to migration being focused on the children of migrants. In the G3 generation, however, for which we can only study first jobs, given the youth of this sample, the average occupational status is clearly highest for Turks in Turkey, who have made substantial gains (four points) relative to the previous generation. Settled European Turks remain at the same level as the previous generation, while migrants to Europe have the lowest average occupational status.

In sum, the pattern of average occupational attainment of migrants and non-migrants across generations is complex. Migrants to Europe have improved their occupational status across generations, as well as somewhat between the job before migration and the job after migration, but this trend is even more salient among non-migrants in Turkey. On average, the non-migrants have better jobs than their migrant counterparts. While those born in Europe make occupational gains when they are in the second family generation, in G3, this has turned around, with the non-migrants in Turkey doing better.

In the next section, we address whether these apparent differences persist when we take into account differences in education, family background,

gender and age. We first address the selectivity of migrations in terms of who migrates, according to background, education and first occupation. See Chapter 4 for further discussion of migration patterns. Note that in subsequent analysis, we standardise both occupation and education within generations, to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (known as Z-scores). This eases interpretation and comparison of direct and indirect effects. We also use a linear probability model (OLS) for the analysis of the decision to migrate, to facilitate comparison with the analysis of occupational attainment and the SAT model.

### Who migrated?

Table 6.3 shows the results from a model evaluating the role of family background, education and first occupation in the migration decision of the G1 ancestor. We first estimate how the migration decision is related to the occupation of the G1s' fathers. Given the predominance of farming among G0s, we estimate farm background separately; the influence of ISEI is then driven by differentiation among other occupations. The effects point in different directions: farm background decreases the likelihood of migration: given the low status of farmers, this implies migrants are a *positive* selection of the sending population. Conditional on non-farm background, the G0s' ISEI has a negative effect that is a higher score is associated with a lower migration probability, implying that within the non-farm population there is a (modest) *negative* selection. However, the relationships are weak to begin with and barely statistically significant, as indicated by the *t* statistics (where a value greater than about 2 indicates statistical significance at conventional levels). In brief, we do not find strong selectivity with respect to parental occupation background.

When we add in G1 characteristics (model 2 and 3), the G0 farm effect becomes non-significant and indirect, while the G0 occupational status effect decreases to borderline significance. As a large proportion of first jobs among G1s are in farming, we again separate the effect into a farm/non-farm effect and an occupational status effect that overwhelmingly refers to non-farm occupations. We find a positive effect for G1s' level of education, indicating migrants are (educationally) a positive selection of the sending population, and a negative effect for status of first occupation, indicating migrants are more likely than non-migrants to have had an occupation that did not match their education (or parental occupation). While the effects are weak, the best interpretation is that migrants to Europe moved having been unable (or failing) to translate their education into corresponding occupational attainment.

Turning to G2 and G3, in the lower panels of Table 6.3, we see that for these generations, migration can occur in two directions: from Turkey to EU or from EU to Turkey. Migrants from Europe to Turkey are relatively

Table 6.3 Who becomes a migrant to Europe? (Linear Probability Models). B-coefficients with (absolute) t-statistics

	B	t	B	t	B	t
Dependent variable: G1 is migrant (N = 1,376)						
Intercept	0.848		0.844		0.894	
G0 ISEI	-0.043	2.4	-0.044	3.5	-0.035	2.0
G0 Farmer	-0.075	1.6	-0.071	1.6	-0.043	0.9
G1 Education			0.023	2.0	0.032	2.8
G1 ISEI					-0.057	3.2
G1 Farmer					-0.104	2.7
Dependent variable: G2 is migrant (N = 4,965)						
Intercept	0.295		0.284		0.331	
G1 Education	-0.001	0.2	0.002	0.3	0.001	0.1
G1 ISEI	0.009	1.3	0.011	1.5	0.010	1.4
G1 Farmer	0.038	2.3	0.034	2.0	0.034	2.1
G2 Education			-0.029	3.4	0.026	2.8
G2 ISEI					-0.147	11.8
G2 Farmer					-0.215	9.0
Dependent variable: G3 is migrant (N = 3,329)						
Intercept	0.159		0.166		0.170	
G2 Education	-0.031	3.3	-0.016	1.7	-0.018	1.9
G2 ISEI	-0.025	2.2	-0.018	1.5	-0.013	1.1
G2 Farmer	-0.019	0.9	-0.022	1.0	-0.015	0.7
G3 Education			-0.056	7.9	-0.045	5.5
G3 ISEI					-0.035	3.3
G3 Farmer					-0.085	2.4

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data. Notes: education and ISEI are Z-standardised, Bs for these denote the increase in the probability of being a migrant for a 1 standard deviation change on these variables. Farmer variables are 0/1: the Bs for these variables denote the difference in probability of being a migrant between a farming and non-farming background. All models refer to persons educated in Turkey. Missing values are treated by mean substitution.

rare in these generations, and the migration dummy is dominated by those who migrated from Turkey to Europe, for whom the comparison with non-migrant Turks in Turkey is most relevant. We restrict the sample for these analyses to those who completed their education in Turkey and exclude those who migrated at a young age. For these generations, migrants' dominant motivation and facilitation are very different from those of G1, as in G2 and G3, migration is motivated primarily by family reunion (see also Chapter 4). We are not surprised to find that this influences the selectivity of migrants in these family generations. Unlike G1, G2 and G3 migrants have significantly lower educations than the comparison groups. For G2, we find no effect of the status characteristics (education and occupational status) of G1 for the likelihood of migrating. Instead, G2s own characteristics are strongly associated with the probability of migration and, as we see in Model 3, in a similar way to G1. We see that conditional that they

were rather well qualified for their jobs compared to non-migrants and that these (non-farming) jobs were of lower status than those of non-migrants: a standard deviation increase in occupational status decreases the likelihood of migration by about 14 per cent. At the same time being in farming was negatively linked to migration: with a 20 per cent lower probability of migration for farmers/farm workers. Both these associations are about twice the size of those in G1.

For G3, the estimates all indicate a shift towards negative selection, rather than occupational mismatch. As with G2, G3s education (Model 2) is negatively associated with migration. The negative effect of parental characteristics (G2 education and occupation) in Model 1, can therefore be seen to operate indirectly through lower educational attainment in G3. Moreover, when we turn to Model 3, we see that education and non-farming occupations (ISEI) are both negatively associated with the probability of migration: rather than those who have high education for their occupation, we see that it is those who have low education, even net of occupation who are more likely to migrate. Once again we see the negative association of being in a farming occupation with propensity to migrate. This is therefore a consistent pattern across all three generations. As we discussed in Chapter 4, the overall pattern shows family migrants in the second and third family generations to be more negatively selected than in the first, pioneer generation.

### **Occupational attainment and mobility**

We now turn to occupational attainment and intergenerational transmission (Table 6.4). Analysis of status attainment in first jobs is unambiguous in the G1 generation of ancestors. We can safely assume these jobs were located in Turkey before migration. We find the occupations of migrants to be of slightly lower status than those of non-migrants, reiterating the findings of the preceding analysis. In addition, the ISEI of first jobs is strongly related to father's (G0) occupational status for non-migrants (0.38), significantly less so for migrants. While there is a standard expectation that migration increases social mobility (in terms of lack of association between parents and children), this analysis suggests Turkish guest workers were already occupationally mobile *before* migration. So the pattern speaks instead to the hypothesis that occupational mobility produces migration.

Given the dominance of farm backgrounds, in practice, this means guest workers were recruited from among sons who had already left their father's farm. If we elaborate on this pattern by taking education into account (model 2, in the lower panel of Table 6.4), we see a significantly weaker relationship between education and status in first occupation among migrants. Again, this is in line with the interpretation that the migration decision was disproportionately taken by those who could not find a job matching

Table 6.4 Determinants of status attainment in first occupation by generation, regression coefficients (with t-statistics) on standardised variables

G1: ANCESTOR		G2: MIDDLE		G3: GRANDCHILDREN				
G1 First occupation (N = 1,376)		G2 First occupation (N = 4,444)		G3 First occupation (N = 2,515)				
	B	t	B	t	B	t		
<b>Model 1</b>								
Intercept	0.040	0.7	Intercept	0.100	2.2	Intercept	0.149	2.4
G1 Migrant	-0.055	0.9	G2 Migrant	-0.073	2.6	G3 Migrant	-0.053	1.4
G0 ISEI	0.384	7.8	G1 ISEI	0.321	7.6	G2 ISEI	0.393	6.4
G0 ISEI*G1 Migrant	-0.165	2.8	G1 ISEI* G2 Migrant	-0.086	3.0	G2 ISEI*G3 Migrant	-0.080	1.9
<b>Model 2</b>								
Intercept	0.066	1.3	Intercept	0.144	3.7	Intercept	0.161	3.0
G1 Migrant	-0.089	1.5	G2 Migrant	-0.152	6.1	G3 Migrant	0.077	0.7
G0 ISEI	0.319	6.7	G1 ISEI	0.151	4.1	G2 ISEI	0.085	1.5
G0 ISEI* G1 Migrant	-0.109	1.9	G1 ISEI* G2 Migrant	-0.039	1.6	G2 ISEI*G3 Migrant	0.046	1.2
G1 Education	0.377	8.8	G2 Education	0.806	22.2	G3 Education	0.609	10.8
G1Education*G1 Migrant	-0.187	3.5	G2 Education*G2 Migrant	-0.190	7.9	G3 Education*G3 Migrant	-0.042	1.5

Notes: Education and ISEI variables are z-standardised.

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.



their resources at the time. Note further that the education effect for non-migrants remains modest (0.38). As we will see, education becomes a much stronger predictor of occupational outcomes in the following generations.

At this point it becomes interesting to consider the occupation attainment of the G1 generation in the most recent job (Table 6.5). For G1 there is some ambiguity in interpreting these results as we do not know for certain whether the last job was held in Europe or in Turkey after return migration (for those 70 per cent of G1s who returned at some point). For the moment, we will assume most actually refer to a situation in Europe. We find migrants have gained in occupational status relative to non-migrants (Model 1), though this largely reflects our decision to scale farm occupations at an ISEI rank of 13. In model 2, we see the impact of father's occupation differs strongly between non-migrants and migrants. There is strong social reproduction (0.44) for those who stayed in Turkey, but it is virtually absent for those who migrated. For the international migrants, the effect of the father's occupation is only 0.06 (0.44–0.38) and is not statistically significant. Destinations of guest workers are, therefore, shown to be independent of paternal origins back in Turkey. This finding is both logical – international migration makes migrants socially mobile by loosening them from their parental background – and telling, even if the most recent job, in fact, followed a return to Turkey.

Model 3 shows education makes basically no significant difference to migrants' (or non-migrants') last occupation when we control for first job. Intermediate analysis (not illustrated in Table 6.5) controlling just for education and parental background, showed an influence of education on last job for non-migrants, but this is all absorbed by first job, when we add that to the model. This is because there is enormous continuity between first and most recent jobs for non-migrants: they are essentially in the same occupation, and, therefore, the influence of education has already taken effect at labour market entry (as we see in Table 6.4). For international migrants, there is only a very modest (0.78–0.57) association between first and last job. In sum, we find the G1 migrants to be an extremely socially fluid group, with almost no connection whatsoever between their most recent occupation and the parental occupation, education and occupation in Turkey before migration.

Interpreting the occupational attainment of the middle (G2) generation is more complicated. The middle generation can be non-migrants in both Turkey and in Europe, but also migrants in both directions. Another important issue is whether we regard the 1.5 generation (those who migrated as children) as non-migrants or migrants. A further complication is that this generation is composed of both men and women, and we know the occupational careers of men and women are so different that they cannot meaningfully be merged in one model. We face the additional complication that the data do not allow us to ascertain definitively the country of employment.

Table 6.5 Determinants of status attainment in most recent occupation by generation, regression coefficients (with t-statistics) on standardised variables

G1 Last occupation (N = 1,367)		G2 Last occupation (N = 4,346)	
	B	t	
<b>Model 1</b>			
Intercept	-0.179	3.1	Intercept
G1 Migrant	0.234	3.6	G2 Migrant
<b>Model 2</b>			
Intercept	-0.208	3.7	Intercept
G1 Migrant	0.265	4.2	G2 Migrant
G0 ISEI	0.438	8.6	G1 ISEI
G0 ISEI*G1 Migrant	-0.379	6.3	G1 ISEI12* G2 Migrant
<b>Model 3</b>			
Intercept	-0.237	4.8	Intercept
G1 Migrant	0.293	5.3	G2 Migrant
G0 ISEI	0.133	2.8	G1 ISEI
G0 ISEI*G1 Migrant	-0.126	2.3	G1 ISEI12* G2 Migrant
G1 Education	0.042	1.0	G2 Education
G1 Education* G1 Migrant	0.089	1.7	G2 Education* G2 Migrant
G1 ISEI in first occupation	0.777	16.2	G2 ISEI in first occupation
G1 ISEI first occ* G1 Migrant	-0.572	10.1	G2_ISEI first occ* G2 Migrant
			B
			t
			0.126
			-0.073
			0.121
			-0.076
			0.300
			-0.091
			0.032
			-0.030
			0.002
			-0.003
			0.137
			-0.027
			0.815
			-0.012
			2.6
			2.4
			2.6
			2.5
			6.7
			3.0
			1.3
			1.9
			0.1
			0.2
			4.8
			1.5
			27.7
			0.6

Notes: Education and ISEI variables are z-standardised.

Source: 2000 Families study, proxy data.

Taking all these factors into account, even with a total of around 4,500 cases, we have limited statistical power to make each of the relevant comparisons. For this reason we establish the pooled pattern, merging men and women and migrants and non-migrants of both kinds.

Among our comparison groups, the return migrants are only a small group, and the migrant effect refers to the comparison between Turks who remained in Turkey, and Turks who moved to Europe or were located in Europe from birth or early childhood onwards. From model 1 in Table 6.4, we find migrants have significantly lower occupational status than Turks in Turkey: migration does not pay off for this generation. As for G1, we find G2's migration has loosened the association between father's occupation and a G2 individual's first occupation, although the contrast is not as sharp as it is for G1. It reduces, but does not eliminate, the influence of father's occupation on G2 migrants' first occupation. When we add education to the equation, we find an extremely strong connection between education and first occupation for non-migrants and, to a slightly lesser extent, for migrants as well. The inclusion of education decreases the negative interaction between father's occupation and migrant status, suggesting the weaker association is driven by differences in the association with education.

When we move to most recent occupation (Table 6.5), we see strong continuity between G2's first and current occupation, and for this generation, this does not differ between migrants and non-migrants. Almost all of the dynamics in most recent jobs are covered by occupation status at labour market entry. Given occupation at entry, father's occupation makes no further difference. However, education still has a positive effect, indicating that occupational differences between those with higher and lower levels of education continue to grow throughout the career. For this middle generation, then, migrants overall fare worse in both first and final jobs, but the influence of parental background and one's own educational attainment show parallel processes among both migrants and non-migrants.

Looking at G3, the grandchildren of the original ancestor, we face many of the same difficulties of interpretation as for the second generation. A further complication is that G3 members are, on average, 19 years of age; hence, many have not yet entered the labour market, even though a minority have already completed a substantial part of their careers. We therefore restrict our analysis (Table 6.4) to first jobs to ensure comparability. The results reveal no differences in occupational outcomes between migrants and non-migrants. The contribution of education is equally strong for both and accounts for all the influence of parental occupation. Its magnitude (0.61) compares with that found in other countries. Model 1 still modestly confirms the hypothesis that international migration increases intergenerational mobility, but the difference does not greatly reduce the strong effect of social reproduction. In the third generation, the expected intergenerational pattern is almost fully restored and the experience comparable

across sites, with no specific migration impact. Across generations, education becomes the route by which intergenerational social reproduction is achieved, whether for migrants or their non-migrant counterparts.

## Conclusions

We began the chapter by discussing the extent to which background influences migration and examining the association between migration and occupational attainment. We asked if migration weakens intergenerational transmission of status, and if so, how. We considered the extent to which socio-economic backgrounds shape the likelihood of migration from Turkey to Western Europe. In the next part of the chapter, we explored the extent to which occupational attainment is more or less favourable for different generations of migrants. Finally, we addressed the extent of occupational mobility or social reproduction between migrants and non-migrants.

For the first question under consideration, we find occupational background weakly determines the likelihood of migration of G1. With respect to paternal occupation of the G1 ancestors, we find that sons of fathers with low status occupations are more likely to migrate than sons of fathers with higher status. However, if we take into account the education and occupation of the G1 group before migration, we find an overrepresentation of the relatively higher educated with somewhat lower occupational positions, whereas the (negative) effect of father's occupational status diminishes. That is, the influence of parental background on migration is indirect, via an influence on first occupation. We conclude that the original labour migrants were selected in traditional terms, given their higher education, but our findings additionally suggest that those who migrated were those who could not find appropriate returns to that higher education in the country of origin.

Among subsequent family generations of migrants, migrating is not associated with greater selectivity. Indeed, in terms of educational attainment, these subsequent generations appear negatively selected. This is likely linked to the change in type of migration, moving from 'pioneer' labour migration to family-based migration (see also Chapter 4). Hence, by contrast with the first generation, subsequent generations are less likely to have favourable attributes that, even if not reflected in their own outcomes, shape the outcomes for the subsequent generations. At the same time, among G2 migrants, there is a pattern of occupational mismatch, in that education is higher than for non-migrants in similar occupations, as we saw for G1. Thus G2 appear to show a more hybrid migration pattern than G1 or G3. By G3, the story is overwhelmingly one of negative selection on migration.

Turning to our exploration of the extent to which occupational attainment is favourable for different generations of migrants, for the first generation, we find post-migration occupational outcomes demonstrate significant

gains from migration. This group escapes relatively low occupational positions prior to migration to move upwards in status attainment. Interestingly, though, those in farming occupations are somewhat less likely to migrate than those in other low-status occupations. Even if ultimate destinations are relatively low-status within Western hierarchies, they represent a step up from pre-migration circumstances. These subsequent jobs show little influence of educational attainment, consistent with the difficulty of translating educational attainment into occupational outcomes in a foreign context. Instead, their educational advantage realises gains through the act of migration itself. By contrast, non-migrants' original occupations are linked to their educational attainment, and their subsequent occupational careers are, then, relatively fixed.

For subsequent generations, migration is associated with either negative (G2) or no (G3) occupational gains relative to non-migrants. For the second generation, this negative impact of migration is net of education. That is, not only is this generation more likely to be negatively selected on education, even when we take account of the substantial and significant association of education with occupational status, albeit not as strong as for non-migrants, the act of migration still yields negative returns. This highlights the relevance of migration route, position within family migration process and initial selectivity for understanding outcomes of migrants in their destination contexts. By the third generation (G3), occupational attainment of migrants and non-migrants equalises, with educational attainment an equally key factor in occupational outcomes (cf. Chapter 5).

Finally, we address the extent of occupational mobility or social reproduction between migrants and non-migrants. In line with existing literature, we hypothesised there would be a weaker association between parental origins and occupational outcomes among migrants, and this is, indeed, what we find for G1. Among non-migrants, parental status is an important influence of first job even net of education, and of last job even net of first job, representing a *direct* effect of origin status on outcomes. Among migrants, the association is already weaker for those who subsequently migrated and disappears in relation to post-migration jobs. This suggests social mobility is a consequence of migration, as expected, but in addition, those who are already more socially mobile are more likely to migrate. For G2, we find a lower association between occupational origins and destinations among migrants relative to non-migrants, but the role of parental background, interestingly, remains important, even for migrants. By G3, the impact of migration on enhancing social mobility is barely evident. Moreover, for both, the effect is channelled through educational attainment. Thus, migrants and non-migrants from this generation show similar patterns of social reproduction in their first job, with the effect of parental background being *indirect*, through education.

Overall, then, we find some support for our expectations that migration will both increase upward mobility and reduce the association of parental origins with migrants' own occupational outcomes. But this is most applicable to the first, male, labour migrant generation. They seem to fit a classic pattern of unfulfilled expectations prior to migration, with subsequent post-migration gains and little ongoing role of parental origins or education in their outcomes. The picture for the second and third generation is more complex, partly because the sample is more complicated, combining men and women, as well as those migrating at different stages. However, it suggests that while social reproduction remains important for non-migrants across the generations, it increases in importance for migrants. Combined with educational expansion in Turkey, the differences between migrants and non-migrants in both occupational outcomes by the third generation are negligible. The findings are consistent with research on the lower selectivity of family migrants. At the same time, they indicate that when evaluating the gains from migration, it is important to take account of the reasons why people migrate and the nature of the family flows within which they are embedded.

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# INTERGENERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION

Socio-economic, Family and Cultural Patterns of  
Stability and Change in Turkey and Europe



<b>EMIRDAĞ</b>	<b>9 Km</b>
<b>ANKARA</b>	<b>200 Km</b>
<b>İSTANBUL</b>	<b>441 Km</b>
<b>BERLİN</b>	<b>2579 Km</b>
<b>KOPENHAG</b>	<b>2983 Km</b>
<b>BRÜKSEL</b>	<b>3089 Km</b>
<b>AMSTERDAM</b>	<b>3134 Km</b>
<b>PARİS</b>	<b>3222 Km</b>

